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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QVARTERLY REVIEW

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AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW

JULY 1957

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Vol. 35 JULY 1957 No. 4

BRITISH DEFENSE POLICY

By Sir John Slessor

THE recent British White Paper on Defense has been described as a momentous shift in policy, a radical change in strategic concept, an "agonizing reappraisal." For this the wording of the Paper may itself be partly responsible, with its talk about a revision of the "whole character of the Defense plan" and "the biggest change in military policy ever made in normal times." So perhaps the first thing that should be said about the White Paper is that in fact it is no such thing. It introduces no basic revolution in policy, but merely rationalizes and (probably for the first time) explains in admirably intelligible form tendencies which have long been obvious and policies most of which successive British governments have accepted and urged upon their Allies for some years. This should be qualified in one respect, one on which unfortunately the White Paper itself is least clear and is even ambiguous, namely the nature of the total war envisaged if the deterrent fails to deter.

This is a basic question affecting the function of all three services, though more particularly (but by no means exclusively) that of the Navy. And the fact that it is not squarely faced constitutes to my mind the major element of uncertainty about the British view on strategic policy, an element which seems to have been obscured in the minds of our Allies by other doubts and fears, notably about our attitude to NATO. In one paragraph the White Paper says that reinforcements which would not be ready for action in less than three months would be of little value in nuclear war; in another it says that the nuclear battle might not be immediately decisive and therefore we must be able to defend Atlantic communications against submarine attack. In other words the White Paper to some extent still tries to have it both ways, with the inevitable result that it does not have enough either way.

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A logical strategic policy for the Atlantic Alliance must surely be based on one of two assumptions. The first is that, in the unlikely event of the Great Deterrent failing to prevent total war—which we are all agreed must be the primary aim—we must be ready to fight another prolonged global war. In that event there is no case for basing the "main elements of the Royal Navy upon a small number of carrier groups;" on the contrary, instead of providing modernized surface and air anti-submarine units "on a somewhat reduced scale," they should be provided on a largely *increased* scale in view of the strength of the Russian U-boat fleet; and further, the assumption of a long war certainly provides no basis for such a drastic reduction of the regular Army or for the relegation of its reserves to a purely home defense rôle.

The general impression gained from a careful study of the White Paper is, however, that the British Government inclines to the acceptance of the second alternative assumption, which is that in the event of total war the ultimate weapon would inevitably be used—not necessarily immediately but sooner rather than later—and that therefore such a war could not possibly last more than a matter of weeks, or a few months at most. It must be admitted that the acceptance of such an assumption involves a terrifically heart-searching decision for a nation dependent for its very existence on supply from overseas. And the failure to face it without ambiguity in this White Paper may perhaps be ascribed to a very human inability to forget the background of British history—especially of two world wars in living experience—and to a dogged survival of the "broken-backed war" theory in Churchill's last White Paper of 1954.

At the moment we are having the worst of both worlds; we are certainly not fitting ourselves for a prolonged global war, a sort of modernized version of 1939–45 which I for one find inconceivable in a thermonuclear and missile age; and we are not taking advantage of the economies which would flow from assuming a short war. We could effect economies which would permit us, not to reduce the over-all allocation of our resources to the fighting services, but to apportion them more in accordance with the real requirements of modern strategy, particularly by the avoidance of such dangerous reductions in the strength of the Army.

Nevertheless, the facts of life must be faced and the decision must be made, not only by Britain but by her Allies, more par-

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ticularly by the United States. It is not one which can be made alone by one member of the Alliance. The White Paper itself states bluntly the truth which should have been evident for years, that "the defense of Britain is possible only as part of the collective defense of the free world." (The same, by the way, can and should be said with equal truth and bluntness of the United States.) There are many in Britain who share the dissatisfaction widely expressed among our Allies at the lack of adequate consultation before publication of the White Paper (though it must be admitted that the United States does not habitually consult us on such matters). That may in part be due to a failure in public relations policy; much misunderstanding might have been avoided by careful explanatory briefing of the press and other organs of public opinion by our ambassadors in Allied capitals. In spite of the somewhat hurried final stages of the preparation of the Paper, this should have been perfectly simple to arrange. It is true that the whole thing was necessarily somewhat hurried by exigencies of the British parliamentary system; the White Paper had to precede the Budget, which has to be submitted to Parliament early in April, and Mr. Macmillan's Government had by then been in power for so short a period as to make extended consultation with our Allies very difficult, to say the least.

Also, it may be pointed out that on a number of occasions in the past two years the need for a radical review of the NATO defense effort has been urged upon our Allies by the Foreign Secretary as well as by Mr. Macmillan himself as Chancellor; no doubt our intentions were disclosed to the President in Bermuda; and in at least some aspects they were discussed with the Supreme Commander and with our Allies in the Western European Union, in connection with the proposed reductions in the British forces in Germany. It is none the less difficult to feel satisfied that the principle of consultation within the Atlantic Alliance was observed as it should have been. The Atlantic Council has never been used as it was intended to be used when it was reconstituted at Lisbon in 1952; and we do not yet seem to have taken advantage of the new system of consultation within NATO proposed by the Lange-Pearson-Martino Committee. As between Britain and America there has been a deterioration in the arrangements for mutual consultation in recent years, and the valuable habit of informal discussions in the politico-military field established

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during the Korean War has fallen into disuse since the accession of Mr. Dulles to the State Department—a fact which both our countries have reason to regret in the light of recent experience.

All that having been said, it remains somewhat surprising to anyone at all familiar with the trend of British thinking on strategic policy in recent years that this White Paper should have created such a stir among our Allies. Its basic tenets are nothing new. The emphasis on the importance of NATO; priority for the prevention of war by an effective deterrent to which Britain must make her contribution; the tendency for expenditure on the Army to decline; the need to be able to undertake limited operations to resist local aggression and protect Allied and British interests in the Middle and Far East; the possibility of the use of tactical atomic weapons in limited war; the importance of the guided missile; the need for a strategic reserve capable of rapid transportation in an emergency—all these have figured in pronouncements on British defense policy since the Statement on Defense in 1954, and even earlier. The general policy in its broad fundamentals is virtually the same as that discussed by the British Chiefs of Staff with their American colleagues in 1952, which had at least a significant influence on the formulation of the so-called New Look in United States defense policy in 1953. And the inescapable truth that British military capability is conditioned by the economic factor, particularly by the balance of payments and the strength of our gold and dollar reserves, was stated in no uncertain terms by Mr. Eden to the Atlantic Council at their Lisbon meeting in 1952.

The economic factor was among the reasons for what is perhaps the most sensational feature of the White Paper—the decision to plan on the basis that compulsory National Service will come to an end in 1962. There are those in Britain who take the somewhat cynical view that this decision was determined more by electoral than strategic or even economic considerations, and are skeptical of the validity of the claim that Britain cannot afford to be strong. They remember the days when, little over a year before the outbreak of World War II, the material basis of British defense planning was a ruling by the government of the day that this country could not afford more than £300,000,000 a year *for all three services* over the five years 1937 to 1941—this at a time when it was known that the Germans were spending more than three times that amount. And they reflect with some

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bitterness upon the number of millions a year we had to pay in the ten years after 1939 for the luxury of being weak *in* 1939. This appeal to economics is a hand that can be overcalled.

However, it would be foolish to deny that, in the words of the White Paper, "the claims of military expenditure should be considered in conjunction with the need to maintain the country's financial and economic strength." This economic limitation is not confined to Britain. In his article in the April issue of *Foreign Affairs,* Henry Kissinger refers to "the predominant rôle played [in America] by fiscal considerations in setting force levels." We in Britain have to look particularly to our export trade, which makes heavy demands on some sections of the economy which are also essential to the defense program, such as the metal-using industries. Our economy narrowly survived the appalling strain of more than ten years of total war in little more than a generation; and to arm ourselves into bankruptcy would merely play into the hands of the Communist enemy and destroy our ability to serve as a worthwhile ally.

It is for government to decide what proportion of the nation's resources, including manpower, can be allocated to defense and it is for the Chiefs of Staff to advise how best, within that mandatory ceiling, those resources can be apportioned to meet the commitments laid upon them by government policy. It should be noted that in the debate in Parliament on the White Paper the Government rightly refrained from any implication that the extent of the reductions involved had the agreement of the Chiefs of Staff. Assuming the reductions were determined by economic factors alone (an assumption which some find it hard to accept), it is difficult to suggest how the available resources could be better allocated—except by facing and accepting the logical conclusions of the basic decision already referred to. But it is difficult to convince oneself that, within a total of 375,000 uniformed personnel (excluding the Ghurka division and Colonial troops), the Army can adequately play its part in the two main tasks accepted for the British armed forces within our various alliances—namely deterring and resisting aggression, and the protection of British overseas interests and limited operations in overseas emergencies.

It is the abolition of conscription—or rather the declared aim to abolish it in five years' time—that is the most questionable feature of the White Paper and one which is liable to have the most serious repercussions in Allied countries. No one will chal-

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lenge the claim that in today's changed circumstances, consequent upon the withdrawal from Egypt and the liquidation of other overseas commitments, Britain could discharge her responsibilities to herself and her Allies with substantially smaller forces than the 690,000 United Kingdom personnel now under arms. But the White Paper does not attempt to assert specifically that those responsibilities can be discharged in full with only 375,000 men. That clearly is only the number which, on the most optimistic estimate, it is considered might be obtained on a system of voluntary enlistment. Whether or not such a number of volunteers can in fact be obtained is, to say the least, open to doubt—a doubt from which evidently the Government itself is not wholly free; past history is not very encouraging in that respect, and the White Paper does face the possibility of "some limited form of compulsory service" if the gap between requirements and voluntary recruiting can not be bridged. The Royal Navy and the R.A.F. should be able to attract their share of the necessary regular recruits; for the Army it is much more doubtful. No one would question that it would be far more satisfactory if the number of men really necessary could be found by a system of voluntary regular service. The present combination of the voluntary principle with compulsory service has many disadvantages; and conscription, even for two years, is grossly wasteful in manpower; of the 690,000 men now in the three services no less than 150,000 (or about 21 percent) are instructors or men under training, and the period of productive service is so short that the young soldier is just becoming really useful when his time is up and he goes to the Reserve. But even if the voluntary recruits are forthcoming, the numbers to which the Army will be limited within the over-all total are so low that we shall have to be extremely selective in allotting priorities to the tasks of the Army, and may be compelled to take certain risks which would be little less desirable to our Allies than to ourselves.

This is so much the key of the matter that it must be discussed in more detail. For provided the policy is sound, it is surprising what can be done with relatively small numbers.

The major individual commitment of the British Army is its contribution to General Norstad's NATO screen in Europe. The very first sentence of the White Paper reads, "As previous Statements on Defense have emphasized, British defense policy is determined by her obligation to make her contribution to NATO

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and other Alliances for collective defense." It is unfortunate, though understandable, that the effect of this clear declaration is weakened by the announcement later in the Paper of the intention to reduce our land and air forces in Germany. Actually, even after these reductions have taken effect, the British Army of the Rhine will remain by far the biggest individual commitment of the Army. There is no question of Britain weakening in her resolve to play her full part in the resistance to aggression in Europe, which is vital to her own safety. And no doubt it is the intention that our full four divisions shall be available if it comes to war, even though they may not all be stationed in Germany. There are, however, political or psychological reasons of first importance for the British maintaining their four-divisional share of Norstad's 30 divisions, and it is to be hoped that we shall do so even if the divisions are not maintained at full strength in peacetime. The difficulty is one of the balance of payments—the practical one of actually paying in gold or hard currency for maintaining large forces in Germany in the absence of support cost payments. This is surely a difficulty which it should not be beyond the wit of men to resolve within the Grand Alliance. For example, the possibility suggests itself that some financial adjustment be made between payments by Britain for her forces in Germany and the far greater expenditure by the United States for the maintenance of American forces in the United Kingdom.

But the real issue transcends this in importance, and is one of strategic policy, harking back again to the basic question referred to in the opening paragraphs of this article. The real issue is what should be the function—or, in American terms, the rôles and missions—of the British Army. As far as the forces in Europe are concerned, that is to ask what are the rôle and mission of the forces under SHAPE? On this point it seems clear from the White Paper that in the view of the British Government it is *not* to fight another prolonged war in Europe beginning with a modernized version of the 1940 campaign. To some the rather unfortunate word "tripwire" suggests that the function of General Norstad's forces is to provide a façade, a thin red line, "there to be overrun" so to speak, thus touching off the nuclear deluge upon Moscow, Stalingrad and points east. This is a demonstrably fantastic conception. The true function of the NATO screen is indeed primarily to avoid just that, to stand between the hydrogen bomb and the frontier policeman, to act as a fire brigade

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to smother the small local conflagration or frontier coup, to ensure that we do not find ourselves again faced with the treacherous *fait accompli;* finally to ensure that, in the almost inconceivable event of the Kremlin embarking on the desperate gamble of an attack on Western Europe, it will have to marshal such massive force as to make it unmistakably clear that this is war to the death and to remove all inhibitions, including, it is to be hoped, the fear of suicide. If we are not prepared in the very ultimate resort to accept the possibility of suicide to avert the certainty of annihilation—then we are lost. I for one see no superior attraction in being disembowelled by a Russian bayonet or pounded to death by V-2 missiles deployed along the Channel coast, rather than risk extinction by the hydrogen bomb.

The point is, what sort of forces do we need for this function? And the answer to this question provides the clue to the manner in which a relatively small British Army—and other Allied armies for that matter—if properly organized, equipped and trained, can meet our true needs and our obligations to our Allies. If this massive assault ever did take place, it is impossible to believe that it could be held up for more than a very limited period, even with the help of tactical atomic weapons, against an overwhelmingly superior enemy armed with those same weapons. I view with anxiety the tendency of SHAPE to rely increasingly on nuclear weapons. My fear is that the armies of the Alliance will absorb a quite unjustifiable proportion of their resources in material and manpower by equipping themselves with weapons that they may never be able to use, either in Europe or in localized wars elsewere. I think they will make a great mistake if they modernize and "futurize" themselves too much. No doubt some limited tactical atomic capacity is necessary for them as part of the deterrent, but it should be strictly limited, and to my mind it is ludicrous for an army to pretend—as the American Army does—that a 1,500-mile missile is essential for the performance of its mission. For their true mission the armies unquestionably need armor; but their main requirement is for very mobile, very highly trained infantry, well equipped with anti-tank weapons—backed in Germany by a highly trained German semi-static home guard with the same weapons. In other words, the proper job of the armies is to provide really good conventional soldiers; for these will always be indispensable whatever kind of operations we may have to undertake; the army will retain quite enough prestige

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without wasting its energy and resources on the modernities like missiles and heavy helicopters and atomic artillery.

It is to be hoped that not only the British but also in particular the German Army will accept this truth. There is at present an understandable feeling that for one member of an alliance to be denied these modern gadgets is rather like being a member of a club who is not allowed access to the bar. The Germans are superb conventional soldiers and, if it is realized that these represent the primary requirement of the Allied land forces, that should reconcile them to being without atomic weapons.

The second of the two main tasks for the British armed forces, according to the White Paper, is "to defend British colonies and protected territories against local attack, and undertake limited operations in overseas emergencies," and the Paper goes on to refer to our commitments in the Middle and Far East, our obligations under the Baghdad and Manila treaties, and the need to be able to reinforce local garrisons from an air-borne central reserve. Our much reduced Army will indeed be hard put to it to meet all these commitments in addition to our first priority, the contribution to NATO in Europe. And we must look to our Allies for political help in reducing them, by such means as a NATO solution of the Cyprus problem. Also, perhaps as part of a package deal in the Far East, Hong Kong could be made an international port with a United Nations force—including, of course, a British contingent—to preserve internal security. But it is fortunate that, as far as the Army is concerned, these limited local operations pose the same desiderata as those outlined above for the NATO forces in Europe—indeed more so. The free world suffers from a built-in handicap, that to take part at all in limited wars in Asia or Africa its forces have to be transported overseas. This involves dependence upon ports at the far end, and on great concrete runways which are as vulnerable as ports to an enemy equipped with modern aircraft, especially with atomic weapons. This handicap must and can be surmounted, but not by forces requiring thousands of tons of fuel and ammunition and huge fleets of motor vehicles to enable them to operate at all. For these sorts of operations the organization of armies should be more akin to that of the old Punjab Frontier Force, or the Frontier Irregular Corps who went cheerfully to war on foot, with a rifle, a couple of bandoliers, a bag of raisins, a *chupatti* or two and a water-bottle. In other words here again the require-

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ment above everything else is for very mobile, very highly trained infantry.

They must, of course, be provided with air cover and support, a function not only of long-range shore-based aircraft but also—as laid down in the White Paper—of the carrier task forces of the Navy. And this raises a question which again is not specifically answered in this White Paper but is exercising the minds of many people on both sides of the Atlantic, namely whether limited war can be kept limited and if so how, with special reference to the employment of atomic weapons. The White Paper of 1956 said that "the possible use of nuclear weapons cannot be excluded" in limited wars; the present Paper merely implies that they may be used, by referring to bomber squadrons based in Cyprus "capable of delivering nuclear weapons," in connection with our obligations under the Baghdad Pact. It is, I think, unfortunate that a clearer lead was not given on this crucially important problem. I do not go along with the advocates of "graduated deterrence"—we often confuse issues by using long words to describe a quite simple thing which, in this case, is the age-old principle that in any form of military operations you use that degree of force necessary to achieve your object, and no more. It may well be that in another limited war the methods and scope of the force employed will be limited by a sort of mutual unwritten agreement—as they were in Korea—if it suits both sides. And in an earlier article in these pages[1] I put forward the possibility of applying the old R.A.F. method of the "prescribed area"—a method evidently visualized also by Dr. Kissinger when he says that "sanctuary areas immune to attack will be almost essential." Beyond this it does not seem to me either practicable or profitable to attempt, even by unilateral declaration of intent, to define limitations in advance, certainly not by specifying limits to the size of bombs or the nature of targets. It is not this sort of thing that will determine whether or not a war remains limited, but whether or not the issue is really vital to either side; in other words, the aim of the war and whether either side can accept failure to achieve the aim for which it is fighting—whether (in Dr. Kissinger's words) "one of the protagonists prefers a limited defeat to an additional commitment of resources." It should go without saying that, in accordance with the age-old principle just quoted, we should exhaust every possible conventional means

[1] "Air Power and World Strategy," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1954.

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of achieving our aim—which in broad general terms will be limited to halting aggression, driving the aggressor back behind his own frontiers and inflicting such punishment as to make further aggression clearly unprofitable. But it would be the height of folly to commit ourselves in advance not to use low-yield atomic weapons in any circumstances. It is by no means necessarily true that (the words of another contributor to this review) "the last extremity, which involves the survival of the losing side, is ruled out by the nature of limited war."[2] An attack on the Middle East, for instance, might initially take the form of a limited war on the Korean model; failure to secure our vital interests in that area, notably of course the oil on which the economy of Europe and the mobility of NATO depend, would ultimately be fatal to the free world; the Communists on the other hand could accept limited defeat in that area without fatal results to themselves.

So I think it would have helped to clear the minds of our friends and to deter potential limited aggressors if the White Paper had included a positive statement to the effect that we shall meet aggression wherever it occurs with that degree of force necessary to defeat it, including, if necessary, with nuclear weapons—and left it at that.

The reduction in the size of the British Army, and to a lesser extent the Air Force, does not mean that we cannot make an effective contribution in a limited war. It does not even mean we could not carry through a small local war on our own—the Suez Canal Zone, for instance, could have been seized by a very small force if the operation had not been stopped by external pressures not related to military action. But the White Paper emphasizes that the conception of collective defense is the basis of all our alliances. The days of "gunboat diplomacy" are gone forever, whether we like it or not. But unfortunately in the world we live in all diplomacy is powerless if it is clear to everyone that force will never be used in any circumstances to right a wrong, even after every resource of economic and political pressure has been exhausted, except possibly with the approval of the United Nations in the event of open invasion across a frontier by an unmistakably Communist army. A major source of disquiet among America's Allies in recent months has been the growing impression that United States foreign policy, if it

[2] "Nuclear Plenty and Limited War," by James E. King, Jr., *Foreign Affairs*, January 1957.

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means anything, means just that—an impression, which it may be hoped, may be removed by recent events in the eastern Mediterranean. To say that we cannot possibly go it alone (a fact that should have been obvious before the Suez folly) does not necessarily mean that American forces must participate actively in every local fracas. It does mean we must have a common policy, for which many of us have been pleading for years, notably, but not only, in the Middle East; that we must have prior consultation before action, the lack of which in October 1956 can by no means be blamed on the British and French alone; and that the United States must at least be ready to hold the ring—as, in a way, they showed themselves prepared to do by General Gruenther's riposte to the Russian threat to rocket England during the Suez crisis.

An impression which has caused some concern among our Continental Allies, and which unfortunately has been fostered by some pronouncements by Opposition Members of Parliament, is that the White Paper means we are concentrating on the nuclear deterrent, thereby reducing our ability to support our Allies. As a matter of fact that is nonsense. The British bomber force is itself suffering certain reductions; and the nuclear weapons together with their means of delivery absorb only about half a crown in the defense pound sterling—say 12 cents in the dollar. And quite apart from their share in the Allied retaliatory deterrent, the British bomber forces constitute a very important contribution to the strength of NATO and to our capacity to take part in limited war in support of our alliances overseas. In the United Kingdom itself public opinion has perhaps been most startled, though not thrown off its sense of proportion, by the open admission that "there is at present no means of providing adequate protection for the people of this country against the consequences of attack by nuclear weapons." But there is nothing new about that—it has been obvious to thinking people for years. And it is merely silly to condemn it as defeatism. It is no such thing but merely a sensible appraisal of the facts; and if it is true of the small area of the United Kingdom, how much more strongly does it apply to the vast area of Russia? Can anyone seriously imagine that *that* is defensible?

Finally the White Paper seems to have given rise to the quite unjustified impression, not so much perhaps among our Allies as in our own services, that push-button warfare is just round

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the corner and that it is only a matter of a few years before manned military aircraft are entirely superseded by guided missiles. That again is nonsense. The missile will of course supplement—and in some specialized fields perhaps replace—the conventional airplane, when it is a really practical, present-day, working proposition and available in sufficient numbers. That day is not yet. Fortunately in the air forces it is easier than in the other services to adjust the tempo of change and progress to the realities of scientific and technical development. Though we have cancelled the contract for a supersonic bomber, it is much too early to assume that it will not be replaced by another of a more futuristic and sophisticated design. Similarly it is far from certain that the R.A.F. will not have to have another fighter after the P-1—perhaps by purchase from America to ease the strain on our own limited resources in scientific and technical manpower. I cannot foresee the day when the manned airplane ceases to play an important part in the air forces of the world.

Collective defense is as essential to the United States as to Europe. The idea of Fortress America is as idiotically out-of-date today as that of Fortress Britain was 20 years ago. It is vital to the United States that it should continually foster and build up its system of alliances and maintain the balance of power in the world, as Britain did for centuries in Europe. And in that process it should not be diverted or thrown off balance by relatively minor fluctuations in the strength of its smaller Allies.

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EDUCATION AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST

By Henry M. Wriston

THE profound involvement of the United States in world affairs raises many domestic questions, some at levels of deep significance. One, anxiously propounded, inquires regarding the adequacy of our education, both quantitative and qualitative, for our international responsibilities.

Though not generally differentiated, a number of quite different issues are involved in the question. One such is the cold war, now a decade old; many feel that education should take its direction from this central international reality. They believe the national interest is so deeply involved that it should be the dominant factor in determining the content and emphasis of our educational system. On this assumption, there is an eager demand to know whether we are turning out enough, and adequately trained, experts in a wide range of skills essential to "success" in the cold war. The varieties of expertness required for international effectiveness are many: legal, economic, political, linguistic, scientific, engineering, cultural and communication skills are all in demand. From the point of view of the national interest, all these seem to critics to be in very short supply. There are equal, and sometimes greater, doubts about another fundamental: the adequacy and quality of general education for international affairs. Are bachelors of arts and sciences ready to meet the citizen's obligation and participate effectively in shaping public opinion on world questions?

The most common measure of adequacy currently employed is the relationship between our educational product and that of the Soviets. Recently there has been an obsession with what the Russians are doing. In a report to the President, members of a special interdepartmental committee expressed their concern in these words: "Science and engineering have made such remarkable progress in recent decades that *the nation which holds the lead in those fields holds the initiative in world affairs*. Only at our great peril could we risk having leadership in basic and applied technology pass into the hands of our potential enemies." (Italics supplied.) This tone reflects a sharp reaction from earlier scorn of qualitative progress in the Soviets. For example, we badly

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underestimated their "mechanical ability;" it was said *ad nauseam* that Russian boys were not accustomed to strip and reassemble a jalopy, and that, as a consequence, Russia could not build and maintain an industrial society.

The superficiality, indeed the folly, of that misestimate of 30 years ago is now clear. Reacting from such extremes, we now tend to overestimate the Soviet Union just as badly, and feverishly seek to recruit scientists and engineers, not on the valid basis of fundamental interests and tastes, but to "keep abreast of the Russians." The educational program is judged in terms of a contemporary estimate of national security instead of the proper central objective in a free society—individual development. Again and again we are reminded that the Russian educational system is specifically designed, organized and operated for the purpose of serving the national interest. This, we are repeatedly told, is one of the "advantages" of the totalitarians.

In these circumstances, the questions usually posed are whether or not we are doing as much as the Russians, or doing what we do as well as they. As is usual, the mood of the moment can be "validated;" a flood of statistics is produced to convince us that we are doing neither so much nor so well. It is pointed out that Russian children go to school six days a week, ten months in the year. They are pressed harder to learn; they study under rigid discipline; more achievement is expected of them. Competition to gain the benefits of higher education—all at public expense—is exceedingly keen. Sardonic stress is put upon a contrast in emphasis in matters of education. We live in a free, competitive society; yet competition, so conspicuous in many aspects of our lives, has been virtually abolished in education. That is why, we are told, the competitive spirit, banned from the classroom, has become so keen in athletics. In the Soviets, on the other hand, the economy is not founded upon competition, but on central planning and direction. Education, however, is fiercely competitive: students know that progress upward is dependent upon superior attainment and they exert themselves accordingly.

In the Soviet Union, students are accustomed to far more rigorous examination procedures than are common in the American educational system. In the United States, many enter college without ever having faced a long, searching examination. Soviet university students, therefore, are said to know more when they enroll, to study more intensively during their undergraduate

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years, and to be better equipped when they have completed their formal education.

So far as quantity is concerned, the Soviets are turning out more "engineers" than are we; often it is asserted that they are graduating at least twice as many. They are also training more "scientists." It is constantly brought home to us, also, that when Soviet citizens are sent abroad on diplomatic or technical missions they have had longer and better training in languages, in cultural appreciation, and in other aspects of education relevant to international service. No one who has the capacity, the will, and is ready to submit to the harsh political discipline of Communism, is denied the opportunity to fulfill his highest ambition for specialized training. If he succeeds in his university work, he can look forward to certain employment, to distinctive social status, and unusually favorable financial recompense. If the process is not democratic in the sense that we understand the word, at least it is based upon equal opportunity without prejudice of birth, parental occupation or other irrelevance—save political conformity.

So runs the argument. The inference is that if the race is to the swift, the Soviets are surely winning it. If weight of numbers is to be decisive, the advantage lies increasingly with them. If thoroughness and expertness are the touchstones, it is agreed that Russia is producing first-class engineers, scientists, technicians of many kinds. That the best of them can do work of the highest calibre is made manifest in the scientific and technical publications which find their way to the West. It is even asserted that Soviet scientists are given more freedom to publish in some "sensitive" fields than many American research scholars, whose work is often blanketed under unnecessarily tight "security" arrangements. Soviet diplomatic skills are evidenced in the United Nations; American officials from several departments and agencies serving abroad are struck with the adaptability of Soviet representatives in many parts of the world.

In current comment the debit side of the Russian educational ledger is not heavily stressed. Yet it needs to be kept in mind. That serious unhappiness and unrest exist among Russian students is indubitable. The assumption, long accepted here as well as there, that perpetual and consistent indoctrination will condition the responses of students and effectively eliminate doubts and questionings has not been borne out in practice. The rôle of

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students in the uprisings in Hungary and elsewhere makes the point explicit. Stubborn faith that the educative process will ultimately defeat efforts to confine it finds supporting evidence in the satellites, as well as in Russia itself.

When scholarly pursuits are carried to the higher levels, when the mind is challenged to new insights in science, to fresh boldness in technology, to appreciation of other languages and cultures, the inescapable result is to stimulate men and women to think for themselves. When Soviet-trained experts are sent abroad they see for themselves how false have been many of the stereotypes of the West which have been stressed in their school years.

Originality cannot be trammeled into official channels; this basic truth should be enough, by itself alone, to suggest the folly of shaping the content and emphasis of education to conformity with an officially defined "national interest." Opening higher education to more and more youth is like opening Pandora's box; while some wills can be curbed and many skills controlled, the human spirit is such that the more original and constructive individuals will seek freedom, not merely as one satisfaction among many, but as an absolute necessity. The very scope and sweep of the Russian educational effort may well hasten the evolution in the Soviet system for which we all hope.

In any event, it does not make sense to count noses of graduates and treat the resultant figure as a reliable index of growing strength or increasing weakness in the specific field tested. Many who are called "engineers" in one country might be called "draughtsmen" in another; labels never accurately reflect the content of education; for comparative purposes as between two disparate societies they are totally unreliable. Far more important than crude numbers is the use to which experts are put. The United States uses a very large percentage of its trained personnel in the production of consumer goods; the Soviets virtually starve consumer industries of such personnel. If we are considering the "usefulness" of expert training for employment in international affairs, the distribution of trained talent is more significant than the raw numbers produced.

More important still is the degree to which experts persist in their occupational commitment. It is said that by the time they are 15 or 20 years out of the universities perhaps two-thirds of the Americans classed as "scientists" or "engineers" have shifted their occupations to posts where their technical training is not of

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immediate use. That is one of the characteristics of a free society; a man is free to choose his vocation not only at the beginning of his career, but at any stage thereafter. Continuance or change may be motivated by an almost infinite number of factors. So long as so large a proportion of specially trained men and women leave the area of their expertness, it is hard to make a convincing case that there is a serious "shortage." It indicates, at the very least, that the best attack on the problem does not lie in producing more people with a superficial or unstable vocational commitment.

High-pressure campaigns to recruit students for scientific—or any other—careers in order to serve the national interest may merely increase the number who later become dissatisfied with their impulsive choices and leave the fields in which they were trained in search of more congenial or more financially rewarding occupations. Any attempt to alter these situations by legislative and administrative action would constitute a revolution in American life. Even before the lapse of time which brings disillusionment to so many persons with specialized skills, large numbers of them are at work which does not fully—or even significantly—employ those skills. A great deal of specialized training is used inefficiently or wasted as a result of inadequate job analyses and poor personnel techniques.

We have no reliable information with regard to either of these two situations in Russia; we do not know how fully their available skills are exploited or how large a percentage persist in their specialized lines of endeavor. The lack makes comparisons almost, if not quite, worthless. In most recent discussion it has been taken for granted that the Soviets do better in these respects than we do, but solid evidence to support the assumption has not been forthcoming.

Part of the American thesis is that, even tested by the national interest, the free and voluntary acts of individuals will, in the long run, lead to more productivity and better results than the directed activities of people, however well-trained, who must be politically obedient and do as they are told, accepting assignments which may be distasteful. It must be conceded that we do not have objective proof that this is true in the short run; the totalitarians, whatever the color of their shirts—black, brown or red—have had striking successes in diplomacy, in finance, in manufacture, in technological and scientific progress.

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It seems likely that where men have never known freedom, as in Russia, and where the state has always had a dominant place in education, the adverse results of directed activity are not nearly so serious as we who take freedom for granted would expect. Count Sforza, in exile from Fascist Italy, like others who fled Hitler's Germany, lamented the readiness of intellectuals of many sorts to knuckle under to dictators and serve totalitarian states with fidelity and skill.

The traditions of education in this country where official control has been almost unknown evoke a different reaction. This is why loyalty clearances, and the uproar over persons who have been denied such clearance, have produced an adverse effect upon the readiness of scholars, students of diplomacy, linguists, scientists and technologists at the higher levels to turn their energies to government programs.

Freedom, voluntarism and self-direction are settled habits with us. When customary modes of work and thought are disrupted by the injection of political questions, the results are adverse. When the availability of individuals for government service is obstructed by over-elaborate loyalty and security procedures, many men, accustomed to the free atmosphere of universities, are repelled. The type of school required for specialists in cultural, linguistic, economic, political and communications fields has long set its own patterns of work and standards of accomplishment without governmental monitoring; when that appears, it is found exceedingly irksome. So long as individuals have complete freedom of choice as to the direction of their energies, they will tend to seek posts where their employment will not be postponed for months waiting clearance, where they do not have to be concerned lest some word misunderstood, or some earlier association, can be exploited to their perpetual embarrassment.

On the other hand, Russians who have accepted political conformity as the price of specialized education, who go to universities in the expectation of accepting direction after graduation, do not have the same resistance to the management of their careers as do Americans. This is the more true inasmuch as other avenues of employment do not stand wide open to them as is the case of specialists in this country.

Even in this matter, however, we should be wary of confusing the short run with the long pull. Over-long as the tenure of the totalitarians seemed to us, the black-shirt and brown-shirt dic-

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tators did not last long enough to test the ultimate consequences. And the red totalitarians have only relatively recently been accelerating their educational programs and sending large numbers of experts abroad; we do not yet have conclusive evidence that Soviet faith in directed effort will succeed, just as we do not have definitive proof that our confidence in freedom will be fully vindicated in this particular area. However, there is much positive strength in our educational tradition. The base upon which higher education rests is broader in the United States than in any other nation in the world, including the Soviet Union. If, under our system, we do not subject the young student to rigid discipline and such urgent pressure to learn, much is done outside school to stir his imagination, to encourage self-reliance, to stimulate originality and individuality of approach.

Undisciplined election of subjects is predicated upon the assumption that the fruits of free minds are both more varied and more valuable than the products of like minds moving under rigid control. Again and again foreign visitors testify to the superior responsiveness of American students. Coming to the United States in a highly critical frame of mind, they not infrequently comment upon the eagerness, the critical temper and the self-reliance of American students. Educators have long held that these qualities constitute a vast natural resource.

This much more can be said: there is almost no special skill, of whatsoever kind, that cannot be developed in some institution within the United States. Where such training is given, the facilities of library and laboratory and the availability of competent instruction cannot be matched anywhere else in the world. This applies to linguistic, literary and cultural subjects, to economics, politics, history, philosophy, as well as to science and technology. The range, the depth and the quality of specialized training available at some institution, or in many, are no less than astounding.

The size of the United States, the enormous variety in the patterns of institutions of higher education—in how they are controlled and supported, in their equipment and standards—sometimes make it difficult to identify precisely the place where the individual can best fulfill his intellectual and vocational objectives. Nevertheless, so far as concerns the acquisition of expertness in almost any imaginable field which can be of national service, the graduate departments of our universities can meet the demands put upon them.

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Limitation upon the numbers of highly trained individuals does not arise primarily from lack of facilities or space or equipment. Naturally every institution is ambitious—and rightly—to have larger quarters and better equipment and more books. In their clamor for these desirable things they often make it appear that what they now have is "totally inadequate." By utopian standards, to which every good institution aspires, it is. In comparison with the rest of the world, however, the standards of university living are as superior as other phases of our living standards. More important than any physical lacks, so far as producing specialists is concerned, are deficiencies arising from inadequate preparation of applicants for admission. That difficulty begins long before the universities have any direct responsibility.

II

This leads to the consideration of another basic question, namely, whether we are supplying our society with college graduates who possess the knowledge, the point of view and the mental approach to international relations which will make them good citizens of the world as well as of the United States.

Basic to any useful thought about this matter is the remembrance that education is, in two senses, a long-term enterprise; programs to deal with fundamental national interests cannot be extemporized. In the first place, what the student can do in college depends, to a large extent, upon his earlier experience. Decisions taken inconspicuously and separately in a great many places affect that experience; in many instances they are not observable until years later. In the second place, the value for citizenship of what a student gets out of his undergraduate years does not become apparent in any decisive way for another 10 to 20 years when his personal responsibilities have come to maturity. Taking these two factors into consideration, there may be a lag of 20 to 30 years before trends and their consequences are perfectly clear. This is why crisis psychology and crash programs, to which we are so prone, do not constitute a wise approach to cold war problems.

Current confusions and frustrations are the fruit of old misestimates as to what needed to be known. Decisions made long ago with almost no public notice have produced some seriously adverse consequences. The damage done cannot be repaired in an instant; "intensive" programs, so often suggested to "cure"

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some deficiency, are bound to fail. This point is so fundamental that some background is desirable.

In the year 1940 an impressive list of names associated with education was attached to a pamphlet published by the American Council on Education, the most widely recognized organization dealing with the total educational program. It was called *What the High Schools Ought to Teach*. Its substance was of great importance; its tone was even more significant. It regretted even the modest amount of mathematics taught, and even the teaching of English, on the extraordinary ground that these were "difficult" subjects. They were described as "stumbling blocks;" insistence upon meeting standards of lucid and effective English and upon reasonable mathematical literacy had the effect of driving students out of school and thus were undesirable. The study of foreign languages was seriously deprecated; a "course in general language" was suggested as a substitute. As for science, "only a few pupils need advanced mathematical physics." Every established study had to face a "pragmatic" test: "What's the good of it?" All too often the "good" had to be tangible and marketable.

The pamphlet was saturated with the dejected spirit engendered by the depression. At that time, it was held that Hitler's rise was aided by people educated beyond their opportunities; many saw a like situation coming to dominate American education. There were not only "too many" engineers and scientists; too many young people were going to college. High school had been raising too many "white-collar" hopes; fear was expressed lest in the backwash of unemployment youth become disillusioned with the American system and fall prey to Fascism. In "the statistification of a mood," figures were produced to "prove" that we faced a dangerous intellectual glut. This mood prevailed long after the depression which occasioned it was gone. As late as the spring of 1950, government statistics led to a prediction that only half the graduating engineers would find employment; thereupon applications for admission in that field fell off sharply. At the same time it was "proved" that there was a "surplus" of high school teachers. Transient situations were projected into the future.

The pamphlet on *What the High Schools Ought to Teach* did not raise a storm because it was not nearly so much a new program as a rationalization of what had already been spreading through the school systems during the depression. When the

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Second World War ensued, it was discovered, to the horror of the armed forces, that the level of mathematical literacy was far lower than it ought to be. The reason lay in the persuasiveness of the point of view expressed in a pamphlet of which the public had heard little or nothing. Mathematical requirements had been whittled down so far as to produce results adverse to the national interest, not to speak of the intellectual impoverishment of unnumbered individuals. The pamphlet which symbolized and stimulated this drift failed to lay emphasis upon the almost magical effect which better teaching could have produced both in the use of our mother tongue and in one of the most precise instruments of human thought. All its emphases were negative; small wonder the consequences were also negative.

Furthermore, a slogan was current a quarter of a century ago: "The failure of the student is the failure of the teacher." This crisp aphorism may have been intended to stimulate better teaching. If that was the purpose it backfired badly. In any event, it did nothing to stimulate better study; it was carried to such an absurd extreme that the grade of failure was actually abolished by official decree in a great many communities across the country. Frequently all grades were abolished lest they stimulate competition.

The effect was to relieve the individual student of basic responsibility for his own performance. Through a complete misinterpretation of democracy—a substitution of equal treatment for equal opportunity—the practice of speeding the bright student along at his best pace and letting the slow student take more time to master the fundamentals was virtually abandoned. Adapting the educational pace to the capacities of the individual was thought to develop a superiority complex in one group and an inferiority complex in the other.

These and many other decisions, no one of which was dramatic in itself, no one of which was imposed by federal or even state authority, infiltrated many school systems. Taken together, many separate decisions led to averaging down the quality and quantity of instruction until the bright were often bored and the zest for learning was sometimes impaired for those best equipped by mind, by motive and by character.

Linguistic competency, so important for our current world responsibilities, deserves a special word. Paradoxically, when the United States had few contacts abroad, language studies flour-

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ished; as our world-wide contacts multiplied, linguistic competence waned. In an emotional binge during the First World War, German was dropped from many schools. There was a switch to Spanish, partly because it was thought to be "more valuable" in our dealings with Latin America, but also because it was "easier." The teaching of French never gained great momentum. The suggestion that Russian should be taught would have been greeted with horror. On the grounds that Latin and Greek were difficult and not "useful," they disappeared from nearly all curricula. Were they not dead languages of vanished civilizations? What was their relevance for the new world of today? The abandonment of the ancient languages, with their great emphasis upon grammar, upon vocabulary, upon exactness; prejudice against German; and the denigration of precision in the use of English produced conspicuous linguistic deficiencies long before the time came for students to enroll in institutions of higher education.

To compound these deficiencies, the laws of many states required publicly-supported institutions of higher education to admit any graduate of a high school within the state. Since graduation became more and more a matter of spending a specific number of years, and less and less learning a defined quantity of knowledge, and qualitative achievement was discounted, many institutions of higher education were almost swamped with poorly prepared undergraduates whose objectives were social rather than intellectual and whose habits were far from industrious. So serious did this situation become that in many institutions at least one year, and often a second, came to be devoted to repairing the deficiencies produced by the soft techniques of pre-college education.

If one dwelt too long upon the various adverse factors in preparatory education, the result would be complete discouragement. Two reasons exist for reaching a more optimistic conclusion. The first has to do with the total environment of American youth. Their habits of mind and action are shaped by many experiences outside school; not all such factors are positive, but most have been predominantly so. This accounts for the independence of mind and freshness of approach which foreign visitors have so often noted.

The second favorable factor is that because of the almost complete decentralization of responsibility many school systems never followed the fads but kept a steady educational course. Moreover,

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in places which softened their programs scandalously some of the bad educational practices have been reformed. There is, for example, a renewed emphasis upon the gifted student. Mathematics has reversed its long decline and again is treated as important. Languages, likewise, are getting more stress. The intellectual disciplines are regaining their lost position; some of the "design for living" emphases are giving way to more substantial study. The fashion for extremes in the absence of discipline has passed. The fruits of these reforms are showing in the improved quality of students applying for admission to strong institutions.

Moreover, the tone of official utterance has changed. In the interdepartmental committee report to the President this is conspicuous. For the first time in many years an official document has laid great stress upon better teaching, upon mathematics and other basic disciplines, and upon early identification of and more attention to the students with outstanding talent. There is fresh and welcome recognition that the problems are complex and must be attacked "on many fronts" and with recognition that the long-range approach is vital.

III

By no means all the difficulties of higher education in the preparation for world affairs stem from shortcomings of the secondary schools. The colleges were swamped by the tremendous expansion of knowledge in the last half of the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century. The progress of science, the diversification of economic studies, the expansion of anthropology, social psychology, sociology and other disciplines created problems novel in dimension. Many kinds of specialism invaded the liberal arts program; professional groups forced the pace of pre-professional preparation back upon the college years.

So great was the glut of courses that many institutions all but abandoned the idea of organization within the curriculum. What had once been an "elective system" among very limited choices was now applied to a vast array. Each course was taught from its own point of view and without much relationship to the content or method of any other. Students often made their elections on whims—on the time of day the class met; whether it met on Saturdays; for vocational reasons, real or fancied; and upon every kind of irrelevant or trivial impulse—as well as upon sound and well-considered grounds.

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It was during this time, and in these circumstances, that international relations began to be regarded as of great importance for the United States. Concern was expressed lest we produce "international illiterates." In the attempt to edge into an already overcrowded curriculum, international relations suffered because it was not a "discipline;" that is to say, it had no well-defined corpus of knowledge and no recognized mental mode of approach to its mastery. Outside academic circles that may seem a trivial barrier.

Nevertheless, in the college context it proved serious; an inchoate subject was brought into competition with well-defined, long-established disciplines. History, for example, has a characteristic content and an identifiable method of approach to its mastery. So also has science. So, at one time, had economics and political science. But international relations as a subject is compounded of history, politics, economics, diplomacy, strategy, cultural appreciation and a dozen other identifiable but complicated subjects. It did not fit neatly into any curricular position; it seemed to trespass upon established fields of study.

In consequence, the new subject worked its way into curricula like a wedge. Early courses tended to center upon international law, reflecting a hoped-for extension of the idea of a "government of laws, not of men" into international life. It accorded with the American enthusiasm for the Hague Conference and the establishment of a "world court." It mistakenly overestimated the number and importance of the matters which opposing parties would agree to regard as justiciable.

The First World War brought disillusionment with international law. The Paris Peace Conference, the establishment of the Council of Ambassadors, the League of Nations and the new World Court centered emphasis upon structures for peace. Accordingly, there ensued a spate of courses on international organization. Ultimately the refusal of the United States to join the League of Nations, and then the failure of the League itself, lowered the level of their popularity temporarily. The establishment of the United Nations and the application of Madison Avenue techniques in "selling" it to the American people led to a renewed emphasis upon international organization.

Meanwhile, stress shifted to courses in diplomatic history. They often seemed to put the United States in the center of events in which its activity had been peripheral; they were marked by the

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lack of objectivity and catholicity of outlook which so annoys Europeans. Moreover, instruction regarding large parts of the world, such as Asia and Russia, was, to put it mildly, meager. With the decline and often the virtual disappearance of language requirements, the range of materials available for reading purposes was narrowed to English. Because relatively little of vital importance was in English, reading was still further narrowed in many institutions to textbooks; they have well been described as "condensed summaries of oversimplified, predigested information without intellectual challenge." Many were more nearly purveyors of dogma of one brand or another rather than enlightening expositions.

The Second World War again called attention to the serious deficiency in the knowledge of language and the inadequacy of language by itself without understanding the culture it expressed. Area-language studies were undertaken under Army leadership, using intensive methods and new linguistic techniques. For the most part the vogue did not survive in undergraduate studies long after the war. So serious is the weakness in this field that of the many thousands who take the examinations for the Foreign Service only a very small percentage can pass a language test of moderate difficulty. In consequence, serious language training must be undertaken for the majority after their appointment.

The cold war led to a strong revulsion from interpretations of international events in terms of law and morals. Instruction tended to make geographical and power considerations paramount. As a result, there was a good deal of emphasis upon geopolitics, accepting the dogmas of Mackinder and his followers rather uncritically. The "realists" who made power the touchstone of reality did almost as much damage to the understanding of international affairs as the sentimentalists had done at an earlier time.

Throughout the whole period there were some courses in current events, often carried under such pretentious titles as "World Politics." For the most part they were discursive and superficial. In the course of the First World War, for example, Stoddard and Franks' "Stakes of the War" became virtually required reading for most college students. It was meager fare, indeed, and far from scholarly. It was part of a tendency towards teaching international relations "for a purpose," in short, indoctrination. It is a tendency which has never been completely rooted out.

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This sketch of the way in which the subject edged into the course of study illustrates two things. First, different phases of an ill-defined "national interest" led to successive emphases in instruction. Second, the development of courses revealed the fact that international relations are exasperatingly complex. Nearly every scholastic discipline in the whole academic gamut makes an impact upon their understanding. There is a tendency, at the present moment, to think that, so far as international relations are concerned, the importance of science is new. This is not true. The coming of gunpowder was scarcely less revolutionary in its day than the atom in our time. It required a complete revaluation of strategy and tactics and altered the balance of power decisively. In international relations such considerations cannot be overlooked.

Clearly the teaching of international relations requires a vast range of mental processes and assessments of values. To be "understanding" requires the student to be a competent amateur in many disparate fields of knowledge. The effort to oversimplify, to choose a key subject or to predigest everything into a ready-made synthesis requiring no urgent or painful effort on the part of the student will do more harm than good.

IV

What conclusions can we draw? First, since it is a long-term enterprise, education that takes its cue from the current situation is obsolescent even before the student who has been exposed to it graduates.

Second, there are goals and values not only more significant but more valid than competition with Communism. There is something inherently absurd in the demand that we "recover the diplomatic initiative" while surrendering the educational initiative to the Soviets, making crude comparisons with them the test of educational success or failure.

Third, we must cease to think of education as stuffing the student, by the age of 21, with enough knowledge to last him the rest of his life. This is an unreal but a persistent expectation. It accounts for the tendency to regard the number of courses offered as a test of an institution's effectiveness. This false faith in bulk also explains that hardy perennial in Congress—"A West Point for Diplomats," as though the main reliance of the Army for general officers was upon what cadets learned there rather

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than their growth through experience and in the many post-graduate schools to which military officers are sent. There should be much less stress on what the student is taught and what he knows at age 21 than upon his capacity to find out, to think about what he knows, to organize it usefully in his mind. Above all we should cultivate the zest and zeal to continue to learn through independent study and reflection. Indoctrination achieves no useful purpose; it seeks to close the mind. What is needed in a world changing as fast as ours is flexibility in approach and power of thought.

In the fourth place, so far as the undergraduate course is concerned, the broader the acquaintance of the student with the fundamental disciplines in the humanities and the social studies, the better equipped he is likely to be for understanding international problems. In most colleges it is better not to have an undergraduate department of international relations, but to rely upon an interdepartmental field of concentration.

Fifth, for those who want careers abroad or wish to be professional students or practitioners of international relations, graduate study is essential. No one in a world as wide as ours can be a specialist in everything, and the universities have done well to distribute among themselves, by a process not entirely rational but nevertheless practical, the many specialized studies. There are several distinguished centers for the study of Russia, its language, culture, tradition, economics, history, strategy and diplomacy. There are four or five which deal with the Far East, more particularly with China. Still others are concerned with the Middle East or Southeastern Asia or Africa. The Indian subcontinent has itself become a field of specialization. There are good courses of study in Latin America and in Eastern Europe. There are almost innumerable graduate courses in law, diplomacy and international economics. There is, in short, an extraordinary range of opportunities for a graduate student to acquire specialized knowledge.

Finally, it must be remembered that in the United States extracurricular interests are often a very potent educational force. For many years there have been international relations clubs, forums of various kinds and a host of other voluntary activities which have stimulated interest and awakened the students' desire to know about international relations. Not to be overlooked are the informal contacts of undergraduates with foreign students

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registered in our institutions. Many assign to such contacts a great influence in evoking the interest of students in international affairs. All these voluntary, non-curricular influences are particularly valuable because they lay the foundation for maintaining a concern for international relations after graduation. They lead to participation in the almost infinite number of voluntary activities which are so characteristic a feature of American life.

American education is the responsibility of communities, of states, of private organizations. As a consequence, there is a variety of approaches to every educational problem which is bewildering to all but long-time students of the American scene. To minds which overemphasize "order" and to those who admire foreign educational practices, the variety will be called "chaotic;" to others it seems full of opportunity. In so complex a situation no "direction" can be established save by public opinion operating in many ways and in many places. Also no generalization can be made to which exception cannot be taken. Nevertheless, considering the relative newness of the United States as a major World Power and considering the problems which institutions have faced in incorporating not only international relations but a host of other new subjects into their courses of instruction, the results have been good.

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THE CHANGING PLACE OF CANADA

By Tom Kent

CANADA'S place in the world has been utterly transformed within less than a generation. Indeed, there is hardly any exaggeration in saying that in thought and feeling the transformation has been going on for barely a decade.

The new era, in which Canada's place is quite different from any she previously occupied, was brought into being in 1939. But through the war and the first postwar years no one could tell with confidence what were temporary conditions and what were fundamental changes. We all took time to adjust, mentally and emotionally. It was as late as 1950 that a distinguished historian and diplomat, George P. de T. Glazebrook, concluded an essay on the historic factors in Canada's external relations with these words: "National maturity brought no fundamental change in the interests of Canada in world affairs or in the principles on which her policy had been based. The change consisted rather in a growing appreciation of the necessity of assuming responsibility for the pursuit and maintenance of interests and principles already deeply embedded in the country's historical development."

The continuity emphasized in those words is real enough. But recent years have made Canadians more conscious also of great changes in the environment in which their embedded interests and principles must be pursued. The changes are too obvious to need listing here. Our problem is to assess how exactly they have produced the new place Canada is coming to occupy in the world.

We can best define that place, and at the same time indicate the problem it creates in Canadian politics, by starting with a proposition that is plainly true but to the truth of which many Canadians are emotionally resistant. It is this: the first, essential interest of Canada in the world today is the security of the United States; that takes overwhelming priority over everything else in Canada's external relations.

This is a revolutionary statement. One does not have to go far back in Canadian history to a time when the United States was the unfriendly neighbor; the border might be unguarded, but the United States was nevertheless the potential danger, the one possible danger to Canada. Most of Canada's short history has been one of divergence from the United States, not of an identity

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of interest. Even when tension between the two countries had almost disappeared, Canada as a member of the British Commonwealth still had little in common, in world politics, with a United States that was isolationist. This remained true through the interwar years, though Canada had fully established her power to pursue her own foreign policy independent of the United Kingdom. In the 1930s Canada was powerfully touched by the same sentiments that produced isolationism in the United States and that elsewhere led to the breakdown of collective security in the name of "appeasement." Nevertheless, when war came, Canada's rôle was as clear to Canadians in 1939 as it had been in 1914.

Shortly before, Mackenzie King as Prime Minister had expressed with rare eloquence a nation's agony of soul: "The idea that every 20 years this country should automatically and as a matter of course take part in a war overseas . . . that a country which has all it can do to run itself should feel called upon to save, periodically, a continent that cannot run itself, and to these ends risk the lives of its people, risk bankruptcy and political disunion, seems to many a nightmare and sheer madness." But for more than two years, in 1939–41 as a generation before, Canada expended her blood and treasure on the great struggle while the giant nation to the south stood by sympathetic but inactive.

No such relationship as existed then is conceivable now. Canada's place in the world, the governing factors in her foreign policy, have been changed by a varied set of circumstances, circumstances so powerful that any one alone would have upset Canada's old rôle; in combination they are revolutionary. Four must be mentioned.

There is, first, the fundamental transformation of the Canadian economy involved in the increasing development of its raw material resources—development primarily by United States capital and primarily for the United States market.

Second, there is the comparative lessening of the United Kingdom's rôle as a world Power and, incidentally, as a market for Canadian exports.

Third, there is the change in warfare, which makes possible a direct attack on the United States by thermonuclear weapons and which means that there are only two great Powers in the world. No combination of middle Powers, not even with Britain included, has the military power to determine whether there shall again be a full-scale war. The issue lies absolutely in the hands

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of the American and Soviet Governments. And Canada is the country, the only country, that lies on the air path between Russia and the United States. Canada's northland is the site of defenses essential to the United States in modern war. If such a war occurs, it is entirely out of the question for Canada to stand aside.

Fourth and last—though first in time and in importance—there is the United States' abandonment of isolationism. This is the other side of the coin of Canada's involvement in the defense of the United States. It means that, just as it is inconceivable for the United States to be engaged in a major war without Canada's participation, so it is also inconceivable—as long as the United States is the leader of the free world's coalition against Communist expansion—that Canada will again be involved in a war, or indeed in any major line of policy which might be carried to the point of military action, except in partnership with the United States.

That is the measure of the intimacy of the alliance. As I write it is 23 years ago to the day since J. W. Dafoe, at that time Editor of the *Winnipeg Free Press,* delivered at Columbia University a lecture in which he talked of "the possibility of an understanding or even an alliance" between the United States and Canada; and he added: "something like this may indeed be necessary for the preservation of that North American civilization which is our joint possession." In 1934 there were few people on either side of the border to whom such words had much significance, and even Dafoe would probably have been amazed if he could have been told what intimacy of relationship was soon to be developed not merely in war but in the succeeding peace.

II

Such are the circumstances that have created Canada's new place in the world. But what, then, is this place? What is this vaunted growth in the importance and influence of Canada? What real influence can there be if the essence of Canada's rôle lies in her interest in the security, and therefore her dependence on the power, of the United States? What real importance has Canadian diplomacy if it must stick close to that of the United States in all things? Is the real truth about Canada's new place in the world simply that Canada has become a quasi-protectorate of the United States? It is all very well for the Canadian Minister of External Affairs to figure large at the United Nations and at other

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international conferences, but does he really amount to more than the chore-boy of the United States?

These are questions that are not often spoken in Canada. The decent reticence of pride inhibits them. But they are not less present, in the mind of anyone who thinks about foreign policy, for being unspoken. Unspoken, that is, as questions about the objective situation: they can come out very readily in politics as an indictment of the Canadian Government by its critics—the implication being not that Canada's place in the modern world makes her a satellite of the United States by nature, but that the Government, by deficiency of will or of wit, chooses it to be so.

They are, I think, false questions, in the sense that they rest on an unreal view of the world we live in. But the asking of them underlines the real paradox of the modern Canadian nation. It is also the key to much in the developing trends of Canadian politics that may over the next few years startle and worry and even embitter our American friends.

To discuss this, it is necessary first to broaden the picture. The world will be a good place for Canadians to live in if, but only if, the United States is powerful and at peace. Take that away and nothing else can serve our national interests. But while American security is thus a necessary condition of the world being what Canadians want, it is not a sole and sufficient condition. A world in which only the American continent was secure against aggression would be a highly unpleasant world to live in, even if it were stable. Whatever our own security, we would not be happy if freedom and democracy were further weakened in Europe, or if the nations of South Asia lost hope of creating free societies. Nor would we be safe, except in the most shortsighted view. The most perfect radar lines, the most devastating thermonuclear weapons, would not indefinitely guarantee our security if the great nations of Europe stood helpless before Communist infiltration or any other sort of decay.

This is as true for Americans as for Canadians. But in opinion in the United States there are some powerful tendencies towards a modern form of continental isolationism based on the theory that North America can be made a fortress which is impregnable in the sense that any attack on it would produce such devastating retaliation that attack is out of the question. In this view, the United States needs no allies except Canada and should not waste its resources helping Europe or other areas overseas.

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Few Canadians believe that this view will ever be dominant in Washington, but it can from time to time exercise a modifying influence of some significance for United States policy. Admittedly, the influence is to be seen more in the words of various United States politicians than in any American actions, but the words are enough to be pretty demoralizing at times for the other members of the North Atlantic Alliance.

It is Canada's good fortune that among us the viewpoint of continental isolationism is almost entirely absent. The importance of having the free nations abroad as friends is more firmly fixed in the minds of Canadians than of Americans. For this, three reasons can be suggested. One is historical. Canada as a new country looked for leadership overseas, and especially to Britain, far longer than her neighbor. And through the medium of the Commonwealth the connection still remains more intimate, not only with Britain but also with the other Dominions.

The second reason is economic. It is true that since the war Canadian trade has become more orientated towards the United States, and this tendency will grow stronger with the years. The old triangular pattern of trade—by which Canada's exports to Europe paid for the excess of imports over exports in trade across the border—has been replaced by a new pattern in which Canada's trade deficit with the United States is largely covered by U.S. exports of capital to Canada. Though Canadian prosperity is thus increasingly linked with that of the United States, nevertheless Canada is, and will remain, far more dependent on overseas trade than the United States. The wheat trade, for example, is not what it was in comparative importance, but it still represents an important segment of Canadian activity that must look east across the Atlantic and west across the Pacific, but never southward within the continent, for its market. Canada can never afford to ignore her economic relationships outside the continent.

These historical and economic reasons for Canada's concern about the North Atlantic Alliance are not, however, decisive in themselves. There is a third motive at work, and it is even more important to Canadians. It is our political survival as an independent nation. We are conscious what a junior partner Canada would be if she were alone with the United States in a close alliance for purely continental defense. This feeling has nothing to do with anti-Americanism as it exists in Europe and elsewhere overseas. Canadians, especially English Canadians, know the

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Americans too well for any such sentiment to be widespread. Except in moments of exasperation, Canadians are fully aware that they could not ask for a friendlier and more considerate giant to live beside. But the friendliest of giants cannot help the fact that Canada seems small to him. He cannot be blamed if sometimes he barely notices how Canada is affected by his actions, still less if he fails to understand how Canada feels about them.

On the other side of the equation, therefore, it is not evidence of unfriendliness towards the United States that Canada dislikes the thought of being too much alone with the giant. She prefers it to be a party, sensing safety in numbers. I am not trying to cast Canada in the rôle of an innocent young girl and the United States as an old man with possibly improper intentions. That would not be at all an accurate picture of either the national characters or the diplomatic representation involved. The point is simply that the United States is too big, and Canada relatively too small, for us to want the relationship to get too cosy without having other friends along—including, preferably, some who are smaller than Canada. That helps to create a useful optical illusion. Size is always comparative. Canadians feel that they look a bit bigger to the eyes of the giant, and certainly feel a bit bigger themselves, if there are some countries even smaller than Canada playing in the same bloc.

It is in this connection that there arises, in my view, the one serious mistake made in Canadian foreign policy during the postwar years. It is one for which responsibility rests perhaps more with the military chiefs than with the diplomats. Canada should, I think, have insisted on treating northern defense—the DEW line, and so on—as a NATO function. The northern rim of the Atlantic area is not merely a Canadian frontier. It stretches from the Aleutians to Spitzbergen, and it is a line vital to the safety of all the free nations. It should be looked on as a northern command within the North Atlantic Organization; to symbolize this, the manning of the defenses should embrace contingents from, at least, Norway, Denmark and the United Kingdom, as well as the two North American countries. From the viewpoint of the Pentagon and of Canadian National Defense headquarters in Ottawa, this would have been a pointless complication, but from the viewpoint of Canada's external relations the failure to make the military men adjust themselves to political needs is highly regrettable. That failure, however, makes it all the more impor-

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tant to emphasize in other directions the importance to Canada of her European partners and also of her Asian friends.

What I am talking about here is clearly something apart from our basic motive for involvement in the North Atlantic Alliance. Canada has played, and is playing, her part because we believe that it would not be safe, or even in the end possible, for us to stand aside from events in Europe. That basic consideration applies to the United States and Canada equally. But why is it more steadily apparent to all sections of Canadian opinion than it is to all sections of American opinion? My point now concerns the reason for that difference. We should not assume that the reason lies in superior virtue or intelligence on the Canadian side. Nor does it lie, as some Americans seem to assume, in Canada's surviving "imperialist" tie with Britain. It lies in the fact that, in addition to the general benefit, there is a particular benefit to Canada in having the European Powers in the partnership with us.

Far from being related to Canada's membership in the Commonwealth, this attitude is the product rather of Canada's growing nationalism. And as such it is an attitude that will strengthen rather than weaken if economic or other circumstances tend over the years further to loosen Canada's direct connection with "the old country."

III

We have looked now at the reasons why, though her relationship with the United States takes priority over everything else, the Western alliance as a whole is so important to Canada. We come to the other side of the coin—Canada's importance to the alliance.

That importance springs from the very fact which often makes many Canadians inclined to kick against the pricks. It springs, that is to say, from Canada's complete dependence for security on the power of the United States. The relationship is not entirely one-way. It means also that Canada's coöperation—in defense, in trade, in many political arrangements—is of considerable value to the United States. It means that the United States can absolutely rely on Canada whenever affairs come to a point of crisis. Canada's rôle is assured. Without this assurance, Canada could not possibly claim what she often exercises—a say in the affairs of the Western alliance far out of proportion to her military importance.

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This is the truth that is not understood when people say: What's the point of it all? Canada's foreign policy can't really depart in any essential way from United States policy, so why bother? Such cynicism ignores the simple point that in the modern world no one is really on his own. The old concept of national sovereignty retains little meaning. The freedom of action of every country is sharply limited. Canada's perhaps does not amount to much more than the freedom, while sitting under her big neighbor's umbrella, to offer some gratuitous advice on how to hold the umbrella. But the point is that we offer the advice, and get away with it. We even have the advice heeded sometimes, though really there is nothing more annoying to most holders of umbrellas. This rôle requires, and is going to require increasingly, a great deal of tact. It could not be attempted at all, however, but for the simple fact that the way the umbrella is held is so particularly important for Canada. That establishes our right and creates our obligation to concern ourselves with the general policies of the United States and of the free world as a whole.

All the Western nations depend for their security on the power of the United States, but Canada is the one among them whose fate is most directly and intimately linked with that of the major partner. It is this that gives Canada a special place, a special concern, a special responsibility, over and above any of the other allies of the United States. Canada is the most involved of all. On that basis, and that basis alone, she has a special influence in the counsels of the alliance.

It has become customary to talk of Canada's rôle as that of a middleman; she can interpret America to Britain and Britain to America; she is the hinge, to use a famous phrase, between the new world and the old, especially between the United States and the United Kingdom. This is a concept with some reality to it, but also with the dangers always inherent in half-truths.

A middleman by definition deals impartially with both parties. A hinge can be separated from both the things it holds in flexible union. On this point, the analogy breaks down. In the last resort Canada can be separated, though with enormous damage to all concerned, from her allies across the seas; she cannot be separated from her alliance with the United States. The bond of mutual interest and mutual security is now closer than can be represented by the screws which hold a hinge. If the analogy must be pressed, it would be more accurate to describe Canada not as the hinge

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but as that part of the North American structure to which the hinge with the rest of the free world can be most securely attached. The special influence of Canada rests on the fact that she is not the United States but she is of North America.

This is a situation to which, it is true, not all Canadians are reconciled. The sentiment of the British connection, of Canada's membership in the Commonwealth, runs strong and will continue to do so. But few people outside Canada—and especially few people in Britain—realize how large a part in Canada's inter-Commonwealth relationships is played by the sense of special friendship with its Asian members, and particularly with India. And India is hardly to be identified in diplomacy with the United Kingdom. The idea that, because of the Commonwealth, Canada is still some sort of British satellite surely was finally disposed of by last year's Suez crisis.

It is important not to be confused in this matter by the political controversy in Canada over the Suez question. The Opposition groups—their newspapers more than the politicians themselves—made some play with the charge that the Government let Britain down. Pro-British sentiment is strong enough for politicians not to pass up the opportunity of making some gesture to it. But the significant thing is that the Opposition groups have not pressed the charge with any vigor. The truth is that Canada's attempt in the United Nations to liquidate Britain's Suez venture with a minimum of hard feelings, and thereby to repair the Anglo-American alliance, commanded the respect and agreement of Canadian public opinion at large. That Canada's rôle was so well played was an accident of personality. With a Minister for External Affairs less able than Mr. Pearson, the rôle might have been more negative and indecisive. But it is inconceivable that Canadian policy could have been fundamentally different in purpose, whatever the political party in office.

In the Suez crisis Canada exercised a greater influence on a major diplomatic issue than has ever been hers before. That this is the shape of things to come is made clear by the aftermath of Suez and especially by the changes in British defense policy which have followed. Those changes involve a recognition that Britain's resources do not allow her to play as large a rôle in defense and diplomacy as she has previously attempted to sustain. Since the war this effort has overstrained Britain. Now her rôle within the Western alliance is being lessened.

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Hitherto, the United Kingdom has dealt with the United States as if Britain were the one ally in some degree comparable in power and importance to the United States itself. That was the basis of the "hinge" theory about Canada. But in the thermonuclear age, of course, no Western nation is really comparable with the United States. Even Britain is separated from it by so wide a margin of power that Britain is now closer to the middle Powers than to the United States. Even the greatest of the foothills is still a foothill beside the mountain peak. Britain is thus losing something of the prior position that she has hitherto occupied among the allies of the United States.

As that happens, Canada's sort of prior position becomes much more important to her and to the other free nations. That position is based not on comparative power but on the special closeness of Canada's relationship with the United States. Canadians are the people among all the allies who can talk to the Americans as fellow North Americans, and yet who can also see the United States from outside, as one of the smaller Powers. She has a special part to play in speaking for them to the United States, and in interpreting the United States to them.

There are still many people, in Canada and overseas, who will say that this sounds well but means nothing in practice. It is all very well for Canada to see herself as an intermediary but why, if she is so closely and so avowedly bound to the United States, should anyone pay any attention? The answer is partly that in fact attention is paid, even if for no better reason than the straightforward friendliness of the United States.

That is a real and powerful reason. But there is also another. Canada's dependence on the United States does not mean that she lacks bargaining weapons. If they are needed, she has them. Their basis is this: the ability of the United States to get on well with Canada is the first and most direct test of her ability to get on well with every other smaller Power. The point was once well put by someone who said that Canada is the world's hostage of American good intentions. Canada is of good repute in the free world. If Canadians said that they were being browbeaten by the Americans, if they said that their interests were being seriously prejudiced by the United States, the world's sympathy would lie overwhelmingly with Canada. The world sees Canada as a country very like the United States and as accommodating to the United States as any free nation. If the Americans could

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not get on well with Canada, with whom could they get on well? Who could trust them? Who could remain convinced that American imperialism is a myth that not even the Kremlin really believes?

In short, good relations with Canada—the good relations of discussion and coöperation, of some real give and take in policy—are a primary interest of the United States. The bargaining weapons thus put in Canada's hands are far from negligible. They are, on the contrary, quite powerful enough to be damagingly abused if a Canadian Government were so minded. In practice, they are merely the silent evidence that Canada has indeed a rôle of importance to play in the policy-making of the Western world.

As long as this is true—as long as it never comes to a tussle in which Canadian-United States relations generate real heat—the only country for which Canada's new place in the world creates real difficulties is Canada herself.

IV

It is only ten years since Mr. St. Laurent, then Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs but soon to become Prime Minister, defined the principles of Canadian foreign policy in a famous speech. The first principle he laid down—ahead of all the absolutes of the rule of law, political liberty, the acceptance of international responsibilities—was that external policy should not destroy national unity. In the temper of these times, that may now seem a strangely negative approach. The Canada whose national unity has sometimes hung by thin threads is of the past. Over the last decade a sense of nationality, a consciousness of common interests and aims at work among Canada's diverse races and across the enormous breadth of her thinly-peopled land, has grown to a maturity and strength that no one could have counted on before.

But this Canadian nationalism is, in timing, rather a strange growth. Under the forcing influence of war and of the postwar boom which has made them confident, Canadians have become nationalists during precisely that period which is distinguished in world affairs by the extent to which individual national sovereignties have been qualified. The coöperation of allies in the age of the hydrogen bomb and the intercontinental missile is far too intimate for sovereignty in the traditional sense to retain much reality. The peculiarity of Canadian nationalism is

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that it has grown, and Canada has become important, at the very moment we have all become conscious as never before of the dependence of each country on the rest.

Intellectually, that is easy to grasp. Intellectually, there is nothing difficult about the paradox of Canada's new place in the world: that Canada's inability to have a foreign policy different in any essential way from United States policy is not the end of responsibility and influence; on the contrary, it is the basis on which Canada can exercise a quite special responsibility and influence in making policies common to the Atlantic community. But while, intellectually, that is straightforward enough, emotionally—and therefore politically—it is a tough one.

The direct manifestation of the emotional problem is this: attitudes which from across the border may seem like anti-Americanism (though, one can fairly confidently hope, of a mild kind) may for a time at least be the readiest expression of Canadian nationalism. At best, this will put some difficulties in the way of an external policy appropriate to Canada's new place in the world. But in any event there will be no need to regard the situation too pessimistically. The difficulties that may be created for Canada's national policy by a degree of emotional unrealism about our relations with the United States are, after all, merely the contemporary evidence of a fact of long standing. Canada is, by history and by geography, a difficult country to run. That has not hitherto prevented it from being, for the most part, remarkably well governed. There is no reason why this should be less true in Canada's new external relations.

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BLACK AFRICA AND THE FRENCH UNION

By Félix Houphouet-Boigny

IN this second half of the twentieth century, a newcomer has made its appearance on the international scene: Black Africa. Strategists, politicians, economists are no longer indifferent to what happens in Dakar, in Abidjan, in Accra, in Lomé. Never has our old continent been honored by so many visitors of such high rank nor been the object of so much study. But since the era of colonialism is over, it is first of all the Africans themselves who must be consulted on the future evolution of Africa and on the relations between the former subject peoples and the former colonizers.

I am a man of the African soil, having lived constantly in the midst of our rural Negro masses, sharing their joys and their sorrows, and making their great hope of liberty my own. For ten consecutive years, they have elected me to represent them in the French Parliament. I am the leader of the most powerful African political movement—a movement which continues to this very day to denounce the abuses and errors of colonialism, and to call untiringly for justice and equality. For these reasons, I think I have the right to consider myself the authentic spokesman of the millions of African men and women who have chosen, in preference to the type of independence just acquired by the neighboring state of Ghana, a Franco-African community founded on liberty, equality and fraternity.

In considering where the real interests of the colored peoples of the French territories in Africa lie, we do not begin with a blank slate. The relations which prevail between Frenchmen of the mother country and Frenchmen of Africa already exist in an historical complex of events lived in common, in which good and bad memories mingle. I forget neither the good nor the bad, but I think that the bonds thus forged are, like childhood memories, understandable and emotionally significant only for the initiated, for those near to the events, for those whose lives these bonds have cast in the same mold. I will therefore examine only the present state of relations within the French Union, as they have evolved during the past ten years.

As a preliminary, we must remove the aura which the concept

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of independence holds in our imaginations. Why do we not demand independence? To answer this question, I can only ask another: What is independence? Industrial and technical revolutions are making peoples more and more dependent on one another. I asked my friend Mr. Nkrumah whether he was ready to leave the sterling zone now that Ghana was independent. "Not only will we remain in the sterling zone, but also in the Commonwealth," he answered immediately.

Indeed, who doubts that close and sustained economic relations are essential to a country which wants to raise its standard of living? What countries are self-sufficient? Not even the United States. Indeed, the countries of Europe in the Coal and Steel Community, in Euratom and in the Common Market are prepared to relinquish a part of their sovereignty, that is to say, a part of their national independence. Why, if not to bring about, by association and mutual aid, a more fully elaborated form of civilization which is more advantageous for their peoples and which transcends a nationalism that is too cramped, too dogmatic and by now out of date?

This is also our goal, because it is in our interest. We want to coöperate within this great aggregate which is the French Union, because it is there that we can safeguard the advantages and the interests of the black people of Africa.

I am a native of a territory whose development has scarcely begun. Between 1939 and 1955 the tonnage handled by the port of Abidjan in the Ivory Coast went from 231,250 tons to 930,000 tons. The population has increased tenfold in the space of a few years and this rate shows no sign of diminishing. The Ivory Coast could not, by itself, find the means of providing the investment monies needed to cope with this heavy and continuing expansion. For many more years—10? 20? 50?—it will require enough capital aid to allow its inhabitants to make up for the heavy handicaps which nature imposes on tropical countries.

This outside capital assistance is needed by all countries undergoing rapid expansion, whether they are nominally independent or not. We wish to remain in the French Union because it furnishes us this assistance and does it by an arrangement which seems to us the surest and best adapted to further the social and technical progress of our peoples.

The Investment Fund for the Economic and Social Development of the Overseas Territories (F.I.D.E.S.) was created in 1946

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to centralize and coördinate, with the coöperation of the Central Fund for France Overseas, a major program of internal development. In the space of ten years, more than 600 billion francs of government funds have been devoted to territories whose area is 9,000,000 square kilometers but whose population does not exceed 30,000,000.

The Administrative Council of the Central Fund, which manages the F.I.D.E.S., is composed of representatives of the important bureaus of the government, and also of members appointed by Parliament and by the labor unions. Several of its members are Africans, who can thus keep a check on the use and apportionment of these government funds and make sure that the interests of the people are effectively safeguarded. It should be understood that we are speaking here of government funds provided by the mother country, leaving aside private investments on the one hand and local budgets on the other.

It has often been said that France has devoted more money to underdeveloped territories than any other country. I would add that France's accomplishments are even more praiseworthy if it is remembered that she has borne the impact of two wars and that in 1945 she had to reconstruct her own territory, ravaged by military campaigns and pillaged by four years of occupation. Nevertheless, the sums which France puts at the disposal of the overseas territories are not so extraordinary that they could not be duplicated. Why attach oneself to this single source?

The fact is that the manner in which money is given can be a guarantee of continuity and stability. Perhaps we will on occasion find some creditor, public or private, capable of loaning, if not of giving, the billions necessary for the industrial, technical and social development of the African territories. But what guarantee would we have that this aid would be forthcoming year after year? How could we control the allocation of the loans offered? For what would we be asked in exchange?

We know what France asks of us—to share in her institutions and to share in them as equals. The right of citizenship has been granted without restriction to all the inhabitants of the French Union, and all the electors, whatever their origin, are gathered in a single college. At one stroke universal suffrage has been instituted everywhere—a privilege that not even the state of Ghana nor British Nigeria has yet dared extend to the tribal regions of the interior. No racial or religious discrimination prohibits any

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activity, public or private. Opportunities are legally the same for all, and if inequalities exist they arise from circumstances or local conditions which the authorities are making every effort to eliminate.

Thus the democratic institutions of republican France have little by little been established in the overseas territories. During the past several months, free elections throughout French Africa have enabled the people to choose those who would direct communal, urban, rural or territorial institutions. As a result, Africans are now in a position to exercise their responsibilities and to assert their political personality. Municipal councils exercise sovereign power over local affairs. Territorial assemblies are endowed with broad deliberative powers allowing them to adopt autonomous laws distinct from legislation which applies to the mother country. They have an executive responsible to them, to whom is entrusted the direction of territorial affairs with the exception of foreign relations, defense and security, which remain in the hands of the central power. It is in some degree self-government, but it maintains essential links with the Republic, and is not without analogy to the federal structure of the United States of America.

What makes it certainly unique, however, among various relationships that have existed in modern times between a mother country and its dependencies is the participation of overseas populations in the central government of the Republic. There are, in the National Assembly and in the Council of the Republic, Negro deputies and senators, elected in the same way as their colleagues of the mother country. The fusion has succeeded so well, mutual courtesy and comprehension have developed so naturally, that no one in France finds it remarkable any longer that the third-ranking dignitary of the Republic, the President of the Senate, is a Negro—Mr. Monnerville. It will seem then just as unremarkable that other colored people have for several years played a part in the Government, and that I myself was able to represent France in the United Nations at the time of the debates on Togo.

It is not vanity which makes me emphasize the importance of the positions occupied by colored people in the highest functions of a great nation. It is simply to explain our attachment to the French Union as it is conceived. We feel at home in it. We participate in family discussions. Nothing is hidden from us—neither

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hopes nor dangers. How could we better preserve the interests of the Negro people who for so many years have put their confidence in us again and again? It is this awareness of a comprehensive interdependence of mutual interests which has permitted the creation of a Franco-African community based on equality. It is expressed by autonomy in the management of local affairs and intimate association in the management of the general interests of the Republic.

Since the French Union is dynamic, our evolution continues on the national level, and other ties are contemplated in a constitutional reform now being prepared and soon to be debated in the French Parliament. We took part in the preparations for this debate, maintaining as our guiding principle the idea of a federal community, freely joining the peoples of French language and culture. The specific terms by which the principle will be expressed must now be decided by French legislators—black and white.

Naturally, we cannot help but compare our own evolution with the experiment which Great Britain has just undertaken in granting independence to the state of Ghana. Actually, the terms of agreement do not differ greatly, although we have not asked for the type of independence which Mr. Nkrumah has just obtained. After much reflection, bearing in mind the highest interest of this Africa which we dearly love, the human relations existing between French and African, and the imperative of this century —the interdependence of nations—from which no power can claim to escape, we have preferred to try a different experiment, more difficult perhaps, but unique of its kind and unknown until now in the long history of nations—that of a community of peoples, equal and fraternal.

Should we turn away from this community, made possible by recent political, economic and social reforms? Should we demand our total independence, as so many other countries have? No major African political party has thought so, and none has put independence into its platform.

Today, no nation, however powerful, can pretend to impose its absolute will on another for long. By doing so, it would irremediably compromise its own future as a great nation. France knows this. Its own best interests no less than its sensitivity to human values and the absence of any racist feelings among its people have led it voluntarily to renounce force as an instrument of

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policy in Black Africa and to seek new political arrangements with us, actively and sincerely.

Those arrangements which we have chosen, and which are going into effect now, offer assurance of stability and security—conditions that are indispensable to the creation of an economic and social environment in which the African people can attain a standard of living comparable to that of the peoples of the great modern nations. These institutional arrangements are such as to attract investments in all forms—imports of capital, technicians and methods—which are indispensable to our territories. They allow us to prove our maturity, within the forms and modes of thought to which our culture has accustomed us.

As our evolution continues simultaneously at the international level, other bonds are to be created through the reorganization of the franc zone. Moreover, in recent international negotiations, the French Government has proposed that the overseas territories be included in the European Common Market. This proposal has now been incorporated into the treaty which has just been signed by the representatives of the six member states.

At the request of Premier Mollet, I took part in the Brussels discussions and in the negotiations which preceded the writing of the definitive text of this treaty. Since my colleagues from metropolitan France were no less eager than myself to defend the interests of the African territories, we succeeded together in overcoming a number of reservations which no territory acting individually could have dispelled. Thanks to the Franco-African community, our territories will enter the Common Market with more guarantees for their future than they could possibly have achieved if they were independent. We can continue to enjoy our liberties without fear that some economic enterprise will interfere in our political life, causing us to degenerate into neo-feudalism, as in the Middle East, or into dictatorship, as in Egypt.

Some of us, of course, have had to fight so that France would not impose on us certain abusive forms of its sovereignty which are associated with the term colonialism. Many well remember the battle waged for emancipation. But I can say, as a member of this group, that despite the violence of some of the encounters, very few of us still feel bitterness.

The presence of the French in Africa is the result of military conquests or of peaceful penetrations which go back to the end of the last century. France has suppressed slavery wherever it

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existed and has put an end to the quarrels which set different ethnic groups against one another; it has given its education to the African masses and its culture to an élite; it has instituted sanitary and medical improvements without precedent. In French ranks, in turn, we have poured out our blood on the battlefields for the defense of liberty, and we have won a place in the history of France and of the free world. We do not want to abandon this recent heritage by trying to go back to our origins.

Moreover, we have, in common with the French, qualities which have facilitated our relations with them: good sense, realism, discrimination, which are as widespread among the black peasants of Africa as in the rural sections of France. In difficult times these qualities have enabled us to establish distinctions between colonization and the abuses of colonization. They enable us to understand today that in a world where interdependence has become the supreme rule, outbreaks of fanaticism and nationalism accomplish nothing and run the risk of merely increasing misery.

The example of the young state of Ghana is very tempting. The seizure of power has something exciting about it, we know. But the exercise of this power in a fashion consonant with national and human dignity is difficult. There doubtless are powerful nations which would provide us with the means to overcome our material difficulties. But which of them would allow us to join them in equality and fraternity? The modern world offers so many examples of barriers to race or class which pen in human beings that we cannot help but want to respond to France's loyalty and humane conduct in like fashion. It is important that the Franco-African community—egalitarian, humane and fraternal—appear to all nations not only as an example to be emulated but also as an element of international stability on which a sure future can be built.

In our view, that community is an act of faith in this future and also an act of human solidarity. It enables us to bring our stone to the world edifice without losing either our national identity or the French citizenship which we have earned and acquired worthily. And it constitutes a home we wish to keep, as in the definition which Robert Frost gave of it:

> Home is the place where
> When you have to go there,
> They have to take you in.

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THE U. N. EXPERIENCE IN GAZA

By Hamilton Fish Armstrong

IT would be wrong to call the United Nations experiment in administering the Gaza Strip a failure; the experiment was never made. Some preparations for it were made. Civilian experts were assembled and dispatched to Gaza on the heels of the United Nations Emergency Force. Before they could get their bearings, while they were still searching for beds and desks, Egypt had stepped in again. Everybody except the Egyptians professed to be surprised, and many were, for there had been wide hope that the enterprise in Gaza might, if successful, set a precedent for future police actions by the United Nations in troubled areas. The hope proved unjustified. The commander of the United Nations Emergency Force retired more or less into the background soon after he had brought his troops into Gaza, and his team of civil administrators, unnoticed while they were there, faded unnoticed away. If the United Nations experiment in Gaza failed, it was a failure by default.

There had been strong support in the West for the view that the United Nations should administer the Gaza Strip for a considerable period of time, at least long enough to use it as a focus of international strength while an attempt was made to face up to the Israeli-Arab problem as a whole, specifically the fundamental questions of frontiers, refugees and the equitable use of the Jordan waters. For years the United Nations had been debating this complex of problems and passing resolutions about them; for years some of its members had been giving unselfish service and large sums of money to mitigate the human misery involved. The United Nations was bound to see that Israel withdrew to the lines from which she had begun her aggression in October; it was not bound, many persons thought, to restore the precise situation which had produced the conflict. For although Israel had begun the actual aggression, responsibilities for the conflict had been divided. The United Nations shared in them. It had allowed its resolutions and warnings about frontiers and refugees to remain unheeded. Despite its admonitions, border incidents and fighting had continued. Its declaration that the prolonged state of technical belligerency between Egypt and Israel was unjustified had been flouted. Only an exceedingly narrow concept of the functions

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of the United Nations could be satisfied with a simple return to the status quo ante.

Partly by decision, partly by indecision, this nevertheless was the result. The General Assembly, properly concerned as the first order of emergency business to get a cease-fire, and as the second to secure the withdrawal of hostile troops from Egypt, neglected the opportunity to lay the basis, as the third stage of its action, for insisting on a settlement of the disputes which had produced the hostilities. The United States, leading the fight for the first two objectives, was entitled to demand that victory there must be only preliminary to efforts to win a more fundamental and permanent victory. It took half a step in that direction, hesitated, and backed down. The Secretary-General showed great energy and efficiency in organizing the emergency force to supervise the cessation of hostilities. He did not solicit for it the wider rights and duties that might have made it a factor in promoting a general settlement nor did he feel free to make use of the evasive and sometimes ambiguous resolutions of the General Assembly as a starting point from which to evolve a constructive policy of his own.

Specifically as regards the Gaza Strip, account had first of all to be taken of the circumstance that it had been the main center for the organization of *fedhayeen* raids into Israel and a main target of fierce Israeli reprisals, and that these activities must be prevented. In addition, there was the fact that it was not sovereign territory of either Egypt or Israel but simply a part of the former British mandated territory of Palestine which had been recognized as remaining under Egyptian control in the Egyptian-Israeli armistice of 1949. The wishes of the population as to their future status were unknown. Of the approximately 300,000 persons living huddled in an area roughly 25 miles long by five miles wide, 213,000 were Palestinian refugees supported by the United Nations.[1] In every respect the problem clamored for an international solution. Although the people were hostile to Israel, the refugees violently so, this did not necessarily mean that they would not have welcomed an interim period of international administration and perhaps even the eventual creation of a small

[1] The funds which finance the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA) come 70 percent from the United States, 24 percent from Great Britain, 6 percent from other members. The fact that the Soviet Union contributes nothing has not kept it from becoming popular in the region. The refugees look on the relief received through UNRWA as a right, less than what is due them because of the West's responsibility in creating Israel.

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Palestinian state, under international guarantees, as a buffer between Israel and Egypt. One suggestion was that such a state might function in connection with (or as part of) a narrow demilitarized zone running down to the Gulf of Aqaba. Jews and Arabs would thereby be restrained from molesting each other along a dangerously troubled border; in addition, a secure pipeline route would be opened up for the Arab states beyond Suez to get their products to Western markets. The Gaza population might have found the scheme particularly attractive if it had included provisions for a free port and installations that would offer local employment.

An argument in favor of U.N. occupation and administration of Gaza was that this would have given UNRWA a chance to make a heroic effort to find permanent homes for the refugees congregated there. At one time Israel had offered to take back and resettle 100,000 Palestinian refugees; later she indicated that the offer had lapsed, but some observers thought that this was the moment to insist that she receive some such number from Gaza and that she compensate the remainder. In 1953 Egypt had favored a plan to make available a large tract in Sinai near the Suez Canal for settlement of Gaza refugees, the irrigation and other expenses to be financed through UNRWA. Deterioration of Egyptian-Israeli relations had caused the project to be dropped. Might it not be revived? UNRWA or a special U.N. commission like that which arranged the exchange of Greek and Turkish populations after the First World War might consult the refugees, supervise the movement of those who wished to go back to Israel and arrange that those who opted for Egypt were settled satisfactorily and enabled, by Israeli compensation and otherwise, to start a new life. All this would have taken planning, effort, time and money; but at least in the end about a quarter of the total Arab refugee question would have been solved, something not now in sight by any other means.

It might be that none of these proposals, nor any combination or variant of them, would have been accepted if formally proposed or, if accepted, would have worked. We do not know. There was not enough imaginative statesmanship either in the United Nations or in Washington (which at the moment seemed strategically situated to take a lead) to so much as explore the possibilities.

The dispute over Gaza was of course only part of a much wider

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conflict involving far more fundamental questions than the *fedhayeen* raids and the Israeli reprisals. These were merely symptoms of the deep-seated disease. On the one side, the Arabs had refused from the start to recognize the right of Israel to exist as a nation and still maintained a technical state of belligerency toward her; Arab leaders had often proclaimed the intention of "pushing her into the sea," and only a few days before the Israeli attack the three neighboring nations of Egypt, Jordan and Syria had placed their troops under unified command as if about to try to carry that threat into execution. On the other side of the ledger, there were the 900,000 Palestinian refugees living on Western charity with no satisfactory offer from Israel to take them back or alternatively to compensate them for their lost homes and properties. When they infiltrated in small bands into their former homeland their depredations were often punished by large-scale Israeli reprisals, officially announced and officially justified. Many other matters were in controversy, but they have been frequently discussed and need not be reviewed here.

What must be stressed is that the state of perpetual crisis between Israel and the Arab states had produced one local war, followed by a series of violent border incidents, and a second local war which threatened to lead to another world war; and that an international organization with the duty of establishing conditions of peace and security was amply justified, to say the least, in attempting to put an end to it. Any such attempt must begin with the refugees. As has recently been demonstrated once again in Jordan, where they form over a third of the population and are the core of revolutionary discontent, they add a sharp cutting edge to every international or domestic problem in the area. An opportunity to begin was provided in Gaza. The refugees aside, Gaza was an open wound that obviously demanded radical treatment. In addition, supposing there was to be a serious effort to enforce a comprehensive settlement, Gaza offered a pivotal position from which the United Nations action might be directed. In the tangle of cross-purposes at the United Nations headquarters in New York these facts were disregarded or else the enterprise seemed hedged about with too many prickly controversies to be worth even a try.

II

Admittedly the United Nations was handicapped in under-

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taking a bold experiment at this particular time and in this particular area. Two of its leading members were accused of having just violated the Charter. Soviet Russia was not at all interested in finding a solution for the Arab-Israeli dispute but sought to prolong it, deepen it and utilize it to win Arab friendship. India might have been expected by both principle and material interest to play a constructive rôle; unfortunately her thoughts were all on Kashmir and she feared to lose Arab support for her claims there by touching the substance of the Palestine question. Perhaps the Indian delegation also had in mind to avoid any U.N. action in Gaza that might be a precedent for similar action in Kashmir. The American delegation, to which everyone looked for a lead, was engrossed with the immediate problem of securing the withdrawal of hostile troops from Egypt.

President Eisenhower's first reaction to the Israeli and Anglo-French attacks on Egypt had been one of outrage. He decided instantly that the United Nations must make this an even clearer case than Korea had been that "aggression doesn't pay;" and the importance of driving home this single simple moral seemed to him so over-riding that nothing else must be brought in that might distract from it. However, unswerving pursuit of the primary goal was not necessarily incompatible with a simultaneous effort to increase the prestige and efficacy of the United Nations by insisting that it carry out its peace-making functions under the Charter—investigation, negotiation, mediation and settlement of disputes. In recognition of this the United States delegation was authorized to make such an effort and on November 3 Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge introduced a resolution to set up a special committee of five to consult with the parties to the armistice agreements of 1949 "regarding a settlement of the major problems outstanding between the Arab States and Israel, with a view to establishing conditions of permanent peace and stability in the area," and to submit recommendations to either the Security Council or the General Assembly as seemed appropriate. In this manner, while dealing sternly and at once with the Israeli attack the United Nations would also have laid the basis for dealing eventually with the long-standing faults on both sides about which it had so often and so long and so vainly complained. Unfortunately, in view of the urgency of getting agreement on a cease-fire, Ambassador Lodge delayed pressing for consideration of his project; and the hostility of the Arab, Indian,

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Soviet and certain other delegations to any program that looked beyond chastising Israel eventually coalesced into such formidable opposition that it seemed inadvisable to provoke a showdown. "Let Dag do it" supplanted "Do it yourself."

Mr. Hammarskjöld had long believed that if any fresh start were ever to be undertaken toward settling outstanding questions between Israel and the Arab states it must be based on the armistice agreements which they had signed following the war of 1948. Whether the agreements were still intact had come into question, the rights which they were alleged to have conferred had long been in hot dispute and now that dispute had erupted into another war. It remained his conviction, however, that they furnished the only ground where any legal foothold could be found for negotiation, and when he was called on to suggest measures to deal with the 1956 crisis he turned naturally to the idea of reëstablishing the armistice demarcation lines as rapidly as possible.

The Afro-Asian bloc, mobilized in effective collaboration with the Soviet bloc by the Indian delegate, Mr. Krishna Menon, demanded simply and solely that Israel withdraw to the armistice line and that sanctions be imposed against her if she refused. They would hear of no "reward" for the aggressor, even if it were to be only a discussion of whether President Nasser should not be required, in law, equity and the general interest, to terminate the state of belligerency which, he asserted, had existed between his country and Israel for the past eight years. This technical belligerency had been used by Egypt as justification for excluding Israeli ships from the Suez Canal and from the Gulf of Aqaba, the entrance to the Israeli port of Elath; and quite obviously if the practice were resumed it would risk inducing new hostilities. In a resolution of September 1, 1951, the Security Council had denied Egypt's right to continue asserting active belligerent rights as a measure of self-defense at such a late date after the termination of actual hostilities.[2] Presumably what had been true in 1951 was even more true five years later. The General Assembly could not make up its collective mind to say so, however, and the American delegation did not press it in that direction.

[2] During the discussion of the resolution in 1951 the point was made that the Security Council's acceptance of the Egyptian thesis that a continued state of war justified hostile acts against Israel would force it to recognize the legitimacy of reprisals by Israel. The Security Council did not accept the Egyptian thesis, but Egypt maintained it in defiance of the Security Council finding. ("Yearbook of the United Nations, 1951." New York: Columbia University Press, p. 297.)

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In these and other matters the United States undoubtedly was influenced by the desire to avoid any action that could be construed as contrary to the Arab interest. It feared that any more positive policy might increase Soviet influence in the area and prejudice the success of the Eisenhower Doctrine, the *grande manœuvre* which was counted on to stabilize the Middle East as a whole and provide a better atmosphere in which to discuss individual problems. Some felt that this was a miscalculation, that no permanent solutions could be achieved in the area so long as the poison of the central dispute over Palestine seeped into every negotiation and kept every controversy at fever height.

III

On February 2 the General Assembly adopted two resolutions. The first called on Israel to complete its withdrawal behind the 1949 armistice demarcation line "without further delay." In the second the General Assembly stated, among other things, that it "Considers that, after full withdrawal of Israel from the Sharm el-Sheikh and Gaza areas, the scrupulous maintenance of the Armistice Agreement [of 1949] requires the placing of the United Nations Emergency Force on the Egyptian-Israeli armistice demarcation line and the implementation of other measures as proposed in the Secretary-General's report [of January 24], with due regard to the considerations set forth therein with a view to assist in achieving situations conducive to the maintenance of peaceful conditions in the area." It further "Requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the parties concerned, to take steps to carry out these measures and to report, as appropriate, to the General Assembly." These were substantive paragraphs. An introductory sentence contained the pious statement that "withdrawal by Israel must be followed by action which would assure progress toward the creation of peaceful conditions." To the extent that it implied a promise, even a vague statement of this sort might have encouraged the Secretary-General to put his undoubted ingenuity and subtlety of mind at work to find ways of ensuring that when UNEF took over crucial areas from the Israeli forces it would remain in charge at least long enough for animosities to cool and mediation of underlying issues to become possible.

The Secretary-General's report of January 24, in which the General Assembly now took refuge instead of stating its own po-

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sition in categorical terms, was a complicated document alike in reasoning and expression. There was wide disagreement as to the author's meaning on many points. However, he was in general taken as saying: that the United Nations Emergency Force could be stationed on Egyptian territory only with Egypt's consent; that if the General Assembly wished to widen "United Nations responsibilities" this would also require Egyptian agreement; that the legal status of Gaza could not be changed except by agreement between the parties; and that Israel could not ask for any guarantees in exchange for her withdrawal. In other words, the Secretary-General, and now the General Assembly to the extent that the phraseology of its resolution as quoted above endorsed his report, turned down Israel's request that the offenses of which she was accused be taken up together with the prior offenses of which she accused Egypt. The Secretary-General supported the view that the *status juris* existing immediately prior to Israel's military action must be reëstablished, including Egyptian "control" of Gaza as provided in the armistice agreement of 1949. "Control in this case," he added, "obviously must be considered as including administration and security." He also suggested that the U.N. forces be deployed on both sides of the demarcation line instead of as previously provided only on the Egyptian side. The General Assembly resolution in effect endorsed these views, except that it stated that the troops should be stationed "on" the demarcation line, which, being too narrow a space for foothold, put another burden of interpretation on the Secretary-General.

During the last week of January while the Secretary-General was preparing his report a number of delegations had been holding discussions regarding a possible resolution to broaden the rôle of the United Nations in the Gaza Strip and at Sharm el-Sheikh, on the Gulf of Aqaba. One objective was to make sure that UNEF would stay in those key places so long as there was any risk of their being used for hostile actions against Israel, whether raids from Gaza or the blockade of shipping to and from Elath. Another objective was political, to give the United Nations a secure base in the area while negotiations on larger issues continued. The Secretary-General's report appeared to contend that such measures would probably be illegal and at any rate were unnecessary. They were illegal, he implied, because "although the United Nations General Assembly would be entitled

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to recommend the establishment of a United Nations administration and to request negotiations in order to implement such an arrangement, it would lack authority in that recommendation, unilaterally, to require compliance." They were unnecessary in that once Israel had fully complied with the 1949 armistice agreement, in particular by withdrawing to the demarcation lines and evacuating the demilitarized zone of El Auja, Egypt's claim to exercise belligerent rights (specifically the right of blockade) would fall to the ground. Many believed that such belligerent rights no longer existed in any case, and that the Security Council had ruled to that effect in its 1951 resolution, mentioned above. To make clear that UNEF should not be pressed to serve in any way except to prevent the renewal of fighting the Secretary-General stated that it was not to be employed "so as to prejudge the solution of the controversial questions involved;" or, as he put it in another place in the report, the use of it must be "impartial, in the sense that it does not serve as a means to force a settlement, in the interest of one party, of political conflicts or legal issues recognized as controversial."

The concept that United Nations forces could be stationed on Egyptian territory only with Egyptian consent was not in dispute in so far as it applied to their initial entry. Many authorities, however, including Mr. Lester B. Pearson of Canada, the author of the resolution creating UNEF, and at a later date Secretary Dulles, held that once Egypt had accepted their entry she could not insist on their withdrawal until the General Assembly decided that in its opinion their mission had been completed. Three of the nations which had supplied contingents disagreed; India, Indonesia and Jugoslavia gave notice that they would withdraw their troops whenever Egypt requested. What might be the opinion of the General Assembly if it ever were forced to formulate one remained uncertain.[3]

The statement that UNEF should not be used to force a settlement of political or legal conflicts seemed valid, also, in so far as the concept depended on the words "in the interest of one party." But did this preclude the use of UNEF to maintain an open situation in areas about which both parties entered claims and com-

[3] During his subsequent negotiations in Cairo, in March, the Secretary-General indicated that he would not press the right of UNEF to remain in Gaza beyond the time when President Nasser felt that it would be to Egypt's advantage to have them withdraw. The problem is not likely to arise immediately. Egypt is too weak militarily for the time being to want to send troops into such an exposed position.

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plaints and regarding which the United Nations had a function to perform in attempting to induce both of them to accept an impartial settlement in the interest of peace? The General Assembly avoided taking a position of its own on this point; and the Secretary-General's narrow interpretation stood. The major interested party was the community of nations which had been putting tremendous efforts into extricating Egypt from the consequences of her military defeat, and was now about to succeed in forcing Israel's withdrawal. Was it to be foreclosed from any gain except the highly important but nevertheless abstract victory of having frustrated aggression? Was no use to be made of that victory to exact a negotiation of the underlying disputes which had menaced the world with war?

Before the vote was taken on February 2 various delegates spoke, among them the American, Indian and Egyptian. Ambassador Lodge referred to the need of preventing a return to the conditions prevailing before the recent hostilities and mentioned UNEF's rôle "as a restraint against any attempt to exercise belligerent rights or to engage in hostile actions contrary to the armistice agreement, the decisions of the Security Council or the resolutions of the General Assembly." Dr. Fawzi, the Egyptian Foreign Minister, did not let this pass unchallenged. UNEF, he said brusquely, "is not in Egypt as an occupation force, not as a replacement for the invaders, not to resolve any question or settle any problem, be that in relation to the Suez Canal, to Palestine or to the freedom of passage in territorial waters." Mr. Krishna Menon remarked that he had tried to "say the same thing in my own way."

A number of key questions remained unanswered, and obviously were intended to. One concerned the nature of the "other measures" which had been proposed in the Secretary-General's report of January 24 and which had now been authorized in the second of the adopted resolutions. Another concerned the nature of the "considerations" governing the implementation of those measures. Another concerned the nature and duration of UNEF's functions. On these and other matters opinion in the General Assembly was deeply divided. Neither of the two main groups felt sure of being able to secure a two-thirds majority for its viewpoint but each feared that the other might.

The Secretary-General was left to interpret what had been the General Assembly's intent and to do his best to give it coherent

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execution. As he remarked somewhat later, however, his office is very different from a government. He did not have the staff to plan the details of an operation of great magnitude, he did not have diplomatic and intelligence services to keep him informed, he did not have tradition to bolster his confidence, and he knew that in the end he would have to account for his actions to 81 discordant principals. These were among the reasons, probably, why he felt constrained to conceive of his function as being that of an intermediary back-and-forth between two hostile and very vocal sovereign parties rather than as a mediator on behalf of a third party with interests certainly not inferior to those of either contestant and possessed of rights beyond those either stated in blurred terms in a specific resolution or left entirely unmentioned.

IV

In this stalemate, Secretary of State Dulles and Mrs. Meir, the Israeli Foreign Minister, undertook discussions in Washington aimed at working out a procedure which would result in the establishment of a peaceable *de facto* situation at the mouth of the Gulf of Aqaba and in the Gaza Strip, bypassing the juridical problems that would be involved in reaching a final settlement in either case. Although these discussions took place outside U.N., the Secretary-General told the General Assembly on February 22 that he had maintained close contact with them, that they were aimed at breaking an unfortunate impasse and that they were "deserving of warm appreciation." He spoke also of Egypt's "willingness and readiness to make special and helpful arrangements" in the Gaza area "with U.N. and some of its auxiliary bodies, such as UNEF and UNRWA;" and he referred to such "other arrangements" to be made with U.N. "as will contribute towards safeguarding life and property in the area by providing efficient and effective policy protection; as will guarantee good civilian administration; as will assure maximum assistance to the U.N. refugee programme; and as will protect and foster the economic development of the territory and its people." Evidently the *de facto* situation in view might be considerably different from a *de jure* one that simply brought back Egypt and left UNEF guarding the frontier. On February 25 a note from the Secretary-General to the General Assembly refrained from expressing any opinion on details of the possible *de facto* develop-

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ment but did reiterate that for his part he could "neither detract from nor annul" any rights Egypt possessed under the armistice agreement.

The Secretary-General's caution about the results of the Washington discussions did not prevent the impression from spreading that some form of interim U.N. administration was to be set up in Gaza. Speaking in the General Assembly on February 25, Mr. Lester B. Pearson urged specifically that this should be done. The United Nations, he said, should "accept responsibility to the maximum possible extent for establishing and maintaining effective civil administration [in the Gaza Strip]; in fostering economic development and social welfare; in maintaining law and order." He suggested that to coördinate and make effective the necessary arrangements the Secretary-General might decide to appoint a U.N. Commissioner for Gaza. After the Israeli civil administration had been replaced, the Commissioner would remain in Gaza, "where he would have chief responsibility for all U.N. activities there, including those of UNEF inside the Strip."

The fact that separate discussions were under way in Washington was criticized by delegates of the Afro-Asian and Soviet blocs, but not as violently as might have been expected. There seemed to be some relief that a *modus vivendi* was in sight and confidence, perhaps, that in operation it could be turned to Arab advantage.

On March 1, Mrs. Meir rose in the General Assembly and announced Israel's decision to withdraw fully and at once from Sharm el-Sheikh and the Gaza Strip in compliance with the first February 2 resolution. Because so many uncertainties had been created by the wording of the second resolution, she listed a number of understandings and expectations on Israel's part regarding the policy which would be followed subsequently concerning those two areas. As regards Gaza, one of the Israeli assumptions as stated by Mrs. Meir was that "the take-over of Gaza from the military and civilian control of Israel will be exclusively by the United Nations Emergency Force." Another was that the United Nations will be the agency for "safeguarding life and property in the area by providing effective and efficient police protection; as will guarantee good civilian administration; as will assure maximum assistance to the United Nations refugee program; and as will protect and foster the economic development of the territory and its people." Another was that "the above-men-

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tioned responsibility of the United Nations for the administration of Gaza will be maintained for a transitory period from the take-over until there is a peace settlement, to be sought as rapidly as possible, or a definitive agreement on the future of the Gaza Strip."

In commenting on Mrs. Meir's speech, Ambassador Lodge said that nothing in it was to be taken as making the Israeli withdrawal "conditional." He added, however, that her declarations seemed to the United States to be "not unreasonable." (The cautious double negative was reportedly substituted at the last moment for the more binding word "legitimate.") As Mrs. Meir's speech was understood to have been discussed word for word in Washington beforehand, and as she had expected full United States support for the Israeli "assumptions," Ambassador Lodge's remarks were taken in very bad grace in Tel Aviv, and for a day the decision to withdraw from the Gaza and Aqaba areas was put in abeyance.

President Eisenhower thereupon stepped in to reassure Premier Ben-Gurion with a strongly-worded note urging that Israel withdraw "with the utmost speed" and saying that he believed that "Israel will have no cause to regret having thus conformed to the strong sentiment of the world community." He went on: "It has always been the view of this Government that after the withdrawal there should be a united effort by all the nations to bring about conditions more stable, more tranquil and more conducive to the general welfare than those which existed heretofore. Already the United Nations General Assembly has adopted resolutions which presage a better future." And he added this pledge (weakened only, one must note in passing, by the reference to the General Assembly resolutions as a point of departure): "Hopes and expectations based thereon were voiced by your Foreign Minister and others. I believe that it is reasonable to entertain such hopes and expectations and I want you to know that the United States, as a friend of all the countries of the area and as a loyal member of the United Nations, will see that such hopes prove not in vain." In view of President Eisenhower's recognition that Israeli "hopes and expectations" were reasonable—by which he was taken to mean the hopes and expectations expressed as "assumptions" in Mrs. Meir's speech—the Israeli Government decided to go ahead with the withdrawal. This took place on the night of March 6–7.

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On March 8, the Secretary-General reported again to the General Assembly. Among other things he said:

"On 7 March, the Commander of the United Nations Emergency Force notified the population of Gaza that 'the United Nations Emergency Force, acting in fulfilment of its functions as determined by the General Assembly of the United Nations with the consent of the Government of Egypt, is being deployed in this area for the purpose of maintaining quiet during and after the withdrawal of the Israeli defense forces. Until further arrangements are made, the United Nations Emergency Force has assumed responsibility for civil affairs in the Gaza Strip. . . .'"

He noted that in its second resolution of February 2 the General Assembly had recognized "that withdrawal by Israel must be followed by action which would assure progress towards the creation of peaceful conditions" in the area; and he said that the completion of withdrawal put the operative paragraphs of this resolution into full effect.

In addition (the Secretary-General went on) the resolution had "requested the Secretary-General, in consultation with the parties concerned, to carry out measures referred to in the resolution and to report as appropriate to the General Assembly. The Secretary-General will now devote his attention to this task. . . ."

He added that the Assembly had further stated that "it considered that the maintenance of the Armistice Agreement requires the implementation of 'other measures as proposed in the Secretary-General's report,' with due regard to the considerations set out therein, with a view to assist in achieving situations conducive to the maintenance of peaceful conditions in the area. This statement, as it was formulated, read together with the request to the Secretary-General to consult with the parties, indicates that the General Assembly wished to leave the choice of these 'other measures' to be decided in the light of further study and consultations."

He continued: "Arrangements made by the Commander of the United Nations Emergency Force provided for an initial take-over in Gaza by the Force. This was in accordance with the statement of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly on 22 February, that 'the take-over of Gaza from the military and civilian control of Israel . . . in the first instance would be exclusively by UNEF'. . . ."

Carrying in mind these statements (among them the ambig-

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uous phrase "in the first instance"), and also recalling the questions left in suspense in the second resolution of February 2, we shall now see what the actual course of events was in Gaza in the days immediately following the Israeli withdrawal.

V

The military take-over of the Gaza Strip by the United Nations Emergency Force was admirably executed. Officials in New York had talked at first of leaving a gap of a few hours between the Israeli departure and the U.N. arrival. A suggested alternative was to send in merely a team of U.N. observers to replace the Israeli. Fortunately both these unrealistic ideas were abandoned. During the night of March 6–7 the Israeli withdrew and simultaneously the U. N. troops came in; General Moshe Dayan, Israeli Chief of Staff, handed over authority without ceremony to Colonel Carl Engholm of Denmark, the deputy of Major General E. L. M. Burns, Canadian commander of UNEF. There was no vacuum of authority and hence no murdering or looting. The rioting came later.

In preparation for the withdrawal the Israeli commander had ordered a 24-hour curfew. The population guessed what was coming and felt safe in ignoring it. This was a mistake; the Israeli meant to preserve order to the end and after there had been some shooting the population remained indoors. Things had been worse when the Egyptians abandoned Gaza on November 2, several hours before the appearance of the Israeli troops. In that hiatus there had been wild looting and a number of murders as Arab groups took vengeance against each other or settled personal debts.

On the same day, March 7, there assembled at Lydda airport near Tel Aviv a group of the experts hastily recruited from UNEF personnel and from U.N. technical assistance missions in Cairo and elsewhere for the task of administering the Gaza Strip under international authority. The original intention was that in advance of the withdrawal these experts and some officials of UNRWA, the agency caring for Arab refugees, would meet Israeli authorities at El Arish, in Sinai, to arrange for a smooth transfer of powers; but that plan had been overtaken by events. The U.N. contingent contained legal, financial, railway and other experts qualified to operate a civil government; UNRWA personnel meanwhile would not only care for the refugees but would

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feed the 60,000 or more of the local population who had been on the Egyptian relief rolls. With little or no briefing on local problems except what they could learn from the Israeli who had just evacuated the Strip and from the UNRWA personnel who had been working there for the past eight years, the civilian experts went off to report at General Burns' headquarters in the Sinai peninsula, while the UNRWA team, which also was technically under General Burns for the time being, proceeded direct to Gaza.

The absence of a specific program of action for the civilian administrators would have mattered less if the military organ with which they were to serve had had clear instructions as to its own functions and authority. These seem to have been left largely undefined, however, with the result that since military men are not accustomed to making political decisions, especially decisions which their civilian superiors have been unable or unwilling to make, the local population soon felt that they had wide scope for independent action. Under Egyptian prompting they were not slow to make use of it. Neither in New York nor in Washington, and certainly not among U.N. representatives in the field, was there expectation that President Nasser would move at once to take over control of the Strip. This, however, was what he had decided to do; and his action may have been speeded by the stress which Israeli propaganda was putting on Mrs. Meir's "assumption" that U.N. would stay in Gaza until there had been an overall settlement and that meanwhile Egypt's return was excluded (a word attributed to Secretary Dulles). As a first step he sent agents into the Strip to organize demonstrations in favor of a prompt return of Egyptian control and began whipping up support for the demand by attacks on UNEF and passionate appeals over the Cairo radio.

On March 8, the day following the UNEF take-over, a group of journalists arrived from Cairo. Among them were three who seemed to have no professional responsibilities but instead very precise instructions as to how to organize the local population in "peaceful demonstrations" for the return of the Strip to Egyptian rule. The demonstrators were provided with thousands of small Egyptian flags and banners with slogans (a photograph shows children carrying one reading, "Hell to Criminal's Colonials"). This elaborate paraphernalia was obviously not of local manufacture any more than were the tommy-guns and hand

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grenades which now made their appearance in the hands of the squad leaders.

UNEF, which had counted on being welcomed to Gaza as friends, found that the population was being organized against them. They had guns, but they had not been told that they could use them. Specifically, could they use them to impose order? Sights like that of a Danish soldier surrounded by a crowd of Arabs clawing at his rifle, while he fired it aimlessly into the air over their heads, did not improve the morale of UNEF as a whole. With or without authority from New York, Colonel Engholm issued an order on March 9 forbidding the possession of arms by unauthorized persons. What should or could be done with violators, however, remained undecided. There was no authority from New York to put trouble-makers in jail and there was no provision of courts, military or civil, to try them once they had been jailed.

On Sunday, March 10, General Burns moved his headquarters from Sinai to the old Police Station in Gaza, the seat of civil administration for the Strip, built in the days of the British Mandate. Colonel Engholm was appointed Military Governor of the city. Hardly was General Burns installed in his new headquarters before it was surrounded by rioters trying to storm it and raise the Egyptian flag. UNEF soldiers used tear gas to disperse them and also fired over their heads; a bullet ricochetted and killed one of the demonstrators. What would have happened if the mob had persisted is hard to say. UNEF had no instructions explicitly authorizing the use of arms; the concept had been that its simple presence would be sufficient to guarantee order regardless of whether it was known to be able and willing to enforce it.

March 10 marked the turning point. The mob was not in control of Gaza but it knew that the United Nations was not in control either. The U.N. civil administrators had been trickling in and had begun by now to get their bearings. It was too late. When the old municipal council was reinstated it had not been required to recognize their functions. The next day President Nasser felt safe in naming General Abdel Latif of the Egyptian Army as Administrative Governor of Gaza. His timing was perfect. He had organized pressure in the streets of Gaza, waited until the mob had produced a shooting incident, and now on March 11 took the decisive step. On this day Secretary-General Hammarskjöld's representative, Under Secretary Ralph J.

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Bunche, flew from Cairo to Gaza to visit General Burns. He received the news of the Latif appointment on his return to Cairo that evening. General Burns heard of it at the same time. The next morning the Moscow radio announced warm Soviet approval. Secretary Dulles was in Canberra, Australia, out of Mrs. Meir's reach. Whatever may have been the aim of the Dulles-Meir negotiations in Washington, the Nasser fait accompli had frustrated it.

On the evening of March 14 General Latif arrived in Gaza accompanied by staff officers and (by the count of an American observer) about 150 military police in red-topped hats, "armed with tommy-guns and swaggering as though they had just won a victory in battle." An authoritative UNEF estimate given to this writer in Gaza a few days later was that there were "about 100" of them. Cairo reported the number as 50. The precise number does not matter. They were soon supplemented by a group of Egyptian officers who quickly organized a Palestinian police. General Burns was invited to move out of his headquarters to make way for General Latif. He left the Police Station, always the recognized center of local authority in Gaza, and installed himself in an unfinished hospital across the street. His troops henceforth were concentrated on patrol duties along the Israeli border.[4]

The United Nations experiment in administering an area of danger to world peace had ended before it had begun.

The dénouement can be traced to many errors of commission and of omission, but to the latter more than the former. The first and probably decisive omission, we see in retrospect, was the General Assembly's failure to relate the measures taken to force the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Egyptian territory with measures to deal with the circumstances out of which the attack had arisen. Without attempting to set up a balance sheet between current wrongdoings and those of the past about which it had heard complaints and counter-complaints *ad nauseam,* the United Nations should have given plain notice that it was not going to tolerate longer a situation which besides being a local shame was an outrageous offense to the whole international community and a perpetual (and at this moment imminent) danger

[4] It was later reported that UNEF patrols were being made in company with Palestinian police. General Burns told the writer that this was not true "as a regular procedure" but pointed out that there was no reason under the armistice terms not to use joint patrols if it seemed advisable.

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to world peace. Had Ambassador Lodge's draft resolution of November 3 been pressed and adopted, perhaps in more carefully thought-out form, it would have set the General Assembly on the right course. Then was the moment to initiate constructive international action, before Arab, Indian and Soviet opposition congealed. There still was a chance even later of saving a basis for an important United Nations rôle in the area if preparations to maintain the *de facto* situation in Gaza had been undertaken with more care and foresight and if the U.N. agencies on the spot had been better instructed as to their functions.

The Lodge resolution, or something like it, would have been in the same current of thought and policy as had prompted the three-pronged proposals regarding refugees, boundaries and regional security made by Secretary Dulles in his speech before the Council on Foreign Relations on August 26, 1955. It was not in any sense an anti-Arab proposal. The Arab states had felt themselves the most injured party in the long dispute with Israel and their fundamental interests would have been well served if they had welcomed a move to settle it while Israel was on the defensive in the court of world public opinion. Unfortunately, they did not see it in that light, and the suggestions and warnings from various delegations that the upshot would be a return to the same threatening situation which had preceded the war of last autumn did not persuade the American delegation to risk a determined effort to deal with fundamental issues or encourage the Secretary-General to initiate such a trial on his own. So far as is known, President Eisenhower has not as yet moved to initiate the "united effort" promised in his urgent message to Premier Ben-Gurion on March 3.

The General Assembly was laboring under the handicap, of course, that it was attempting to fulfill some of the thwarted functions of the Security Council but without that body's legal powers of enforcement. The early days of the crisis, however, had proved how effective its recommendations could be when they were clear, when the United States gave them all-out support and when the Secretary-General translated them into vigorous action. Within 48 hours after the General Assembly had asked Mr. Hammarskjöld to bring in a plan for a United Nations Emergency Force he had done it. The subsequent experience with UNEF—both in Egypt and in Gaza—should be turned to account. The Secretariat should be enlarged and strengthened by

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the addition of a military advisor to the Secretary-General and a skeleton organization capable of being promptly expanded to undertake tasks in the field in case of need. The Peace Observation Commission provided for under the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution of 1950 should be put on a ready footing, prepared to report to the General Assembly at any time on situations threatening the peace and giving signs of requiring international action. Finally, the military forces which the 1950 Resolution recommended that member nations earmark for police operations should in fact be made ready for that service.

The United Nations came into existence because the international community believed that it had interests above and beyond those of particular disputants; it accepted the duty of defeating and rectifying acts of aggression and it established norms for action to remove causes of dispute. Sometimes the nature of a crisis makes members or groups of members incline to emphasize one duty or the other. A nation with universal interests and a constant concern for peace should not neglect either.

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THE FUTURE IN RETROSPECT

"MOTHER INDIA" THIRTY YEARS AFTER

By A. M. Rosenthal

MOTHER INDIA. By Katherine Mayo. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1927.

THE pictures that flash into a man's mind when he thinks of a foreign country or its people spring from an enormous variety of experiences—a movie or a song, a book read in childhood, a cartoon caricature, a painting or a college lecture, a travel poster or a newspaper feature story. For a generation or more, an American's mental image of France was quite closely tied to the Mademoiselle from Armentières. In the 1930s, in a certain block in New York City, to call a boy English was to call him a dandified sissy and invite what followed. There are millions of people throughout the world who, to the day they die, will see jackboots when they hear the word "Germany." A couple of years ago, a British moving picture director thought of the perfect way to make sure his audience immediately identified a well-dressed young woman as an American. Naturally, he had her snapping bubble gum when she came on-screen.

These flashing images, these quickly recognizable symbols or caricatures, obviously have a great deal to do with the attitude of a man or a country toward another country or its people. Even in this Era of the American Tourist, they are important, because it is easy and wonderfully comforting to find in a country what before you ever bought your ticket you were quite sure existed.

All this has to do with the American image of a country about which Americans seem to be thinking more than they have in the past—India. The political images of India are usually on the unpleasant side: Nehru sitting on a fence or shaking a finger in self-righteous lecture. The Indian Army occupying Kashmir in opposition to Pakistan (mental image: turbaned soldier standing shoulder to shoulder with a G.I.). V. K. Krishna Menon, ruffle-haired and sharp-featured, leaning into a microphone and saying something at least faintly nasty. Happy Russian leaders standing garlanded before hundreds of thousands of cheering Indians. But it is a fair guess that these political images of India occur in the minds of Americans a lot less frequently than the

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dramatic and usually horrible mental portraits that often can be traced back to, or at least symbolized by, a book published 30 years ago and detested in India to this day.

There are few people more important in the relationship between India and the United States than Katherine Mayo, few books, if any, that contributed more violent coloring to the American mental image of India than "Mother India." To read "Mother India" in public in New Delhi is to ask for sour looks and a pointed talk on the evils done to India by its author. When this reporter reread the book on planes recently he found it the price of privacy to turn the jacket cover inside out. A friend, one of India's most able diplomats, advised him not to write any piece that used "Mother India" even as a take-off point. He said that no discussion could be taken seriously that started from libel. Another Indian made the point that "Mother India" could no more be used as a basis for discussing India than could the "Protocols of the Elders of Zion" be used as a basis for discussing Israel. Some Indians seem to have the idea that every American who visits India has read the book carefully. The likelihood, of course, is that by this time most Americans who come to India have never even seen a copy.

But Indians' hatred of the book is not simply founded on what they take to be a monstrous distortion of their country and religions, but on the belief that too many foreigners have the "Mother India" picture of their country. The importance of the book, therefore, is not its accuracy. A small shelf-full of books has been written attacking Miss Mayo point by point. The authors of these books question Miss Mayo's facts, her judgment, her ability to understand the country on the basis of a few months' visit, her method of presentation and her fairness. But what nobody is able to question is that the picture she drew of India is the picture that remains alive in the mind of the rest of the world. That is why "Mother India" is worth talking about 30 years after publication.

This, broadly, was Miss Mayo's picture:

India is a country whose people are self-cursed. Their religion is degrading, their society leads them into ways of life even more degrading mentally, morally, socially and economically. Too-early marriage and encouragement of autoeroticism have created an indolent, weakened, ineffectual people. Indians are mentally sterile, as well as bodily feeble and often sexually impotent. They

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are habitually inclined to blame their faults on anybody but themselves. Temple prostitution, infanticide, child marriage, bitter isolation for widows, untouchability, ignorance, cow worship, a cow-crippled economy, cruelty and callousness, disease and a layer of filth over the country—these are some of the ingredients of the "Mother India" diagnosis.

Many of the horrors that shocked Miss Mayo and contributed to the "Mother India" image can be found in India today. Hinduism, as a religion, philosophy and way of life, has been able to satisfy the spiritual needs of billions of people for thousands of years. That in itself makes it somewhat ridiculous to write off the Hindu civilization, to dismiss it because it has failed to produce social and economic decencies for the people who follow it. But it is no great discovery to say that, in terms of those decencies, the end product of Hindu civilization remains today an appalling one. Every tourist who has seen the bathing in the slime of the holy rivers, stepped across the street sleepers of Bombay, edged away from the lepers of New Delhi, seen the naked children of Calcutta, watched humans condemned to a life of removing the excrement of other humans, seen the scabs and flies of Indian villages, can leave the country, if he looks no further, with his own "Mother India." With no trouble at all, any writer who has stayed in India for a few months could fill a book cataloging the human degredation he has seen. These things are still part of India. No amount of good will, no amount of sophistication, changes their reality. But the truth is that a "Mother India" could be written about most countries in Asia and perhaps most countries in the Middle East and even some in Latin America, subtracting a few horrors, adding a few horrors.

It is not the purpose of this article to re-review "Mother India," to condemn or justify it or to apologize for or praise India by saying, "See how things have changed!" Looked at 30 years later, the most important element in the book is not the listing of horrors, some of which existed for thousands of years, some of which exist today, some of which never existed or at least were never witnessed by foreigners and Indians living in India. The most important element in the book is Miss Mayo's picture of the mental India, her portrait of the Indian as spineless, eternally accepting, spiritually slothful, without curiosity, without quest and without gumption. It is important, not just in the evaluation of the book, but in the evaluation of India today.

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Something has happened in India whose beginnings were visible 30 years ago but which Miss Mayo did not take into consideration. That something is mental fermentation on a national scale.

After ages of acceptance, India is questioning and changing. More changes have been made in the Indian social structure in the decade since independence than in centuries before it. Attitudes are changing; and for a country searching for progress, attitudes are perhaps more important than any other factor. The changes are painfully slow, both the changes in attitude and the changes in social structure that they bring with them. There is one sure way for India to change faster, to strike harder at the social and economic evils. That would be for India to adopt authoritarianism. This does not mean, of course, that even within the democratic framework India could not make changes she has not yet attempted. But for the time being at least India is willing to pay the high price of change through evolutionary democratic processes.

The heaviest handicaps under which India labored through the centuries were the attitudes toward authority and the individual's place in society and human relations within the society. An individual-to-individual callousness, despite India's belief in her own spiritualism, was always part of India. No miracle has taken place. This callousness is still so strong in the country that it is the greatest danger for a foreigner living in India, for it is a frighteningly easy thing to find it creeping into one's own soul.

It has many manifestations. One day a couple of years ago, in a South Indian city, an Indian of considerable prominence was driving with a foreigner. The Indian was talking of the great Socialist reforms his country was undertaking. The foreigner, new to the country, was staring out the window at some near-naked Indians pulling a load of steel in the 110-degree sun. The foreigner called his companion's attention to the men. The Indian stared briefly, said "Oh, coolies," turned away and went on talking about Socialist reforms. This is a trifling example of something rather important. There is a great deal of turning away in India, even more of simply not seeing. There is an explanation: if Indians reacted to all the misery they see about them and of which so many of them are a part, they would find their day-to-day lives shaken emotionally to an almost unbearable point. It is easier to shrug and turn away, and Indians do both. Among India's upper classes there is depressingly little realization of the responsibilities

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that go with wealth and position. It is the exceptional Indian woman who will give even a tiny bit of her time to the mountain of social welfare work to be done in India, the exceptional Indian businessman who will put any of his profits into a hospital or a school.

A decade of independence also has not been enough to change the ordinary Indian's jumping-to-attention sort of respect for somebody above him, the snapping-of-fingers sort of disrespect and unspoken contempt for everybody below him. It is not frivolous or naïve to point out that Indians never say "thank you" to a servant, virtually never leave off the "sir" to a superior.

This trait is not something confined to social life but has its influence in the political makeup of the country. On the national and state level, India is governed through the processes of parliamentary democracy. Get down into the district, though, and New Delhi seems awfully far away. In the district, the magistrate or the collector rules as a virtual king and rules usually by decree and the awesome respect of the villagers and townsmen for his office. In the city of Belgaum two years ago, not a taxi-driver would dream of taking some Goa-bound correspondents toward the border, or even sightseeing around town, until approval had come down, from the magistrate to the police superintendent to the regional transport officer to the taxi-driver.

But to say all this is to say what could have been written about India at any time in its modern history and to say no more than could be said about most countries of Asia. What counts now is whether there have been changes in national mental attitudes, and there have been. A clerk still snaps his fingers at a *chaprassi* —a messenger—but in Bombay a *chaprassi* sits in the state legislature. The villagers still salaam at the sight of the district officer, but the district officer, like it or not, is taking courses to teach him that a civil servant is not a civil master.

In the years since independence, India has done what the British thought could not be done—outlawed untouchability, recognized the human rights of women, permitted divorce, attacked some of the legal anachronisms in the Hindu code. For the moment, the question as to whether all these changes have succeeded is not the most important one. The essential point is that independent India has shown, by these laws, that she is looking inward, finding things in herself that displease her and is trying to cast them out.

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There are few countries in the world whose leader scolds his people more often and more sharply than Nehru does. There is no other leader who insists so often on probing his country's national psychology and then telling everybody who wants to listen just what's wrong. And it is difficult to think of another country where the government and the ruling party, even though they do not always carry through, are pledged to social reforms that strike at tenets and ways of life held holy by the majority of the people.

It is being neither condescending nor Pollyannaish to say that a nation that disapproves of itself, that seeks to change peacefully a social structure sanctified by the religion of the majority of its people, has achieved something prideful. This sort of nation is something more than Miss Mayo's wallowing "Mother India."

The fermentation in India has not, obviously, come to the point where it has eliminated the mental burdens and crippling attitudes from which the country suffered for so long. Of these, possibly, the most important are the attitudes toward caste. To foreigners, caste in India means only one thing— untouchability. But this is simply the most dramatic part of the problem. Caste is important to India not just because it divides high-born from untouchable but because it divides the country into unnumbered thousands of compartments whose members act and think as members of that compartment and who guard their privileges and rights against the members of all other compartments. This compartmentalization leads to a sort of boxed-in thinking and set of attitudes toward the rest of the society. It leads to a contempt and disgust for certain kinds of labor, and, beyond that, to a shutting of the national mind to those who participate in those forms of labor. The importance of caste therefore is not simply the physical manifestations of it but, for a country seeking for a form of social justice, the mental attitudes that go with it.

After 10 years of independence, India suffers from a split personality. As a nation she is committed to and believes in an egalitarian form of society. As a people, Indians, to nobody's great astonishment, have found a decade not long enough to change patterns of thought and attitude made rigid over the centuries.

In the elections this spring, possibly the most important single political factor, on a state and local level, was the caste to which the candidate belonged. Caste was the problem that bedeviled and split the Congress Party in Madras, Bihar, Bombay, Orissa

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and other states of the union. All over India, politicians told this reporter that the general rule was that, outside of a few pocket boroughs controlled by one party or another, caste was the first thing the local nominating committee had to consider. This was true not only of the Congress Party but of most other parties in the opposition, including the Communists.

If important Indians once were inclined to look away from caste or justify it, that is not true today. Every now and then little articles appear in newspapers berating the fact that the iron framework of caste—marriage within the caste—still is a way of life not just in the villages but among the educated, and that matrimonial advertisements still prescribe the caste to which the bride or groom must belong.

Professor M. N. Srinivas, an anthropologist at the University of Baroda, put the problem of caste this way at a recent meeting of the Indian Science Congress: "Caste has played a crucial rôle in the functioning of representative institutions and in the struggle for power. Devolution of power in India is seriously complicated by caste. One of the dilemmas of modern India is that while smaller states will make for more intimate associations of the people with the Government, they are also likely to make for the tyranny of the dominant caste. The conferring of vast powers to *panchayats* (village councils) places great temptations before the locally dominant caste to use the money and power available to it in favor of its own members and at the expense of the other and dependent castes." He added that caste was so "tacitly and completely accepted by all, including those who are most vocal in condemning it, that it is everywhere regarded as the unit of social action. . . . The politician who wants caste to disappear is also aware of its vote-catching power and is thus faced with a real dilemma."

The 1951 census reported that there were 51,343,000 Indians belonging to the depressed or "scheduled castes." The law is on their side but economics is against them and so are taboos sanctified by thousands of years. Millions of the "scheduled caste" members, according to a report written by an investigation commission, are virtual serfs. They till land belonging to their masters, and only as long as their masters please. If they attempt to break their caste bounds, they find themselves destitute.

The Government outlaws untouchability, but Indian officials, most of whom seem to face the problem squarely, recognize that

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the Government cannot yet enforce the ban. Harijans—"children of God," Gandhi's name for untouchables—do not go easily to the police or the courts any more than a Negro in Alabama 15 years ago would have petitioned the local police chief for his civil rights.

Harijan leaders speak bitterly. N. K. Lingam, a Harijan member of the Andhra Assembly, said in 1955:

"We Harijans are reconciled to the life of untouchability in spite of what has been done to remove it. We pray, however, that at least when we are dead this curse should not follow us. Separate cremation grounds for Harijans should cease forthwith."

Another Harijan member of the Andhra Assembly, Mrs. Rukminamma, said this:

"You tell us to draw water from wells in the central part of villages inhabited by caste Hindus. You point to us the Removal of Untouchability Act. But if we poor Harijans dare approach these wells, caste Hindus threaten to break our bones."

These are not simply isolated quotations. They are examples of the enormous problem of making social custom catch up with legal action—a problem that the United States Supreme Court knows something about.

But on the question of caste, as on most other problems in India, a foreigner can look at the situation in two ways. He can concentrate on the problem itself, built up over so long, and see nothing else. Or he can look at the problem in conjunction with the attempts made to deal with it.

For instance: Is the only important thing about caste in India in 1957 that it still exists, still hampers the country's mental and physical growth? Or is it also important that for the first time in Indian history efforts are being made, through the laborious and unglamorous process of change by law, to do something about it? Is the only significant element within the caste picture in India the fact that scores of millions of Indians still live by it? Or is it even more significant that for the first time millions of other Indians have shucked off, or are beginning to shuck off, ways of caste thinking that not many years ago seemed indelible?

In tens of thousands of Indian villages, caste is today as it always was. But in a hundred thousand other villages, Government Community Development workers are fighting the battle against untouchability as they are fighting illiteracy, disease and hopelessly antiquated agricultural methods—by example and

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persuasion. This battle is just as much a part of the picture of India as is the fact that the complete miracle has not taken place. Looking at India from the point of view of attitude and changes of attitude, it is more important.

In the Indian Government, in India's armed forces, in the big cities, in the publicly supported schools, untouchability as such no longer exists. There are Harijans in the civil service, in the central and state cabinets. When India voted, Harijan queued with Brahmin. All this does not guarantee the social acceptability of Harijans any more than permitting Negroes to ride buses without Jim Crow in Montgomery guarantees their social integration in the American South. But both are achievements and part of the picture.

The slow change in attitude toward caste in itself is part of a bigger change that is perhaps the most striking difference between India as it is and "Mother India." The realization has come to the people of India that better ways of living exist and can be achieved. The bringing of this realization, and with it the lesson that the achievement must be brought about peacefully and legally, is certainly the greatest accomplishment of Gandhi, Nehru and the people who fought and worked with them. As in every major peaceful step, this accomplishment has not been perfectly achieved but that does not change the fact that it exists.

This realization not only marks an historic change in attitude but has brought with it enormous new problems, psychological as well as economic. Summed up, these problems are that India is ready for more than she has achieved, wants more than the Government and the economic structure of the country can at present supply, and is becoming impatient with the waiting.

It was once thought, for example, that the great difficulty in constructing the Community Development Program would be to get the Indian villager to accept new techniques, new habits, new attitudes toward change and progress. But the administrators of the project have found that the desire of the villagers is outstripping the ability of the Government to satisfy the desire. This is something that gives the Community Development people a deep and warm inner satisfaction. But it is something that has its dangers, obviously enough, for a country wedded at least by law to peaceful change.

It also has its dangers for the Community Development Program. The benefits brought by the program certainly are not

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anything that would make a Kansas farmer unhappy with his own lot. But for people with nothing, a new drain, new seeds, schools, the attention of a doctor, farm credits, the first loosenings of caste, are a great deal indeed. The villages untouched by the Community Development Program see neighboring villages emerge into a touch of economic and social sunlight and want to come out of the shade themselves. The problem this has posed is that the program has developed political overtones. The Government has promised that by the end of the second Five-Year Plan in 1961 every village in the country—about 500,000 of them —will come under the Community Development Program, or its less intensive offshoot, the National Extension Program. But putting a village under the latter may turn out, in tens of thousands of cases, to be giving it little more than paper attention.

There is another situation in India indicating that the country's chief psychological problem at the moment is not the sloth of the mind about which Miss Mayo wrote but something quite the reverse. In the decades of rebellion against the British, habits of resistance to government were developed among millions of Indians. The revolt against British rule was not simply a coup engineered by a few, not a flash mutiny or a quick take-over of government. It was a long and slowly built up movement and by the time it succeeded millions of people had participated in it, had fought the government by every method Gandhi taught from boycott to refusal to recognize the laws of the land.

These habits of resistance to government still exist in India and worry the leaders of the country, probably more than anything else. There is an impatience with parliamentary change, a reluctance to wait, a deep and genuine belief that it is the citizen's right to use other methods than the ballot to force his government to change a decision. This is a way of thinking that may be an advance over passive acceptance of evil but is an important step away from understanding of a man's place in a free society.

A huge variety of things that could quite easily be settled peacefully are, in India, taken into the streets. A change in state boundaries in Bombay. A change in the price of a bus ride in Patna. A railroad worker's dispute in the Punjab. As Nehru sees it, this is a perversion of Gandhi's teachings of peaceful resistance. As Nehru sees it, the problem stems from the abandonment of one set of political morals and the failure to achieve completely another set.

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Durga Das, one of the editors of the *Hindustan Times,* wrote in a column not long ago that Indians were coming to the point where they were recognizing their rights. He asked himself whether they would now recognize their duties. Putting the same problem more directly, he wrote: "Nehru can raise a storm, but he has yet to prove that he can direct the whirlwind." Durga Das and other Indians point to the danger: that a people whose desire and political consciousness have been awakened may not be content to wait indefinitely upon the processes of law.

To an Indian observer, what counts most is whether the whirlwind can be directed. But to a foreigner interested in India's growth and change the picture looks slightly different. The existence of the storm, the existence of the danger, are in themselves marks of the fact that the eternally slothful, mentally crippled, perpetually accepting "Mother India" is a caricature and not a true likeness.

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PRIVATE INVESTMENT AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

By Emilio G. Collado and Jack F. Bennett

THIS year's debate on the amounts and kinds of public assistance which the United States should provide to foreign countries has been particularly intense. Much attention has been directed to the question of the proper rôle of our Government in stimulating long-run economic development abroad. Some have argued the need for an increase of several billion dollars in foreign economic aid; others contend that United States assistance should be tapering off.

This difference of opinion is at least partly due to disagreement about the capacity of private investment to promote economic development abroad. And it seems clear that the present debate has not taken fully into account new analysis and factual information becoming available on the amounts and results of private investment abroad. The purpose of this article is to review the new evidence and to discuss the relation between government actions and private investment in economic development abroad.

The impression is widely held that United States private investment abroad has been running below a billion dollars a year, with little of that amount being invested in the underdeveloped areas. Yet conservative estimates suggest that last year capital expenditures abroad by United States investors were actually on the order of $5 billion. Between 35 and 40 percent of this amount was invested in underdeveloped areas. These capital expenditures have been rapidly expanding and in 1956 were about two and a half times the amount of United States economic assistance abroad.

The impression that private investment abroad is relatively small stems in part from the practice of measuring foreign investment in terms of a net balance-of-payments figure. This tells simply the size of the *net* flow of private investment dollars out of the United States. In calculating this figure the amounts considered to be new flows of dollars from the United States have been reduced by the amounts returned to the United States from the proceeds of liquidating old investments. Whether or not this figure is valid for balance-of-payments purposes, it is not ade-

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quate as a measure of the contribution of private investment to economic development.[1]

Even by this yardstick, however, United States private investment abroad is rapidly expanding. In 1954 the net outflow was $1,619 million in all private forms of direct, portfolio and short-term investment. In 1955 it was $1,153 million. Then last year it shot up to $2,746 million. The part of this figure made up by direct investment—the outflow from United States companies to foreign affiliates—jumped from $664 million in 1954 and $679 million in 1955 to $1,633 million in 1956. Though these figures reveal a large expansion in investments, they do not reveal its true magnitude.

In addition to this net outflow figure the Department of Commerce has regularly published estimates of the retained earnings of the foreign subsidiaries of United States corporations. These amounts, when added to the outflows mentioned above, raised the investment totals to $2,263 million in 1954 and $2,021 million in 1955. They will probably raise the total to about $3,900 million for 1956. But that will be the end of the published figures on the world-wide totals of United States private investments.

For some time the inadequacy of these figures has been obvious to those private investors who compared them with their own investment activities. For example, the balance-of-payments figure showed a net reduction of $22 million in the Latin American investment of the entire United States petroleum industry in 1954. Yet in that year alone the Latin American affiliates of our company, the Standard Oil Company (New Jersey), spent almost $200 million for new plant and equipment and in the search for oil. In this case the spending decisions were not made on one basis for investments with new dollars from the United States and on another basis for those using funds already abroad. In the Jersey company, and probably in most other companies, each new investment project abroad is considered upon the same basis without regard to the source of funds.

The degree to which total private investment abroad has been

[1] In practice, arbitrary and economically meaningless methods have been used in classifying what were and what were not balance-of-payments contributions merely on the basis of the corporate source of the funds invested. The investments of the foreign branches of United States corporations have been considered a net outflow of capital even though actually a large part of the investments were from net earnings retained abroad without passing through foreign exchange markets. At the same time, the reinvested net earnings of subsidiary foreign corporations and reinvested depreciation and depletion reserves abroad have not been considered a net outflow even though there were the same possibilities for withdrawing these funds through the exchange markets as there were for branch earnings abroad.

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underestimated is suggested by the 1956 investment figures of the Jersey company. Last year the company would be shown on the net outflow basis as making total investments abroad of only about $289 million. In fact, new investments in property, plant, equipment and in the search for oil amounted to $686 million.

In January of this year, the Department of Commerce issued a pioneering study of private investment on a broader basis. The study was limited to a single area, Latin America, and a single year, 1955, but it is hoped that a world-wide study can be conducted on investment made in the year 1957.

The new study shows the *gross* amounts of capital expenditures by United States companies in Latin America. Thus, for the first time we have statistics comparable to those used in studying investment in the United States. We are familiar, for example, with the estimates that business expenditures for plant and equipment in the United States are now proceeding at a rate of somewhere between $35 and $40 billion a year. These domestic estimates include investments from all forms of retained income as well as those from newly contributed capital. Similarly, the gross investment shown by the Latin American study included investments from reinvested subsidiary profits and from income allocated to depreciation and depletion reserves by both branches and subsidiaries abroad. The Department of Commerce study revealed that the total of direct investments in plant and equipment, in mineral exploration and development, and in net working funds in the area was five times the net balance-of-payments outflow of direct investment to Latin America. The total was two and a half times the sum of the net outflow plus the reinvestment of foreign subsidiary earnings—the largest figure shown by the previous official data.

With the help of the Latin American study, the published balance-of-payments figures for 1956, and the reinvested-earnings estimates for earlier years, it is possible to hazard guesses on the totals for United States private investment abroad in 1956.[2] On

[2] Preliminary figures for portfolio and short-term investment and for the balance-of-payments net outflow of direct investment in 1956 have already been published, though several country totals have to be estimated on the basis of 1955 figures. Compilations of reinvested subsidiary earnings during 1956 are not yet available but may be estimated conservatively by continuing the rate of growth experienced in 1955, despite the known acceleration in other kinds of investment. Direct investment from depreciation and depletion reserves, etc., will probably never be known, but again a conservative estimate may be made by assuming that in Latin America such investment will in 1956, as in 1955, be equal to 5.9 percent of the existing value of direct investment at the beginning of the year. In other areas a 4 percent rate may be assumed to be on the safe side.

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rough but conservative assumptions based on these sources it may be estimated that private United States capital investment abroad last year was $4,980 million, of which $3,700 million was in direct investment. On the same basis the total American investment in underdeveloped areas[3] was $1,760 million, of which $1,430 million was in direct investment. Perhaps the most noteworthy aspects of the estimates are the large size of the total; the fact that the largest percentage of the investment—about 74 percent—is in the form of direct long-term investments in enterprises abroad controlled by the investors; and the fact that about 39 percent of the direct investment is now going to what are generally regarded as underdeveloped areas, exclusive of the underdeveloped areas in Europe itself.

Some have suggested that the investment in 1956 was likely to prove abnormally large because of several non-recurring investment projects, in particular the $176 million purchase of the Trinidad Oil Company and the payment of entrance fees by successful bidders for new oil concessions in Venezuela. There is no reason to believe, however, that there will not also be large individual investments in later years. Actually, the total of the entrance fees paid in Venezuela by American investors was about $247 million for the entire year 1956. In 1957 about $358 million will be paid on the concessions offered during just the first few months of the year.

Investments made during 1956 brought the stated value of United States private investment abroad to a level of almost $33 billion. Even this figure is a serious understatement, for although portfolio investments were counted at their market value, direct investments were considered at book values based on original costs. For the year 1955 the Department of Commerce studied a sample of the direct investments and found that their reasonable market values were about double the book values. Since direct investments are so large a percentage of the total investments, it is obvious that the $33 billion is a far from adequate measure of the great productive power of United States investments abroad.

II

Private investment is sometimes thought of primarily in terms

[3] For the purpose of this estimate the underdeveloped areas were taken to be all areas outside the United States, Canada, Western Europe, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Japan.

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of the dollar exchange it brings to foreign countries. The figures mentioned above show the rapid growth in the foreign exchange provided to developing countries by the net outflow of United States private investment. Sometimes this net outflow has been improperly calculated by offsetting earnings on past investment against new inflows of investment. Actually, a large fraction of profits is reinvested; the profits that are withdrawn are only part of newly-created wealth, not a subtraction from the existing wealth of foreign countries. The fear that has existed in some countries that profits on foreign investment would become a drain on foreign exchange has not been justified. Of course, some firms do repatriate a large part of their investments, but taken as a whole United States direct investors in recent years have invested abroad much more than they have withdrawn. In the aggregate, original investments are not withdrawn, they expand.

Furthermore, exclusive attention to foreign exchange aspects overlooks the contribution of the investment by private United States businesses of local funds, even inconvertible funds. Such funds could alternatively have been merely held idle or could have been invested only in safe properties or securities rather than in risk-taking enterprises. Whether United States businesses are bringing in new dollars or using local funds, it is their productive investment of this money that makes the contribution to economic development. Only the net inflow of foreign investment provides foreign exchange, but the entire gross amount of capital expenditures brings into play the technical and managerial knowledge and innovating insight of the investors. The technical skill is provided to make projects physically feasible. The managerial ability is made available to render the undertakings economically and financially valuable. Initiative is brought to bear in recognizing the existence of economic opportunity.

These factors other than capital may be considered instruments for improving the productivity of given resources. Here in the United States careful studies have shown that our economic growth has been the result far more of improvements in productivity than of increases in our stock of capital. Professor Moses Abramovitz's study for the National Bureau of Economic Research suggests that between 1869–78 and 1944–53 net output per capita in the United States would have increased only 14 percent if productivity had remained the same and if we had merely had the use of the additional capital which our savings had made

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possible. Happily, the productivity of a representative group of resources increased about 250 percent over the period. The same conclusion should be equally valid for underdeveloped areas. That shortage of managerial and technical ability is more significant than capital shortage would seem to be indicated by the inability of the underdeveloped countries to propose programs which would fully utilize the available funds of the International Finance Corporation, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Export-Import Bank.

A government program of assistance is not likely to impart the dynamism associated with the capital expenditures of private enterprise. With public funds it is possible to buy "packaged" plants and "turn-key" jobs, but the private owners will not be available to exert their more flexible efforts in rearranging the whole set of processes and practices of a country's productive machine.

An increase in private investment activity in a country reveals its benefits in various direct and indirect ways, and the indirect may be as important as the direct. In direct fashion, successful investments provide:

—greater income to governments through royalties, income taxes, and other forms of exactions;

—more varied and abundant supplies of commodities and energy for consumption and for use in expanding other industries;

—increased money incomes and often improved medical and educational services for the working force.

Specific calculations of the extent of these various benefits for one area were included in the recent Latin American study already mentioned. For example, it was estimated that in 1955 United States investors paid $1.1 billion in taxes and other payments to Latin American governments. Last year our own company and its affiliates paid to foreign governments or collected for them a grand total of more than $1.8 billion in taxes and other payments required to conduct the various phases of the petroleum business. In the size of such payments there lies an obvious answer to those who argue that private investors cannot build highways, dredge ports or provide technical experts on urban sanitation, and that therefore United States public assistance must be provided. The activities of private investors are already

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providing monies that can be used for such purposes. And in addition, of course, private investors often literally provide roadways, ports and health experts in connection with their investment projects.

The likely indirect benefits of a new investment from the United States may be summarized as:

—encouragement of new local enterprises to supply goods and services to the new investment project;

—training of workers in new technical skills that they may later transfer to other activities;

—introduction of new concepts of the possibilities of personal advancement through economic endeavor;

—demonstration of the possibilities of doing business successfully on a high-volume-low-profit-per-unit basis while fully recognizing a company's responsibilities to the public, in action and information.

For one outstanding example of some of these attributes perhaps we can be pardoned one more reference to the Jersey Standard family. Several decades ago the development that is now the Creole Petroleum Corporation, the largest investor in Venezuela, got under way in almost wholly self-contained field camps isolated from the local economy and community. As these settlements grew, Creole gradually, and through conscious policy, sought to contribute to economic and civic development in the surrounding communities. This often has required financial backing, but the company's long-range objective is to be able to concentrate more fully on the business it knows best, the oil business. It is a slow process, sometimes involving temporary inconvenience, and there is a long way to go. Service functions are being transferred to independent local enterprises. Creole and its employees are increasingly able to buy their power and water, their housing, their supplies and groceries from Venezuelan companies which are an indirect result of private investment from abroad. Similarly, Creole and other investors from abroad have provided thousands of workers with new and transferable skills, have introduced into the country new concepts of the possibility of individual advancement, and at the same time have set high standards of efficient business operation.

Such benefits as these accrue to developing nations whether the private investment is in extractive industry or in a manufac-

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turing or other type of enterprise. In this connection it might be pointed out that the investments of the oil industry are by no means limited to extraction. Somewhere between a third and a half of all foreign investments by the oil industry are actually in marketing, manufacturing and transporting facilities. We do not intend, however, to be in any way apologetic about extractive investments. The important thing for all concerned is that the investments be suitable to the economic circumstances. An oil well may be the only sensible investment for the middle of a desert.

The statistics of foreign investment are sometimes presented with petroleum investment excluded on the grounds that the resulting figures are a fairer indication of the investment prospects of the bulk of the underdeveloped areas; it is maintained that there are only a few selective opportunities for large extractive investments. In our own experience, however, we have been forcibly impressed by the large number of areas that could hope for sizable investments in the minerals field if only outright prohibitions or discouraging policies were removed.

With the growth achieved over the last few years in the absolute level of private investment abroad, it seems likely that the various benefits brought by foreign enterprise will become more widely understood. The result may be that the climate for private investment will improve in many areas. Most countries have not frozen their policies against foreign private investment, and the visible examples of successful coöperation with private investors around the world should influence their future policies. Private investment—not only from the United States but from other sources—is already making massive contributions to economic development abroad, and nothing is so likely to succeed as success.

III

It is, of course, conceivable that there will be further actions of the type exemplified by the expropriation of the Suez Canal Company. Other foreign governments may seek short-run economic advantage at the expense of the long-run confidence necessary to attract investment. It will become increasingly apparent, however, that, in cold dollars-and-cents terms, expropriation is not likely to provide even a short-run economic advantage. This would certainly seem likely to be Egypt's experience. There are

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few shortcuts to wealth, and today the actions and policies of foreign governments are the most important factors in determining whether private investments will be attracted to their countries.

Many removable obstacles to private investment are well known: first, the host of restrictive measures which normally accompany attempts to peg exchange rates at unrealistic levels; second, the forms of protection for entrenched interests; and third, shortsighted attitudes regarding possible expropriations or governmental failures to abide by agreements with foreign investors. Other obstacles are more subtle; there are many devious ways by which a foreign government can lead private investors to the conclusion that they would be well advised to invest their funds elsewhere.

But in the United States we must not be blind to the influence of our own Government, whose actions can strongly affect the level of private investment abroad, both directly by measures it takes itself and indirectly through its influence on investment climates abroad. In determining what economic opportunities are open to United States citizens and companies, and in advancing United States foreign policy interests, it is essential that a proper relation be established between Government actions and the international private investment process.

Probably of greatest importance to foreign investment is the Government's policy in taxing income from abroad. There are at the moment three features of our tax law which reduce the burden of United States taxes on income from investment abroad: foreign income taxes may be credited against the United States taxes which would otherwise be payable on income from abroad; investments in the Western Hemisphere meeting certain limiting conditions are entitled to a 14-point reduction in the rate of United States tax; and the income of subsidiaries incorporated abroad is left free of United States tax until the income is distributed as dividends. These provisions allow the United States investor substantial freedom from double taxation on income from abroad. If United States law took no cognizance of foreign taxes at all, then in many cases United States investors would find that their total tax bill was considerably larger than their total income. Even if, in calculating taxable income, United States laws permitted only a deduction of foreign taxes (rather than their application as a credit against U.S. taxes), investors

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would be faced with combined taxes as high as 85 percent of income before taxes.

Despite the three provisions mentioned above, there are still several basic defects in our system of taxing income from abroad. Tax burdens are imposed more on the basis of form than of economic substance. For example, the income from an investment made by a *branch* of a United States corporation in a foreign country is taxed currently by the United States even though all the income is invested in the foreign country and none of it brought back to the United States. Yet at the same time the income in a neighboring country from a similar investment by a local corporate *subsidiary* of the same United States corporation is not taxed currently by the United States if the income is reinvested and none distributed as dividends. This distinction seems all the more arbitrary when it is realized that the choice between using a branch or a foreign subsidiary is often dictated by regulations or political conditions in the country in which an investment is being made. Incidentally, the British Government announced in April its intention of revising its tax law so that the income of certain categories of British companies earning all their income abroad would not be taxed until the profits were distributed. This action will deserve study in the United States as a means of removing an obvious inconsistency in our tax law.

Another more basic defect in our system results in failure to encourage investment in underdeveloped areas. The system now ensures that ultimately the same high burden of tax must be paid by an investor abroad on earnings from a primitive economy with a low rate of tax as on earnings from a venture in the stable surroundings of the United States. Consequently, investment in underdeveloped countries with low tax rates is handicapped, any foreign government's tax incentive programs for attracting investment are thwarted, and foreign governments are encouraged to raise their tax rates at the expense of the United States Government, since higher foreign tax rates would normally not increase the total tax burden on the investor but would instead only increase his credit against United States taxes. The system does not ensure that all United States investors abroad pay equivalent taxes to the United States Government; it ensures only that they pay equally high taxes. Taking this situation into account, several high-level commissions and, on at least three occasions, the President himself, have recommended to Congress

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that the 38 percent corporate tax rate now applying to certain investments in the Western Hemisphere be extended to investment income from all foreign areas. The lower tax rate would offer little encouragement to investment in developed countries having tax rates substantially as high as those in the United States, but it would assist investment elsewhere.

The Administration does not appear to be pressing this proposal, although the British, meanwhile, plan a sharp reduction in the corporate tax on some types of investment abroad. There is some possibility, however, that progress will be made in implementing the announcement made by Secretary of the Treasury Humphrey at the Rio Economic Conference in 1954. This was to the effect that the United States Government was willing to modify its tax system in particular cases to provide that the effective United States tax rate would not be raised when a particular country lowered its tax rate for a limited period to attract investment. So far no treaties providing for this sort of treatment have reached the stage of signature.

None the less, action in the fields of tax legislation and of tax treaties appears to be the most effective way our Government can help create the proper framework for private investment in economic development abroad. Of course, other aspects of Government policy should not be neglected. Efforts should be continued to improve the legal basis for investments abroad through the negotiation of modern treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation. And there seems to be room for improvement in the diplomatic support of the proper interests of United States investors abroad.

The time has not yet come to end the Government's investment guaranty program, but some limitations might be appropriate. Although the program has probably been the principal undertaking by the Government specifically for the encouragement of private investments abroad, its accomplishments thus far have not been impressive. Under the program, for a small fee, insurance is provided against the limited political risks of loss from expropriation, inconvertibility of currency, and war. The insurance is available on new investments in countries which have signed governmental agreements providing in general that in case of insured losses the private investors' claims may be transferred to the United States Government to be pursued on a diplomatic level. The program has expanded slowly over the nine

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years of its existence. At the end of March this year the first war-risk agreements were still under negotiation, but insurance was available against one or both of the other two types of risk in 33 countries; $143,000,000 of insurance had been written, with no payments on losses yet being made; authority exists for an additional $385,000,000 of insurance.

In one sense, this insurance appears to be available on too generous a basis. Now that European economic recovery has been so successful and economic assistance is no longer being provided to most European countries, there does not seem to be any reason why Government assistance should continue to be available on new investments in Germany, for example. On the other hand, insurance which promotes investment in Korea or Pakistan, for example, would seem to be an appropriate adjunct of the foreign assistance program.

IV

There are inevitably many inter-relations between our private foreign investment and our large program of public assistance abroad. The Fairless Committee has estimated that, on a gross basis, the total of United States economic assistance in the fiscal year 1956 was $1.7 billion, not including United States assistance provided through the international lending institutions. This figure probably approached $2 billion in the calendar year 1956. Of this sum, about $1.6 billion went to the underdeveloped areas, as defined above. Some of the assistance was dictated more by short-run political considerations than by interest in long-run economic development, but even if the entire $2 billion were considered economic development, the sum would be only about 40 percent of the total of private capital expenditures abroad during the year.

Of course, there are some countries which receive no public assistance, while in others private investment from abroad is only a fraction of the total foreign economic aid, as for example, in Korea and Viet Nam. In the underdeveloped areas as a whole, economic aid is about equal to, or a little less than, the private investment expenditures.

In attempting to establish a proper relation between these two sources, both contributing to economic development abroad, we face a dilemma. On the one hand, public assistance obviously can help to create economic conditions attractive to private invest-

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ment. On the other hand, by providing relief to governments under pressure of need, it may delay actions that would remove obstacles to investment. Obviously, aid should not be given to a project which private investors are willing to undertake by themselves alone. Nor should aid be given when a few simple and obvious actions by the foreign government would make private investment feasible. But a nice problem of judgment often arises in guessing whether aid encourages investment or confirms governments in policies which discourage investors. It is more than a question of simple bargaining; it is a matter of guessing economic and political reactions within a foreign country. Judgment will depend on specific circumstances and cannot be embodied in general principles. Undoubtedly, there will be circumstances in which for compelling reasons of foreign policy the decision will be made to provide public assistance even though it is believed that the recipient has the power and the opportunity to change its basic policies in such a way as to attract ample private investment. But clearly, great effort should be exerted to limit the number of such cases to a minimum.

The question naturally arises whether better use of private investment could be made once the decision is taken to give public aid. The Fairless Committee commented that, "Foreign areas can get the most from economic coöperation with us if they accept us for what we are, that is, a nation in which the reservoir of industrial ability, skills and capital resides, not in government but in private hands." The group went on, therefore, to suggest that "the large areas between purely private and purely public projects should be more fully explored."

In a sense the area in between is already being tested by the guaranty program, but in many of the underdeveloped areas where the United States is providing substantial assistance the limited insurance device is not sufficiently strong to persuade private investors to undertake industrial projects now being financed by the United States on a government-to-government basis. In these circumstances the Fairless report concluded that it was preferable to supplement the guaranty program by the joint use of public and private funds in projects that otherwise would not attract private interests. To make a project feasible, the Government might make fixed-interest loans to a private company set up to operate the enterprise. Alternatively, the Government might buy participating debentures or bonds that could be con-

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verted into stock when they were sold by the Government. Such arrangements would save the taxpayers' funds, support the private sector in foreign economies, and instill a greater awareness in our aid officials of the obstacles to private investment abroad.

In April the Administration recommended the creation of a development fund which would provide loans to foreign countries on terms more favorable than are possible through existing institutions. The proposal was welcomed by the Senate's special committee on foreign aid as a possible encouragement to private enterprise, and later the President told Congress, "A major purpose would be to promote—not impede—the flow of private investment, and to this end the fund should have authority to engage in appropriate financing operations." Presumably, then, this new fund will make it possible for the Government to participate in joint projects with private investors.

V

In these various ways, especially in the fields of income taxes and of administration of foreign assistance, the United States Government has the power to take actions that would facilitate investment abroad, but as elsewhere the analogy applies that it is easier to pull a string than to push it. The climates created by foreign governments and foreign communities will remain the principal factor determining the levels of private foreign investment.

There is reason to hope that foreign officials anxious to further the welfare of their countries will observe and take heed of the accumulating evidence of what private investment can accomplish in the field of economic development. Among the clear-cut results available for observation are the examples of Canada, Venezuela and Peru, which are largely free from obstacles to investment. If, as we may expect, there is considerable improvement over the next few years in the receptivity to investment in many areas abroad and in the relevant policies of our Government, we are convinced that we will witness a veritable explosion of interest in foreign investment.

The potential for growth is large. The basic factors are present to create the indispensable economic opportunity; there is a growing demand for raw materials and for sources of power in developed countries and for manufactured goods in the underdeveloped areas. That investors are making use of this opportunity

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is shown by the rapid growth in the total statistics on foreign investments, and is also borne out in the day-to-day experience of law firms and banks that assist new investors in going abroad.

Private investment abroad should continue to expand geographically as well as in total volume. This is not to say that the need for economic assistance programs will abruptly end. In the years to come there may well be political developments and emergency situations justifying such assistance. There is a clear relation, however, between increased private investment and reduced need of public assistance for general economic development abroad. Even in those countries with which we have important military obligations, and in which external assistance is now large in relation to the domestic economies, growth in private investment can reduce the need for assistance. Also, many of those countries now receiving only economic aid have excellent opportunities to attract sizable amounts of private investment, thereby reducing their reliance on public assistance. This appears to be true even in such countries as India and Indonesia where both public assistance and private investment are now small in relation to the tasks of economic development. In both of these countries it seems clear that the small flow of private investment—in view of the vast known and probably even larger unknown physical resources and the developing consumer markets—is largely attributable to internal political situations and attitudes.

There is no reason beyond human remedy why all countries —to the immense benefit of their citizens—could not partake fully of the burgeoning of international investment which we believe possible, and likely, in the next few years.

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NATIONALISM: ANTIDOTE TO COMMUNISM

By Habib Bourguiba

THE question is frequently raised whether nationalism—particularly Arab nationalism—fosters the expansion of Communism or serves rather as an antidote to it. If we may judge by the experience of Tunisia, there is no doubt that the struggle for national independence served as a restraint and a deterrent.

Under the French Protectorate many young Tunisian intellectuals had been attracted by Communist ideas. In them they found relief from the colonial yoke which weighed so heavily upon them, and a hope of future freedom. These young men, whose ideals were primarily patriotic, received encouragement from the French Communists, who in 1944 led them to set up a Tunisian Communist Party (P.C.T.).

In spite of its Tunisian label, the P.C.T. failed to acquire strength. It sought in vain to associate itself with the Destour Party and share some of its prestige. But Tunisians knew that the policy of the Destour Party was more in harmony with their aims than was that of the Communists; they rejected foreign ideology and rallied around a movement which was genuinely based on the national interest. The P.C.T. of today has a ridiculously small number of Moslem members, and in the national elections of last May the Communists gained only 2,764 votes out of more than 250,000 cast.

One of my earliest companions in the struggle for independence is a case in point. As a student in Paris, at a time when French rule seemed absolutely unalterable and the original Destour movement was standing still, he became a member of the French Communist Party. But after he had returned to Tunisia he realized that Communism was a false substitute for his patriotic ideals and he joined me in founding the Neo-Destour Party to fight actively for independence. Today he laughs at his youthful error and finds that his concern for social justice is fully satisfied by the struggle to develop his new country.

Farhat Hached, the great leader of Tunisian trade-unionism and martyr to the national cause, is still another example of the moral conversion which nationalism has effected upon men at-

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tracted by Communist doctrine. Like many other union leaders he found in nationalism the way to social progress; for the attainment of independence does not fulfill the goal of Tunisian nationalism. In order to maintain and develop our independence it is essential to raise the living standard of the great masses of the people and ensure harmony among all classes. Nationalism implies social action—a revolutionary change in the condition of the people, inspired by concern for the interests of the nation as a whole. From this point of view it is directly opposed to Communism, which exploits patriotic feelings for mere propaganda purposes and is predicated on a class struggle designed to divide the nation rather than bind it together.

II

Can we generalize from Tunisia's experience? In other Arab countries and in the Far East, has not nationalism opened the door to Communism? This was the conviction of a British journalist in Singapore, who wrote in 1951 under the suggestive title, "Nationalists Hatching Red Eggs." Noting the Russian technique of capturing the sympathy of peoples engaged in casting off the bonds imposed on them by European imperialism, through military establishments or oil interests, he came to the conclusion that Communism would open a breach through Iran into Asia Minor and then spill over into Africa, establishing itself at Europe's back door.

Now, six years later, would the same prophecy hold true? Of course, Communism is still trying to obtain a toehold in Africa and the Middle East. But a completely independent Iran has kept Communism out, and the Arab nationalist groups have bidden their people be wary of Communism despite the obvious temporary advantages to be secured by accepting Soviet offers of collaboration. The West has not yet definitely won the struggle; but neither has there been any decisive result from the very considerable efforts of the Communists to bring this part of the world under their sway, particularly by the clever tactic of exploiting nationalist feeling.

Some people believe that Islam is responsible for this resistance to Communist penetration. Certainly our Moslem religion inculcates respect for the individual and his liberty, implants faith in the transcendence of moral laws and inoculates us against the fallacious logic of dialectic materialism. On the other hand, Com-

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munism has made a successful compromise with Islam in the Soviet Republics of the Caucasus and Central Asia. It has skillfully hidden its philosophical tenets behind the social and material benefits obtained through an authoritarian and collectivist régime and a rapid improvement of what was an abysmally low living standard. Ignorance and poverty are quite capable of weakening the armor of the Moslem faith. The Arab masses can be tempted by an apparently generous system which simultaneously promises them freedom from European domination, social equality and better economic conditions, while also appealing to their old instinct for community living. The spiritual ramparts of the Moslem faith must be defended against Communism's insidious aggression by men with something constructive to offer. And only a nationalism resolutely committed to the path of progress can fit this need.

National feeling is as old as the world, but the present-day revolution of underdeveloped, dominated peoples takes on the appearance of a struggle between haves and have-nots. This is the aspect of the nationalist movement that lends itself to Communist exploitation. To keep free of Communism, Arab nationalism must not content itself solely with an assertion of its rights. It must remake the economic and social structure of the Arab countries in a manner consonant with their own genius and in such a way as to win them a place in the modern world. By adding the teachings received from the West to the best of Islam, educated Arab leaders may find other weapons against Communist propaganda.

Our young men are inspired, above all, by an immense need for personal dignity and by an uncoercible spirit of independence. This spirit and this need underlie all their work, all their thought. Their frame of mind is like that of the European and American peoples in the time of their national revolutions; it is characterized by the same uncompromising patriotism, the same thirst for liberty. These impulses find their healthiest outlet in the struggle for independence. If they are stifled or repressed they may turn to Communism for expression. That is what I mean when I say that nationalism is an antidote to Communism.

Educated young men furnish the most active recruits to the nationalist cause, and it is from their ranks that we must draw the governing class of tomorrow. These young men must lead and educate the masses, develop their feelings of patriotism and civic

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responsibility and endow them with moral principles to such an extent that the interests of the nation as a whole will seem more important than the class struggle. Through the young élite of the nation we must inject the antidote of nationalism into the masses of the people.

In short, the blossoming of nationalism enables the Arab peoples to resist Communism by allowing them to center their hopes on the spiritual growth of Islam. In this resistance they will be strengthened, particularly in North Africa, by a natural attachment to the liberal civilization of the West.

III

Indeed, the affinity of North Africans for the liberal democracy of the West, their geographical proximity to Europe and their need to enjoy the economic coöperation of the great nations of the free world are further obstacles to the advance of Communism. Africa touches Western Europe and reaches out toward America. The Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean, which are channels of communication rather than barriers between them, keep Africans in constant contact with the whole Western world. Having grown up under the influence of the liberal and democratic West, the African peoples have naturally drawn upon it for their political ideals. The great principles of the French Revolution, the ideas of Woodrow Wilson and the juridical structure of Western civilization hold an important place in their civic credo. From the very first stirrings of their independence movement, North Africans have had a latent tradition of democratic liberalism which binds them to the nations of the free world.

African economic resources are complementary to those of the West, and in particular to those of Europe. Agriculture is Africa's chief source of wealth, and its surplus products—oils, fruits, grains, cocoa—find a natural outlet on the European market. The industrial nations of the West take Africa's minerals and raw materials and sell them back in the form of machines and manufactured products. In order to develop industries of their own, Africans must look to the West for investment and technical aid. The full development of Africa's natural resources and the transformation from a colonial to a national economy will by no means do away with their need for coöperation with the West. A prosperous, liberal economy cannot function without international exchanges.

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African nationalism has its place within the Western orbit, and in spite of some lingering resentment against the colonial Powers, Africa knows that its future is linked with theirs. But if Africans are in the process of emancipation, they are still economically underdeveloped. The danger is that the Western nations may leave them to their fate rather than coöperate on a basis of equality and full respect for their independence. It is only then that the young African nations might be tempted to turn, out of sheer despair, to the Communists. Their spiritual independence is still fragile; it hinges upon their political independence and on the West's willingness to help them improve economic conditions. The Western Powers therefore have an important rôle to play in keeping the Arab and African countries out of Communist hands.

First of all, the Western nations must not seek to prevent the emancipation of colonial or economically dependent peoples. They should, on the contrary, encourage them and facilitate the setting up of sound independent states. Furthermore, they have a moral obligation to render them such financial and technical aid as will enable them to maintain a free economy and living standards high enough to give them a dignified place among the nations of the world.

Nations are like families: when a child grows up and leaves home, is he not helped in making a place for himself? The African need is all the more pressing inasmuch as colonial exploitation has not allowed production to match the needs of rapidly increasing population. It is to the best interest of Western society to reverse the flow which is enriching the metropolitan countries and give generous aid to the young states that they may help their people to live decent lives.

African nationalists, for their part, will then think twice before breaking off relations with the country of which they were former dependents. They will lay the groundwork for voluntary coöperation, and will come out openly in favor of working with the West. Among nations as well as among individuals determination and sincerity pay off better than hesitation and duplicity.

As for Tunisia, it has chosen unequivocally to follow the free world of the West. But while rejecting Communism, it bears no enmity toward the nations which live under a Communist régime. Every one of them should have the right to live under the ideolog-

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ical and economic system which suits it best. But Tunisia is geographically, economically and spiritually remote from the Communist nations and there is no reason why it should cast its lot with them. Tunisia's natural sympathies are with the democratic and liberal nations, and its economic interests demand that it trade with its neighbors. Inasmuch as the free world and the Communist world are two opposite camps, Tunisia belongs to the former. Thus far it has seen no need to join any defensive alliance against Communist aggression, but if it felt threatened it would not hesitate to do so.

Nevertheless, it should be appreciated that for a newly emancipated country without major resources neutralism appears to offer certain advantages. In the present state of latent conflict between the great world Powers, neutralism may keep smaller nations out of quarrels in which they have no direct concern and give them an illusory feeling of security. At the same time they may lay claim to moral superiority and seek to arbitrate the differences among the great Powers. And of course they are in an excellent bargaining position, because each rival group may try to outbid the other for their support.

As the people of Tunisia are idealistic and peace-loving, they are instinctively attracted by neutralism. They do not wish to be drawn into armed conflict nor to find their country once more a battle-ground over issues which chiefly concern the Great Powers. As the fable tells us, "A little man has nothing to gain by entering into a big man's fight." Tunisians are therefore inclined to believe that neutrality might be a bar to invasion and save them from the terrible weapons which promise to characterize the next world war.

But Tunisian political leaders are realists. They know that the neutrality of a weak nation cannot save it from invasion if it stands in a belligerent's way. Belgium has proved this, to her own sorrow; and if Switzerland has thus far succeeded in keeping herself isolated it is only by reason of her peculiar geographical position and the fact that in one way or another all the warring Powers found her neutral status advantageous to them. If another world war were to break out, would Tunisia's strategic position allow her to maintain neutrality? History proves that unilateral declarations of neutrality and even nonaggression pacts fail to stand up in the face of large-scale conflict. Neutralism in the cold war and neutrality in a "hot" one are equally precarious.

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Solidarity offers small nations the greatest security. In union, the proverb warns, there is strength. Young nations must, first of all, assure their protection against an aggression aimed at any single one of them; and partnership in a collective security system is usually sufficient to discourage an isolated attack of this kind. As for a widespread conflict, protection can be effectively assured only by the solidarity of a large powerfully-armed group.

Tunisia is in no way a warlike nation; she has no unsatisfied claims and no ambition to extend her sway. But she must defend her freshly-won independence against any attempt to return to the old colonial system or any new imperialistic designs. The United Nations offers a definite recourse, and Tunisia has complete faith in this international court of appeal, which it hopes may become stronger and stronger as time goes by. But the existence of a court does not absolve an individual from the responsibility of guarding his property, and the United Nations has not opposed the organization of regional security systems.

Heretofore Tunisia was a part of the French military system. The French Army performed a double duty—that of colonial occupation and defense against foreign invaders. Obviously, the first function must be abandoned as soon as possible; indeed, this is essential if Tunisia is to negotiate a mutual defense agreement with France. After that, Tunisia will be able to participate in a broad collective security system which will guarantee both her independence and her security in case of a large-scale war.

Economically, also, Tunisia has inherited ties of interdependence with France. We have everything to gain by maintaining close economic relations with a country which is in a position to extend considerable financial aid if it so desires. But the new economic relationship must be based on free and non-exclusive coöperation. Tunisian economic development is predicated upon association with the whole free world; that indeed is one of the reasons why Tunisia has decided in favor of association with the West.

What advantage could Tunisia derive from economic neutralism? A seesaw game between Western aid and Communist aid would soon ruin Tunisian credit in its natural market place and introduce elements of imbalance and disorder into the whole economic picture. Every enterprise calls for a choice at the outset and tremendous perseverance if its goal is to be realized. Having chosen to follow the liberal economic system of the West,

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which corresponds to both the present and future needs of Tunisia, we must now hew to that line. The life of a nation somehow hangs together; to split the allegiances of its culture and mores, its economy and defense, would mean inviting dissolution. If a country were to link its political or economic fate to that of the Communists, how long could its civilization endure? A unified philosophy and a unified way of life are essential conditions of national stability.

And yet the personality of a nation is composed of complex elements; its culture and racial allegiance create bonds which do not necessarily correspond to its defensive and economic arrangements. Even if it has chosen a certain military and economic alliance it may preserve other ties if they are not incompatible with it. Such is the case with Tunisia. Her economic interests and future development exercise a westward pull, but she cannot deny her allegiance to the Arab and Moslem world. Her ethnic and cultural traditions, her brotherly feeling toward the other Arab peoples, are in no way inconsistent with her ties to the West. The Arab and Moslem East has nothing in common with the Communistic Far East, a fact which is too often forgotten when East and West are spoken of as fatally opposed to each other.

In the Arab and Moslem world, Tunisia and the other North African nations occupy a place of their own: they are the *Maghreb,* literally the "West." This fact explains their westward orientation. Their "Western" political line in no way conflicts with the brotherhood of the Arab peoples. When the Lebanese Premier, Sami Solh, came to Tunis last March he commented shrewdly, "I have come to tighten the historic bonds between Arabs of the East and Arabs of the West." In this way he underlined the fact that no nation is excluded from the Arab brotherhood because it has also a Western orientation.

Tunisian policy is determined both by its history and by its geography. Because Tunisia is a part of Africa, it tends to identify itself firmly with other North African nations whose interests it shares. As a member of the Arab community, it has brotherly relations with the Arab countries to the East. And because it is situated in the "West," and is a neighbor to Europe and in particular to France, it looks for security and economic progress in a close alliance with the free nations of the West. It is along these three lines that our foreign policy must develop.

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

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STRATEGY OF THE MIDDLE EAST

By Hanson W. Baldwin

LAST fall's Suez crisis restored the Middle East to proper perspective in the war offices of the world. The strategic importance of this crossroads between continents and its relationship to the world conflict were again emphasized by the clash of arms in an area where man first raised sword to man. Oil, trade routes, geography and terrain, faith and ideology, all contribute to the strategic importance of the Middle East.

The Middle East oil fields, stretching in a great arc from Iran and Iraq around the Persian Gulf, comprise collectively the largest known petroleum deposits, approximating about two-thirds of the oil reserve of the free world. Access to this oil and use of it at reasonable prices cannot be termed "vital" to the United States. Western Hemisphere sources can supply United States needs, though costs would undoubtedly increase if the West were denied Middle East oil. For limited periods even Western Europe can get along without the "black gold" of Kuwait, Bahrein, Iran and Iraq. This was demonstrated during the past winter when alternative sources of supply and new routes were utilized. The Suez Canal was closed intermittently during World War II and would probably be closed during any future war. NATO's strategic planning cannot count upon use of Middle Eastern oil in another war and Western Europe—with United States help—can probably fight without it. During limited periods of emergency the Western world *can* live without Middle East oil, and this fact is perhaps the strongest answer to political blackmail from any quarter.

Nevertheless the oil of the Middle East is a major economic factor in the well-being of Western Europe. Despite the development of nuclear power, Western Europe's needs for oil will increase steeply for at least the next 20 years—and probably for the next half century. There is today no foreseeable substitute for oil as a source of power; nuclear energy may supplement but will not replace it. Middle East oil, provided the Mediterranean route remains open, is the cheapest oil source available to Western Europe; over any long-term period it is well-nigh indispensable to the industry and economy of Western Europe and it is therefore a major factor in the cold war. Furthermore, the oil

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fields mean much financially to several of our principal Allies, especially the United Kingdom. The revenues received by Great Britain from her holdings in Iraq, Kuwait and elsewhere help materially to sustain the sterling bloc.

The other factors that give the Middle East its vast importance are too well known to need elaboration. The area is a highly important communications hub. It is a land bridge between three continents, and the Nile Valley and the Moslem lands of North Africa are gateways to the great undeveloped continent of Africa. Global air routes from Europe to the Far East cross the Middle East, and oil pipelines seam the deserts. Radio communications —so crucial today in the struggle between truth and falsehood— focus in Egypt, Israel, Beirut and Cyprus. The Middle East, then, is a key area in trade routes, communications and transportation.

Geography also endows it with importance. The Turkish Dardanelles control the debouchment of Soviet submarines or surface ships into the Mediterranean. The chains of rugged mountains backed up by hundreds of miles of desert, extending from the Caucasus to the Himalayas, provide major obstacles to any land invasion of the area from the Soviet Union. And available bases like those at Dhahran in Saudi Arabia, at Adana in Turkey, at Habbaniyah in Iraq, and in Cyprus, as well as the aircraft carriers of the U. S. Sixth Fleet, are closer to the Soviet Union's south central area—the site of many of its important industrial and military facilities—than any others. Conversely Soviet control of bases in Egypt and Syria would neutralize the present Western geographic and base advantage in the area.

The political and psychological significance of the Middle East is a major part of its strategic importance. It is a symbolic and emotional area; here are centered the shrines of three of the world's great religions, Christianity, Judaism and Islam. The Pan-Arab, Pan-Islam movement is centered in the Middle East and its influence extends westward to Morocco, deep into Africa, eastward to India. Here, too, Zionism has made a lodestar of international Jewry, and since its creation this Jewish state has influenced the foreign policy of many of the nations of the world.

The strategic importance of the Middle East must, however, be measured against the yardstick of the global situation. In a simplified and geopolitical sense the world conflict between Soviet Russia and the Communist nations on the one hand and the

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United States and its Allies on the other is a struggle between "heartland" and "rimlands." Soviet Russia and her satellites and allies occupy the great interior land mass of Eurasia; the Western Powers control, in general, the coastal areas. These rimlands hem in and more or less surround the great Communist land empire. A breakout by Communism to the high seas would be a strategic defeat of the first magnitude for the non-Communist world; it might, in fact, ultimately spell its doom. This is why the conquest of China by the Communists was much more than a battle lost in the struggle for the world; it put most of the eastern coast of Asia under the red banner of Communism. In the Pacific this conquest is somewhat—though not entirely—neutralized by the emplacement of United States power on the island chain extending from the Aleutians to the Philippines. These islands hem in the coast of Asia; nowhere, except at Petropavlovsk on Kamchatka, does Soviet Russia have a port fronting upon the high seas. In the Atlantic, the British Isles and Iceland provide offshore bases to back up Allied positions in Western Europe. But in the eastern Mediterranean the Allies hold no such important island bases, except Cyprus, which is torn by revolt. And in the vast area of the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean there are no important island bases available to the West except Madagascar and the Maldive Islands, both of them too far from the Middle East rimlands to be of much strategic usefulness.

Long before Bolshevism came to power in Russia, Tsarist governments had expansionist ambitions and dreamed of a warm-water port on the Persian Gulf. This dream is not dead; it will almost certainly become more and more lifelike as Soviet Russia expands her economy, builds up her merchant marine and becomes an exporting nation. Moreover, a successful Soviet drive to the Arabian Gulf and Indian Ocean might mean, in a strategic sense, ultimate victory in the struggle for the world. Communism already holds China and northern Viet Nam; it is threatening Burma, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, South Viet Nam, Malaya and Indonesia. Communist successes in Southeast Asia would mean that India was outflanked. A companion Communist success via Afghanistan, already to some degree under Moscow's influence, or via Iran or other Middle Eastern lands, would outflank India to the west. Who could doubt, then, the ultimate fate of Pakistan and India itself? If the teeming subcontinent goes Red, along with all the Middle Eastern area adjoining it, the

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Southeast Asia Treaty Organization is outdone. What then would be the fate of the peninsula called Europe?

This vision of apocalypse—unlikely though it may be—nevertheless symbolizes the threat of Communist expansion in the Middle East. The future complexion of the world may well depend upon what happens in that vast arc of ocean extending from Aden to Singapore. Yet it is there that the power of the United States and its Allies is weakest—is, in fact, in a military sense almost non-existent. SEATO and NATO, loosely linked by the Baghdad Pact Powers, meet somewhat amorphously in Pakistan—the eastern flank of the Baghdad Pact, the western flank of SEATO. But Pakistan, beset with political and economic difficulties and not strong militarily, is feuding with India over Kashmir, is in any case geographically divided and separated by neutralist India from her SEATO allies.

The global system of rimland security which the United States has built provides one tremendous strategic advantage. It offers bases for strategic air power to operate close to the Soviet heartland and—except for the gap between Karachi and Thailand—it rings that heartland. Soviet Russia has no bases in the Western Hemisphere. This advantage obviously is reduced if Communism is able to seize the rimlands around the Eurasian continent. And the Middle East, a great vacuum of power, offers a route to the Indian Ocean rimlands which, if seized, would irretrievably breach the West's security ring and would isolate India.

But the Middle East has strategic importance in a narrower sense than in this global context. It is, in the first place, the extension of NATO's flank, with Turkey as the eastern anchor and the weak states of Iran and Iraq providing a link with Pakistan. This southern flank of NATO is of key significance strategically since the Mediterranean-Black Sea-Middle East offers an approach by sea or air to central Russia. The Mediterranean outflanks the strong Soviet positions in the Eastern European satellites and in western Russia. Aircraft operating from Middle East bases or from the Sixth Fleet are within easy range (without inflight refueling) of the Dardanelles, the Caucasian oil fields, the Black Sea nexus of military installations and the Don-Volga-southern Urals industrial complex. Moreover, the Mediterranean provides the *only* route by which Turkey, flank guard of NATO, could be supplied and reinforced in case of war. And, so long as the Mediterranean and Middle East are held by the West, the

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great undeveloped continent of Africa is protected by space and time from Communist conquest. So, too, our "back-up" military bases in North Africa are safeguarded. On the other hand a Communist success in the Middle East—either in cold war or hot—would have inevitable repercussions upon Africa.

It may be argued, of course, that the Mediterranean could not be used by the West in case of actual war. This is quite possible, though any appraisal must be qualified by definition of the kind of war fought. In an all-out nuclear war, the U. S. Sixth Fleet—and in fact all the American bases—must be considered expendable. The strategic success or failure of the Sixth Fleet in the eastern Mediterranean would not be judged by whether or not it was sunk—it would almost certainly be sunk—but by whether or not it had accomplished its mission of bombing Soviet objectives with nuclear weapons before it was wiped out. In a limited or non-nuclear war one of the tests of our power would be maintenance of supply lines to Turkey. This would be a difficult task, though in less than an all-out war not an impossible one. Plans for over-the-beach supply routes in case such ports as Iskenderun were demolished have been made, and Turkish roads, railroads and military pipelines have been improved.

The Mediterranean-Middle Eastern flank, therefore, gives NATO a tremendous advantage in the form of an outflanking approach to the Soviet heartland. In all-out nuclear war this advantage might be utilized for only a few short hours, but perhaps they would be vital ones. In a limited war, this position offers so many strategic assets that it would justify intensive efforts to hold and protect it.

In the strategic context Turkey occupies a dominant position in the Middle East. She is a Moslem but not an Arab nation. She is of Asia yet turns towards Europe. She is one flank of NATO and another flank of the Baghdad Pact Powers. She has more military power than any other state in the area. And geographically her land forces and air bases obstruct any Soviet drive toward the Persian Gulf; her guns and mines and soldiers and ships guard the Dardanelles and her territory provides a link, though a tenuous one, with Greece. Further, in a political sense, she thrusts a strongly anti-Communist wedge squarely between Soviet Russia and leftist-inclined Syria and thus damps the ardor of extremist Syrian politicians.

Unfortunately, Turkey's strength is not equal to her impor-

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tance. She has a rugged, fairly primitive army with the will to fight. Her economy is strained, her political system rigid. She is relatively isolated; her staff has little knowledge of logistics; she is exposed to attack from north, east and west, and she has little air power.

All of the northern tier states have terrain suitable for ground defense. The high and tortuous ramparts of the Caucasus, the Zagros and the Elburz chains backed up by waterless regions offer major difficulties to invading ground troops. Turkey and the other Middle Eastern states are not highly industrialized areas; there are relatively few good urban or industrial targets for air attack. Those in Western Europe are so much more important that it is likely the major Soviet effort would be made against them. There are some major exceptions to this generalization. A nuclear or a conventional bombardment of Istanbul might create such confusion and panic as to "unhinge" any Turkish defense west of the Dardanelles. But this area is indefensible in any case against a major Soviet assault; Turkish pride rather than pragmatic strategy dictates the maintenance of large forces in European Turkey.

The oil refineries and oil fields of the area might appear to offer tempting prizes either for seizure or destruction. Soviet airborne troops could be easily transported above the forbidding ramparts of desert and mountain to descend upon such key areas as Kirkuk or Kuwait. There is little force in the Middle East today capable of meeting such a thrust; the oil fields and refineries are virtually unprotected against vertical envelopment or bombing. Yet such attacks would not appear to be—in the larger context of world strategy—of much significance. For if general war comes the West must reckon in any case without the use of the oil of the Middle East for the duration of the war. The Russians very clearly can destroy the refineries and fields or deny the use of the oil to the West. Conversely, they could not use it. They have today no pipelines to transport Middle East oil to Russia and our air power could destroy the oil fields if they fell into Soviet hands,[1] or could, at least, prevent the transportation of oil to Russia. In case of general war the oil of the Middle East would probably be denied to everyone.

But to conjure up the prospect of all-out general war between

[1] More likely refineries and pipelines and wells would be destroyed by a scorched-earth policy prior to Soviet seizure.

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the Communist nations and the West involving the Middle East is to envisage, in this writer's opinion, the least likely possibility. Even a large war involving that area but still short of being universal seems unlikely. But they are possibilities and ones against which we must guard. This is why land and sea bases for our nuclear bombers in the area of the Middle East, the eastern Mediterranean and the Arabian Sea are highly important to our global concept of nuclear deterrence. The more bases we have, the more scattered they are and the closer they are to Soviet Russia, the less likely the chances of nuclear war. But the prospect of such a war seems the least probable of the many risks we face in the Middle East, even in the years to come when Soviet medium-range missiles based on Russian territory will be able to reach any base available to the United States in the Middle East.

The prospect of actual Soviet attack with conventional forces by Soviet troops in the Middle East also seems improbable for two reasons. The terrain difficulties are enormous; the distances and supply problems are great. And the commitments of the United States under NATO, SEATO and the Eisenhower Doctrine—not to mention the presence of our forces in the area, including the Sixth Fleet, air personnel at Dhahran and in Turkey, and large missions in Turkey, Iran and Pakistan—would almost certainly mean our involvement if Soviet forces themselves attacked any Middle Eastern state. And this would expose Soviet Russia to the threat of nuclear bombardment.

The basic strategic problem in the Middle East is *not* overt Soviet aggression, but covert Soviet infiltration complemented, perhaps, by proxy aggression (as in Indochina and Korea) by some of Soviet Russia's Communist allies. This type of Communist aggression is now familiar to the Western world. Political, cultural, economic and military means are combined to win a foothold in a country ripe for change; indigenous Communists are aided with funds, propaganda, arms and experts. The pattern is always fitted to the local situation; the special discontents of the region, political or economic, are all exploited. This has been the developing pattern in the Middle East, with Egypt, Syria and Jordan the main spots of danger, until in the case of Jordan King Hussein checked the trend by strong counteractions.

In these countries the danger has been and still is of an internal coup aided by external means or of a gradual increase in the influence of local Communists past the point of no return. There

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is a corollary danger. The exploitation of local revolutions or regional frictions to the point of civil or regional war or widespread riots or disorders offers Communism an opportunity for accelerated military penetration of the countries affected. Soviet "volunteers" or experts could provide a skilled military cadre to stiffen left-wing forces.

In the Middle East these techniques have a fertile field. Two major factors aid Soviet attempts to penetrate the area. One is the tide of Arab nationalism and the emotional desire for Arab unity and greatness. The other is the Arab-Israel enmity. Soviet Russia has exploited both of these with skill. The desire for change, the revolt against colonialism, the impact of oil revenues upon a feudalistic social structure, the emotional volatility of the peoples, fully exploited by the Cairo and Damascus radios and by the powerful Soviet transmitter in Tashkent, all create unrest and keep temperatures at a high point. Russia's frank support of the Arabs against Israel has, more than any other one factor, helped her cause in the area.

The problem of the West is how to counter creeping Communism, internal subversion and conquest by proxy.

Communist influence in the Middle East today is strongest in Egypt and Syria. Yet it would be unwise to discount too greatly leftist sentiment when it is combined with extreme nationalist sentiment as is the case in such a country as Iraq. Iraq for the moment presents a picture of stability; and her oil revenues, the greater part of which is being wisely applied to improve the country's economy, should contribute to keep her on a course of political moderation. But there is no doubt that a vast number—perhaps a majority—of the population admire Nasser greatly, dislike the Baghdad Pact and would like to see Iraq a firm part of an Arab federation. Iraq's position is important, for as long as she casts her lot with the West the position of Syria as a left-wing or Communist "base" remains precarious. Syria today is surrounded by unfriendly neighbors; there is friction between Damascus and Beirut, Damascus and Baghdad, and Damascus and Ankara. Recently Syrian influence received a severe setback in Jordan. And powerful Israel lies on Syria's southern frontier.

All this means that the first politico-military job of the United States is to help the Arab countries of the Middle East internally, to capitalize upon the very considerable fund of good will that exists for Americans there, and to counter creeping Communism

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in every legitimate manner. It means, particularly, that a friendly government must be helped to remain in power in Baghdad.

There are numerous ways to accomplish these objectives. We must insist in our policies that what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. Both Israel and the Arabs have repeatedly defied the United Nations—and have gotten away with it. Our actions in the Suez crisis last fall were strong—and rightly so; they were strong again at the time of the Jordanian crisis. In between they have lacked authority. The first requirement for a sound military defense against creeping Communism in the Middle East is political fairness and justice in *all* our actions, plus firm and unequivocal policies based on this fairness.

Second, we should not regard either Egypt or Syria as irretrievably lost to the Communist world; this is an over-simplified analysis. The cultural, economic and political penetration in these countries has been pronounced and the military penetration has been considerable. But there are means of countering this form of Communist influence. The Syrian Army, for instance, still has major ties to the French and sizable amounts of U. S. and Western equipment. The Egyptian armed forces have even more substantial psychological and technical ties to the West. The motto of the Egyptian military academy—"Duty, Honor, Country"—is the same as that of West Point, upon which it is, in many ways, patterned. More than 100 officers of the Egyptian armored force have attended our armored school at Fort Knox, Kentucky, in recent years. Throughout the Arab world and particularly in the Arab armed forces there is real eagerness not only for U. S. military equipment but for U. S. military knowledge. This eagerness and these ties should be exploited. Our military schools have a considerable influence in the Middle East and the careful selection of an increased number of Arab officers to study at Fort Knox, Fort Benning, Leavenworth and elsewhere would provide more than military dividends.

This utilization of military means towards a psychological and political end—to check the progress of creeping Communism—is one of our tasks in the Middle East.

But we must also be prepared to halt local aggression, to prevent small regional conflicts from becoming major wars. We cannot do this with atom bombs; they remain in reserve as deterrents. It is significant that at the height of the Jordan crisis, 1,800 United States Marines were given shore leave in Beirut, Lebanon.

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These forces, plus airborne troops based in the United States, are the kind of military power most useful to put out "brush fires." The Sixth Fleet is not as well equipped for this job—the one it is most likely to have to do—as it should be. The 1,800 Marines comprise a reinforced Marine battalion landing team—a powerful little force, but not large enough for the tasks it might face. It should be strengthened.

In a military sense we face another danger in the area. This danger, stressed and over-emphasized in Britain, is the stockpiling of Soviet arms and equipment in Egypt, Syria and perhaps elsewhere in the Middle East, ready for use by so-called Soviet "volunteers" when desired. There are sizable stocks of Communist equipment in Egypt and Syria and more is being shipped. There are also some hundreds of Soviet technicians in both countries. It is possible to fly men and arms quickly from the Caucasus area into Syria, and thence into Egypt. This danger does, therefore, exist; but it should not be a major one, unless we are blind. Soviet Russia has a contiguous frontier with Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan but not with Syria. In the Middle East, there is no exact parallel to the simple situation of Korea or Indochina; logistic aid and Soviet "volunteers" would have to come, in case of war, by air or sea unless Turkey or Iran or Afghanistan were over-run first. Such supply and reinforcement would be difficult; if it were openly opposed by our air and naval power only a trickle at best of alleged "volunteers" could get through. To counter this threat we need: (a) to intensify our opposition to creeping Communism within Egypt and Syria and other threatened areas of the Middle East; (b) to improve our intelligence in the area; and (c) to erect, probably under the ægis of the Baghdad Pact, a chain of early warning and fighter control radar stations across Iraq and Iran. There is a great gap in our electronic line of "sentinels" in Iraq and Iran; it should be filled.

There are two other para-military needs if we are to develop a satisfactory security posture in the Middle East. One of the primary objectives of Communism is to utilize the nationalist sentiments of the area to deny the West the use of the Suez Canal, to nationalize Western oil holdings in the area and to oust the West from bases in Arab countries. Whether or not these attempts seem likely to succeed, prudence requires the development of alternatives. Both economically and militarily Western dependence in the past upon the Suez Canal was unsound. A super-

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tanker building program should be pressed, supplemented by the construction of new oil pipelines and possibly the development of a route from the Gulf of Aqaba to the Mediterranean. Nationalization attempts can be guarded against or compensated for by a wise oil royalty policy, political, cultural and psychological defenses against creeping Communism, and continued emphasis upon the interdependence of the Arab oil lands and the West. The best alternatives to bases in Arab countries are bases at sea (the carriers and seaplanes of the Sixth Fleet), an expanded base program in Turkey, and retention of Cyprus bases by the British. This little divided island is of very considerable importance in the strategy of deterrence; it also acts as a fire alarm station for the entire Middle East and is of particular importance as a strategic checkmate to a leftist Syria. Retention of British bases in Cyprus is of major importance to security in the area.

Finally, perhaps the most important military requirement of the region is the establishment of a major U.S. command in the Red Sea-Arabian Sea-Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean area. Today, the United States Navy maintains a so-called Middle East Command, but it consists only of a seaplane tender (without seaplanes) showing the flag, and, intermittently, two to four destroyers. The Middle East Command is today under a junior rear admiral. His force has some psychological and political value, but very little military utility—and hence less political importance than a real fighting fleet would have. A small fleet, possibly including one aircraft carrier and a helicopter mother ship with Marines aboard, and a guided missile cruiser plus destroyers—all knit together by a command and communications ship capable of controlling aircraft—should be established in what is now the vacuum of the Indian Ocean. This command—a job for a vice admiral—should be staffed by Arabic-speaking officers and political advisers specially selected for their knowledge of the area. It should be essentially a command and staff echelon, though capable of immediate small-scale military action without reinforcement.

These requirements may seem major and onerous. But the Eisenhower Doctrine means, in effect, that our frontier is now in the Caucasus. We are involved now in the Middle East for an indefinite future. We must have the strength to oppose the kind of aggression most likely there—Communist infiltration and Communist exploitation of regional conflicts and local wars.

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EDUCATION, VALUES AND POLITICS IN JAPAN

By Marius B. Jansen

CHILDRENS' textbooks in the social sciences tend to reflect accurately the values of a society. Since their lessons and morals are set forth in direct and simple language, they indicate in bold outline the things which the society, or part of it, thinks it important for the young to absorb. In Japan today such textbooks show a striking contrast to those used before the surrender of 1945, and they deserve attention as evidence of the rapid change of values that has taken place in some parts of Japanese society.

Recently the new textbooks have come under sharp attack. The debate over educational policy is one of the most important and least publicized struggles in contemporary Japan, and the controversy furnishes an excellent opportunity for judging the nature of change in Japanese society. That change has been sectional and uneven, differing in quality between those who teach and those who govern. There is a particular contrast between the way in which segments of the intelligentsia interpret the new moral basis of Japanese education and the way in which the political leaders, the liberals and moderates of prewar years, cling to the old ethic of their younger days.

The struggle focuses sharply on who is going to write the textbooks. Since Japanese society has been open and free in recent years, the textbooks in use today reflect the values and concerns of the intellectuals, or at least of the articulate and representative minority which gives the broader group its tone. To be sure, the intellectuals are not a united or clearly definable group, and neither are the so-called "conservatives." Yet there is a large area of agreement within each group. Each is convinced the other is determined to destroy its influence by alienating the minds and affections of Japan's 20,000,000 lower-school pupils.

The education controversy also throws light on reforms effected during the American Occupation. One can see where these fell short, where form was confused with substance, and one can also see where they satisfied long-standing needs. One is also struck by the way institutions can serve purposes other than those for which they were designed. Certification of textbooks, for in-

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stance, installed by Occupation planners to eliminate nationalistic and militarist indoctrination, has been continued by Ministry of Education officials who now utilize the system to ward off excessive anti-militarist and anti-nationalist teachings. The government leaders have discovered the possibility of putting old wine into new bottles.

II

Any doubt that the education system is in the forefront of the political struggle in Japan today should have been removed by the behavior of the House of Councillors in late May of 1956. The Hatoyama Cabinet had sponsored legislation making the Boards of Education appointive instead of elective. The Socialist minority, responsive to the appeals of the powerful Teachers Union, fought to prevent final action by all the methods known to other parliamentary bodies and by some of its own devising. In answer, the Government mobilized 500 policemen in and around the chamber. The outnumbered Socialists were then unable to prevent action on the bill, which passed June 1 amid scenes of wild disorder.

This marked the first substantial change in the organizational pattern which had been instituted during the American Occupation. Many Japanese liberals concluded that local politicians would now be able to warp the education system back to some of its prewar themes. Others, however, pointed out that the elective Boards of Education had not been outstanding successes, and that the same liberals had complained earlier of their domination by local political bosses. Perhaps all that can be said is that there is no longer the possibility that the Boards can become effective elective bodies.

Other organizational aspects of the new educational system are not yet under serious attack. The pattern of grammar, junior high and high schools leading to the colleges seems to have considerable support. And although there are many who deplore the rise in the number of colleges and universities in which today more than half a million students are enrolled, vested interests in the form of local pride and status-conscious faculties make it unlikely these institutions will be reduced.

A bill affecting the manner of selecting textbooks in lower schools which failed to pass the 1956 Diet was in many ways much more important than the changes which affected the

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Boards of Education. It would have altered the machinery of textbook certification to allow for greater bureaucratic control. This is a matter which could immediately affect the content of education, and it is the more significant in view of the history of Japanese textbooks.

Before the end of World War II, schools in all parts of Japan used uniform textbooks prepared by the Ministry of Education. The system of national textbooks was instituted in 1903. Loyalty and duty, taught in ethics (*shūshin*) textbooks and reinforced by lessons in history, geography and language, were the core of the value structure. The ideology had been given its definitive statement in the Imperial Rescript on Education of 1890, which cited loyalty and filial piety as "the Glory of the fundamental character of Our Empire, and . . . the source of Our Education." The principal revisions in the national textbooks came in 1910, after the annexation of Korea; in 1918, after World War I; in 1933, after Manchuria; and in 1941, on the eve of Pearl Harbor. Except for the 1918 version, each revision tended to strengthen the nationalist content of the textbooks. Information about the outside world, names of famous foreign figures and descriptions of other social systems diminished, to be replaced by increasing emphasis on the benefits of Japan's family state. As symbols of that state, the Imperial Rescript and the Imperial portrait were the center of reverence at school ceremonies. The textbooks provided most of the content of Japanese education. Teachers expounded them, and for the pupils they represented ultimate truth. In the words of the United States Education Mission to Japan, the education system, "through prescription, textbooks, examinations and inspection, lessened the opportunities of teachers to exercise professional freedom. The measure of efficiency was the degree to which standardization and uniformity were secured."[1]

Occupation reformers set to work to change this system of sacrosanct textbooks. They had the advice of leading American educators as well as the enthusiastic coöperation of Japanese educators—for the intellectuals, unlike the landlords, militarists, *zaibatsu* and politicians, were eager to help in reforming themselves. Under the new Fundamental Law of Education of 1947 it became the duty of the education system "to contribute to the peace of the world and the welfare of humanity by building a

[1] *Report . . ., submitted to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Tokyo, March 20, 1946* (Washington: G.P.O., 1946), p. 7.

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democratic and cultural state." Education was to strive for "the full development of personality," and peace, democracy and international coöperation were to become the themes for the new system.

Basic revisions of the curriculum followed. The old training in ethics was ruled out, and in the lower schools history and geography disappeared as separate subjects. Henceforth, the new laws stated, efforts were to be made "to develop a proper understanding of the actual conditions and traditions both of children's native communities and of the country, and further to cultivate the spirit of international coöperation."[2] Out of this came new courses in social studies, with textbooks bearing titles like "Akarui Shakai" ("The Enlightened Society") and "Shakai no Kōzō" ("The Structure of Society"). In content and approach these differed sharply from the previous eulogies of *samurai* and Emperors.

Japan's postwar textbooks have been produced privately. The system works as follows: The Education Ministry provides course-of-study outlines for each age level and indicates the material that should be covered. Each November and December publishers present drafts to the Ministry, which then refers them to five readers selected from a list of qualified educators. These men judge the work against the curriculum requirements and determine whether or not it is neutral in politics and religion and in harmony with the Fundamental Law of Education. In other words, the drafts have to support internationalism, peace and democracy. The readers do not know whose manuscript they read, and their verdicts are reported anonymously. The next step involves a review by a committee of 16, also appointed by the Ministry, which reconsiders the manuscript in case of sharp disagreements among the original readers. Until recently this committee verdict, identified as "Opinion F," was a formality.

If the manuscript is approved, the publisher can list his book. He now sends sample copies to one thousand textbook exhibits which are held throughout Japan in late June. Representatives of schools and school boards come to these exhibits, make their selections and file their orders. The publishers then print the required number of copies. As before the war, parents buy the texts

[2] The Fundamental Law and School Education Law can be found in *Education in the New Japan* (Tokyo: Education Division, Civil Information and Education Section, SCAP, 1948), v. 2, pp. 109, 112.

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for their children. The textbooks are no longer uniform and standard, and since they change constantly and are poorly bound and disintegrate rapidly they have become a major form of private enterprise. Many jobs are involved; in 1955, 92 textbook publishers printed over 230,000,000 textbooks. A sixth grade teacher had a choice of 173 books.

Keen competition for sales results. Lateness in having the copies at the exhibits is disastrous, and many publishers have printed a large number of books, confident of certification, only to lose expensive gambles. Efforts to influence selection or adoption boards have also resulted in the inevitable round of hot-spring and banquet parties, caustically referred to by the press as the "publishers' treat" policy. In one case an entire committee from distant Kagoshima was invited to Tokyo to inspect printing facilities and stayed to be shown more expensive and entertaining spots as well. This is important for it provides arguments for government publicists who charge that the new system is really costing the parents more money than the old national textbooks did. Those books were good everywhere, they could be reused, and, like everything else before the war, they were inexpensive.

But the real struggle is over content. In August 1955 the Democratic Party issued a pamphlet entitled "Ureubeki Kyōkasho no Mondai" ("The Problem of the Dreadful Textbooks"). This was prepared by a party commission which drew on records of a House of Representatives committee as well as on many popular attacks on textbooks. It tried to link the Teachers Union with the Japanese Communist Party, and charged that Union leaders were writing misleading and slanted texts which were poisoning the minds of the young as well as emptying the pockets of their parents. The attack was badly overdone. Education Ministry officials denied ever having seen the pamphlet, and the press was quick with charges of McCarthyism. But the pamphlet had some results. It probably convinced some of its readers, since it was issued all over the country through party offices. It frightened the publishers, who the following year quietly withdrew most of the textbooks attacked. And it convinced the intellectuals, if they needed convincing, of the depravity of the Liberal-Democratic leaders.

Those leaders next prepared the bill changing the system of certification which failed to pass the 1956 Diet. Since then, ad-

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ministrative measures have been taken to achieve some of the same results. Beginning with junior high school, social science textbooks are again to be divided into sections on history, geography and current problems. The committee of 16 readers will now be drawn from a panel of 80, so that specialists can judge each subject. New policies toward "controversial" textbooks have gone into effect, and "Opinion F" now plays a more active rôle.

A particularly striking case was the rejection of a junior high school text called "Nihon no Shakai" ("Japanese Society") which had been a nation-wide best-seller with a half-million sales. "Opinion F" rejected a revision of the book on grounds that it was overly partial to the new constitution, unbalanced in its treatment of basic human rights and portrayed World War II in excessively dark colors.

There was a good deal of money at stake here, and publishers and authors quickly traced Opinion F to its source. The strong man on the committee of 16 turned out to be Professor Iwao Kōyama of Japan University. He, it seems, had done some detective work of his own, and had traced the unsigned manuscript he was reading to its authors, recognizing them as leading figures in the Teachers Union and, worse still, co-authors of one of the texts which had been singled out for attack by the government-party pamphlet.

Out of this has come a new phrase for the lexicon of current slogans, "F purge," and the periodicals have been full of indignation. Press interviews with Professor Kōyama have shown him distrustful of the idea of treating social sciences together (although he thinks it natural for a country without a history like America), and convinced that it is time to resurrect Japanese patriotism.

This is where the matter stands at present. It is clear that the Ministry, whether or not it gets its way with proposed legislative changes, has enough power to keep textbooks from going too far to the left. It can revise curricula and force a review of current texts at any time. It is equally clear that many of the textbook writers are deeply concerned by what they see as a trend back toward old-style patriotism. Symbolic of their position is the refusal of elementary school teachers in several cities to lead their pupils in singing the national anthem, on grounds that its reverence for the Imperial family is out of harmony with the new

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democracy. Meanwhile, there is the ironic sight of the elderly conservatives who sit as judges of what the young shall read, to see that it is in harmony with laws which they did not make, do not like and seek to change. Seldom have there been such travellers, lonely and afraid, in a world they never made.

III

The conflict of values comes into sharpest relief when textbooks are judged against the criteria of conformity with the new educational standards. So much emotion and belief, and so much history, are involved in the application of these criteria that in many cases there is not a sufficient area of agreement to permit of compromise.

For instance, textbooks are required to be "neutral." They must not lean toward any particular religion or program or party, and they must support the goals of the Fundamental Law —that is, peace, democracy and international coöperation. For the better part of the intellectuals, however, "neutrality" means that there must be no support for the Emperor system, Shintō, the national anthem, the Ise shrines and other traditional supports of the pre-surrender Japanese state. "Neutrality" means that discussions of such subjects will be hostile or that they will be avoided altogether. Support of peace and democracy, on the other hand, will require a vigorous exposition of the evils of prewar Japanese government and policies and, logically, support of the early Occupation and its work in reforming these evils. And since social studies are to contribute to an understanding of current problems, the textbook discussions are more than likely to lead to reflections on the nature of current Japanese society, government and politics, to the discredit of whatever elements seem to be linked with or to champion revivals of prewar trends. In other words, "neutrality," as interpreted and understood by the textbook writers, usually produces material that will be considered "slanted" by those who judge the books. And for the textbook writers the conservatives' preference for patriotism and rearmament constitutes an equally pronounced "slanting" toward pre-surrender themes.

These problems of approach are particularly apparent in the treatment of Japanese history. An analysis of 21 standard textbooks shows that most of them treat the emergence of the Imperial family only to illustrate growing power differentiation in

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early Japan.[3] Only six mention the Imperial shrines at Ise, which were central to the pre-surrender lessons, and most brush aside the formerly sacred mythology as untrue. The periods of classical Japanese culture are treated not so much in terms of achievement as of the burden they placed on the commoners. All the books lay great stress on Japan's debt to China; some, indeed, go beyond cultural admiration. Feudalism, of course, comes in for extended treatment, and the fears of the present and recent past intrude on the treatment given the Middle Ages. Feudalism, the definitions run, is reactionary because it tries to preserve the past; it is the opposite of democratic, and it allows 6 percent of the population to bully the other 94 percent.

In dealing with the modern period, only four of the 21 books give much space to the Emperor Meiji's Charter Oath of 1868, which was long cited as the beginning of Japan's democratic changes; instead, they prefer to stress the theme of absolutism. Japan's modern wars are shown as the inevitable result of the search for markets and profits, and for the 1930s and 1940s the story is one of unrelieved oppression at home and aggression abroad, resolved finally by liberation under the Occupation. The new constitution and the postwar freedoms are everywhere praised. One textbook, in fact, is so enthusiastic that it maintains that the new constitution, unlike the old, was prepared by the people—surely a case where approbation has gone beyond "neutrality."

This determinedly anti-militarist emphasis has some interesting results. Parents whose children come home without having heard of the great warrior heroes of the past and unable to cite many of the Emperors usually conclude that history is no longer being taught. After all, that is what they were taught as "history." And what are they to make of a treatment of the Russo-Japanese War which makes no mention of General Nogi, the commander at Port Arthur (none of the 21 textbooks does so) but has room for enthusiastic accounts of the handful of pacifists who refused to support the war? This is partly because the textbook writers have such a difficult time finding heroes of democ-

[3] A private organization calling itself the Committee for Study of Instruction in History (Rekishi Kyōiku Mondai Kenkyū Kai) has issued a 288-page analysis of textbooks. The Committee's standards are clearly very conservative, but since they produce extensive quotations from each book on a number of issues there is no reason not to use their work. "Kyōkasho ni kansuru chōsa: Chū-Tō rekishi kyōkasho no hihan" (Investigations of Textbooks: Criticism of Junior and Senior High School History Textbooks), (mimeographed), Tokyo, March 1956.

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racy and peace to write about. When they turn to foreign examples like Lincoln, their critics deplore this too and call for an independent history with a revival of patriotism.

What is behind this desire for a revival of patriotism? The textbook writers think they know. They see it organically related to plans for constitutional revision, for reëmphasizing the place of the Emperor, for changes in the civil codes governing family law, and for rearmament. And so the writers, defending peace and democracy in their teaching, feel they are fighting a return to militarism and absolutism. Since they remember the way in which changes were made in the textbook system in prewar days, they naturally see it their duty to stand and fight here and now.

What of their opponents? Some of them are genuinely scandalized by what they read in the textbooks. Others are politicians who see a useful issue. Still others, senior scholars trained in the old tradition, are appalled by some of the slipshod generalizations which have been substituted for more factual accounts. Most of them, it is safe to say, are patriotic men who feel that there is much of nobility and valor in the history of prewar Japan which should again become a legacy for the scholars of young Japan. They see it as an injustice to the pupils not to give it to them.

The problems of textbook certification thus reveal a profound lack of agreement on the ethical core of democracy in Japan. A century of Western contact has served to invalidate most of the standards of traditional Japan. For much of the first half of the twentieth century intense xenophobia and ultra-nationalism concealed basic ideological differences in Japanese society. With defeat and surrender, the "modern" blend of archaic Shintō with twentieth century nationalism lost its supporters, and it has no longer been possible to conceal the crevices in what had seemed a united front. Patriotism, long the highest virtue, is now controversial and suspect; national strength, which so long held precedence over individual needs in the teachings of the government schools, has become, for many, irreconcilable with individual well-being and security.

IV

In this controversy, the social rôle and emotional state of mind of the intellectuals are central elements. During most of Japan's modern century, intellectuals have acted as transmitters of

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foreign ideas and values. Like their counterparts in other Asian societies, they have interpreted and explained for their countrymen the standards and beliefs of the Western world.

Unlike their counterparts in other Asian countries, however, Japanese intellectuals were for a considerable period of time in substantial agreement with their political leaders on the need for utilizing Western experience in achieving the goals of national strength and unity. During the second half of the nineteenth century the intellectuals were few, but they were highly respected and very influential. With the twentieth century came increasing sophistication and discrimination. The intellectuals' horizons broadened; they were more numerous, but also less close to the seats of power and influence; many became alienated from the values of their own society. In the fevered crises of the 1930s and 1940s, however, the essentials of national unity were preserved.

In the postwar scene Japanese intellectuals have been more numerous and far more vocal than ever before. They have had the outlook of an élite in a society no longer willing to grant them this rôle; many of their supposed adversaries are as well educated as they. The intellectuals as a group show much the same cast of mind as do their fellows in underdeveloped Asian countries; unlike them, however, the Japanese spokesmen operate in a society with a high level of political and economic maturity and sophistication. Despite this limited ability to communicate with their peers, the intellectuals have been able to take advantage of the high level of popular education by appealing to their countrymen through the pages of the press and periodicals. Yet despite their key rôle in forming opinion, the intellectuals remain poor in votes. And today their monopoly over the materials of instruction is being sharply challenged after a decade during which they have had things largely their own way.

Their success so far has been due, in part, to the fact that they alone were prepared to join in the Occupation's sweeping condemnations of old Japan. They had, after all, been the principal casualties of the thought-control and ideological conformity in Imperial Japan; some of the most respected intellectual leaders of Japan today were dismissed from their posts during World War II and prosecuted as disloyal. These men and their followers recall the way in which statements of patriotism were used to carry out ideological indoctrination, and they do not want that to happen again.

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At the same time, the tone of protest and concern which Japan's intellectuals emit is conditioned by the strongly Marxist trend of most historical and economic writing in postwar Japan. For many persuasive writers, including those with large student followings, Lenin's theories of imperialism, the economic causation of war and the "contradictions" which led to modern Japan's "absolutism" are all firmly held as provable beliefs. Hence, in their view, Japan's postwar structure, while superior to the pre-surrender state, is nevertheless ordained to suffer the consequences of the general capitalist doom.

Marxism had long had great, though not always overt, influence as a "scientific" approach to history and social science. In Japan, as elsewhere in Asia, intellectuals were drawn to its comprehensive vision of the meaning of history; in its all-encompassing claims they saw a possible substitute for the values in their own tradition that had ceased to draw them, and they saw in it a rôle for themselves as the prophets, theorists and élite of the new society. In the early postwar days of Allied unity, of sweeping reforms and of ideological confusion, Marxist thought was able to make tremendous headway. Since then, the international conditions which underlay the pacifism of the new constitution and the shallowness that saw militarism as the only possible enemy of Japanese democracy have changed. But important groups of Japanese intellectuals still retain that outlook, and this 1946 attitude in 1956 makes for a dark picture of the world. This is particularly true of the leaders of the powerful Teachers Union; their view of world affairs helps to shape their determined stand in domestic affairs.

The intellectuals' view of their own recent history and of America's participation in it is further affected by the feeling that, but for a change in American policy, things might have turned out differently. The early Occupation, with its sweeping condemnation of old Japan as "feudal" and its calls for a new society, was very much to their liking. In 1948, for instance, General MacArthur could denounce prewar private enterprise as "limited to a few of feudal lineage, who exploited into virtual slavery the remainder of the Japanese people, permitted higher standards of life to others only through sufferance, and in search of further plunder abroad furnished the tools for the military to embark upon its ill-fated venture into world conquest. The record is thus one of economic oppression and exploitation at home, aggression

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and spoliation abroad."[4] This is not very good history. By the end of the Occupation it was no longer good politics, and in 1957 it would certainly be considered "slanted" by any textbook committee of the Ministry of Education.

In any event, it was to be expected that the intellectual atmosphere in Japan should change more rapidly than either the school system or the society. Currents of thought which were largely taboo under the militarists' rule became popular to the point of being almost compulsory after the militarists were discredited. The old virtues, the old heroes and the old values were firmly rejected, and the search for meaning and progress in Japanese history became a search for previously unsung heroes and causes that had stood out against the flooding tide of militarism.

No group of scholars or writers had the prestige and purposefulness which the postwar Marxists showed. And so for a decade now the Marxist interpretation of history has been equated with "progressive" and "scientific" thinking; Marxist concepts have gone unchallenged even among non-Marxist writers. Inevitably, this overwhelming preponderance of Marxist interpretation and analysis has been reflected in the textbook popularizations of the scholarly literature. The "men of culture," as the intellectuals are called, are therefore quite correct when they reply to criticisms of the texts that they are in line with the latest and most "scientific" thinking. Whether that thinking, in turn, is in line with the best in social science methodology, however, is another question. But in Japan it is only beginning to become a respectable question.

In some ways, however, the trend of academic work seems to be toward more meticulous and responsible scholarship. The postwar generalizers were too busy writing to have much time for documents and facts. This is no longer the case. But since it is still early in the partial turn from Marxist theory to empirical research, and since in large measure the alternative seems still to be the dreary chronicle of heroes and rationale of prewar acts that many critics would prefer, it is small wonder that the historians, the teachers and the Socialists are prepared to stake their all in the education controversy. For in their minds the alternative is a system like the one from which they were liberated—which, if

[4] "Reply to Criticism of Economic Policy" (a letter to J. H. Gipson, of Caxton Printers, Caldwell, Idaho) in *Political Reorientation of Japan, September 1945 to September 1948*, Government Section, SCAP (Washington: G.P.O., 1949), v. 2, p. 780.

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established again, would isolate them completely from their countrymen within a generation.

It must be added that not all intellectuals are Marxists (although the more influential and popular writers are) and that not nearly all of the intellectual Marxists are pro-Communist. And, while glaring imbalances have been shown to exist in some textbooks, and although the men who write them occasionally use their "neutrality" to lean in the direction of the mainland, on the whole the situation is still far and away superior to that prevailing before the war. Moreover, existing controls at the command of the Ministry of Education would seem to rule out the possibility of large-scale subversion through textbooks.

At the same time, the conservatives seem to an outsider to be far less united and purposeful in their objectives than the intellectuals claim. No responsible persons have suggested that the ideas of suiting education to life, substituting learning for indoctrination and making equal educational opportunities available as widely as possible are bad or should be abolished. Even the suggestions that have been made for revision of the status of the Emperor, while they may lead to others, are in themselves a far cry from anything that could safely have been suggested in pre-surrender Japan. The climate of opinion has shifted so far to the left that there would seem little possibility that it can return.

As yet, however, no middle ground for ideological unity and stability is in sight. It is true that on both sides of the education struggle there are to be found large numbers of men of good will and high intelligence whose opinions are their own and who follow neither government pamphlets nor Teachers Union propaganda. It should not be thought that the half-million members of the Teachers Union are accurately represented in their political emotions and affiliations by their vigorous leaders, or that the questioning attitude of the Japanese public is reflected by the obstinate determination of the Diet's conservative majority. But so long as no middle position develops the battleground will be dominated by spokesmen of the left and right, who are contending for the right to determine the way the Japanese of tomorrow will understand their country and their world.

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THE POLITICAL MIND OF INDIA

By Asoka Mehta

THE recent General Elections have brought to the fore the strength and weakness of India's infant democracy. They speak with such clear accents that it would be criminal to ignore them. Rarely has any nation been given such an opportunity to discover and combat its weaknesses and foster its sources of strength.

In round figures, 112,300,000 voters participated in the recent elections as against 103,800,000 in the previous General Elections of 1952. The percentage of voters increased from 44.9 to 49.2. In Rajasthan, one of the politically backward states of the Indian Union, the votes polled jumped from less than 44 percent to over 57 percent. The Indian voter has become vote conscious.

The earlier General Elections had shown that, like her agriculture, India's political life suffered from fragmentation. The recent poll has shown that forces of consolidation are at work: as against 76 parties in 1952, only 26 political parties entered the elections this year. The number of candidates for the Lok Sabha (the House of the People) declined from 1,800 to 1,456, and that for the State Assemblies fell from 15,000 to 9,840. The four major parties, recognized as "national" by the Election Commission, increased their combined vote from 73 million in 1952 to 84 million in 1957, while the vote of all other parties, as well as of independent candidates, fell from 32,300,000 to 30,600,000.

All the four major parties improved their positions in varying proportions. The ruling Congress Party increased its vote in the elections to the Lok Sabha by more than 6,500,000, and its share in the total poll by 1.5 percent; it won 366 seats, 12 more than last time. The combined strength of all members of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha dropped from 132 to 122, thus accentuating the majority of the Congress Party. The Communist Party more than doubled its vote—polling 6,100,000 additional votes —and increased its share in the total from 5 to 9.8 percent. Its representation in the Lok Sabha increased slightly, from 26 to 29. The Jan Sangh, a Hindu communal organization, more than doubled its vote and received 5.7 percent of the total poll. Its representation increased from three seats to four in the Lok Sabha. The Praja Socialist Party (P.S.P.) superficially seems to

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have suffered a setback: its vote fell from 17,300,000 to 11,700,000, a drop from 16.4 to 10 percent of the total poll; its representation declined from 20 to 18. But the earlier total included votes of two rival socialist parties; for a fair comparison with 1952, nearly 3,000,000 votes should be added to the P.S.P. total in 1957, on which basis the party's decline would appear as marginal. Further, while the Communists contested 115 seats this year as against 69 in 1952, the P.S.P. contested only 175 seats in 1957 as against twice that number in 1952. The P.S.P. with a smaller vote had consolidated its position.[1]

The elections to the State Assemblies tell the same tale. The Congress Party won 1,889 or about 65.1 percent of the seats in the state legislatures. In 1952, its share was almost the same. The Socialists increased their representation from 125 to 195, the Communists from 181 to 189 and the Jan Sangh from 34 to 46.

The figures merely sketch the surface. To get an understanding of the unfolding complexities of India's political mind we must dive deeper.

The recent elections were profoundly affected by the reorganization of States, carried out mostly on linguistic lines. Where the linguistic aspirations of the people were satisfied, the Opposition took a beating; where the dissatisfaction rankled deep, the Congress had to retreat. Of the 14 States in India, four (Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, Jammu and Kashmir, and Assam) were unaffected by the reorganization. Of the ten affected, four (Madhya Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh, Madras and Mysore) were happy with the new boundaries obtained. Three (Bombay, the Punjab and Orissa) were furiously dissatisfied, while the remaining three (Bihar, West Bengal and Kerala) were neither satisfied nor actively perturbed. The voting patterns in these States, with the exception of Kerala, generally conform to the reactions of the people to the reorganization.

In the State of Madras (a so-called "sated" state, meaning one where the linguistic aspirations of the people are satisfied) the Congress Party's vote increased by 7 percent, while the Communist vote shrank by 3 percent, and votes of smaller parties and independents fell by as much as 15 percent. The consolidation of the Congress Party was remarkable. By effecting some land re-

[1] Thirteen smaller parties, generally representing special interests like the Scheduled Castes Federation, the Muslim League, or regional affinities like the Ganatantra Parishad, the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, polled over 12,000,000 votes and won 45 seats to the Lok Sabha. Independent candidates polled 18,500,000 votes and elected 26 members.

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forms and by satisfying the linguistic aspirations of the people, the Congress cut the ground from under the feet of the Communists. The Congress won 151 out of 205 seats in the State Assembly. The Communists, who loomed large in the last elections, won only four seats.

As a detailed example of the process, let us look at the Telengana area of Andhra Pradesh, where the Communists had staged armed struggles some years back, and where in the last elections their strength had been considerable. The Congress made significant gains in the State elections, as the following table shows:

TABLE I. THE VOTE IN TELENGANA

	1952		*1957*		
	Votes Polled	*Percent*	*Votes Polled*	*Percent*	*Seats Won*
Congress	1,196,292	37.5	1,720,507	46.5	68
Communists	971,677	31.2	941,309	25.6	22
P.S.P.	423,031	13.4	211,587	5.7	1
Others	595,732	17.9	815,366	22.2	14
Total	3,186,732		3,688,769		

The entire increase in the number of voters was picked up by the Congress Party. The Communists have been literally "contained;" their share in the total vote went down from a third to a quarter. The separation of Andhra Pradesh seems to have paid good dividends to the ruling party.

In "unsated" states, on the other hand, the Opposition found favorable ground. The classic instance is Bombay State. There all the Opposition parties united and more than doubled their representation in the legislature. Particularly in the Maharashtra area, the Congress vote slumped from 55.9 percent to 38.9 percent and it won barely 34 out of 134 seats to the State Assembly from that region. It is significant that numerically the Congress vote declined from 2,740,000 to 2,250,000, that is by less than half a million. But an additional million voters in this election swung the election against the Congress. More recently, it suffered a further defeat in a municipal election, obtaining only 55 of 131 seats in the Bombay City Council.

In Orissa, the Ganatantra Parishad that had spearheaded the State's demands for some parts of Bihar increased its vote and its strength in the State Assembly phenomenally (from 35 to 52 seats). In Assam, though the Congress vote increased by 12.7 percent (from 43.9 to 56.6) and the miscellaneous Opposition

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vote went down from 34.2 to 23.2 percent, the Congress position in the legislature was weakened by three seats because in the tribal areas the Congress lost 17 out of 18 seats to various tribal organizations, all clamoring for a separate state which had been denied them. In Bihar, the Jharkhand Party, an organization of the tribal people claiming a separate state of their own, not merely maintained but consolidated its hold. The Congress Party, as well as other national parties, has failed to inspire confidence in the tribal people, particularly where they live in compact areas; unless emotional integration is achieved, grave consequences may follow. The recent Naga tragedy is a serious portent that democratic India can ignore only at her peril.

We see, then, that language questions provoke powerful emotions. In South Asia, at least, religious solidarity is yielding place to linguistic affinity as the supreme vehicle of mass emotion. In Pakistan the two wings of the country are today perhaps more language-oriented than religious-minded. In Ceylon, the conflict over language has flared up with a violence unusual for that placid island. Indian leaders have handled the language question with wisdom and dispatch, but it still deserves careful attention and a consistent application of principles and laws.

Satisfaction of linguistic claims, however, does not snuff out regional feelings. In Madras State, for instance, all national parties fared badly against the Congress. The Opposition vote rallied round the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, which entered the elections for the first time and polled 13.8 percent of the total vote, winning 15 seats. The Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam was agitating for a separate sovereign state of the Dravid (Tamil-speaking) people, but it compromised its stand to the extent of soft-pedalling that issue; instead, it played up the hostility of the southerners toward the north and campaigned on the Government's neglect and niggardliness towards the Tamil State of Madras. This plea is raised in different regions and finds a quick response in the hearts of the people. It is interesting to note that the Communists have been emphasizing the same two points in Kerala, both before and since their electoral triumph.

Opposition to the Congress is emerging not in terms of rival national parties but mostly through various regional groupings: Ganatantra Parishad in Orissa, Jharkhand Party and the Janata Party in Bihar, the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam in Madras, Samyukta Maharashtra Samiti in Maharashtra (Bombay State),

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Maha Gujarat Parishad in Gujarat (Bombay State), and the various tribal organizations in the tribal areas of Assam. Collectively, these parties have won more seats in the State Assemblies and the Lok Sabha than any national party in opposition to the Congress. As a matter of fact, it is not easy for a national party to satisfy and articulate the emotional discontent of a region. When a region wants to express its discontent it prefers a party whose allegiance is to the region alone and whose horizons are limited. This is perhaps the biggest danger that Indian democracy faces during the next 20 years when it will be under the severe strains of economic development.

The dilemma was well brought out in Mysore State, where the recent Assembly elections showed the following voting pattern:

TABLE II. THE VOTE IN MYSORE

	Votes	*Percentage*	*Seats Won*
Congress	3,343,644	50.9	150
P.S.P.	887,928	13.6	18
Communists	123,403	1.9	1
Jan Sangh	83,734	1.3	0
Independents	2,115,761	32.3	39

Against the Congress, insufficient support was found either for the Communists—whose vote increased between 1952 and 1957 from 1.3 to 1.9 percent—or for the Jan Sangh—whose vote fell from 1.5 to 1.3 percent. The P.S.P. evidently is in an advantageous position. But there is a sizable unorganized vote, and once the first flush of the new linguistic unification is over it will rally round a party that will champion the grievances, real as well as fancied, of the State against that universal whipping boy, the Union Government. If the P.S.P. takes a lead in this, its position in other States will be compromised; if it hesitates, a new party, most likely regional in its allegiance and operation, will arise to threaten its hard-won position.

In Kerala, the Communists increased their vote from 920,000 to 2,160,000, mostly at the expense of the P.S.P., the Revolutionary Socialist Party and the Independents, and by attracting most of the 630,000 new voters who came to the polls. Though polling only 36.5 percent of the total votes cast, the Communists have formed the state government. To a certain extent this success is due to the fact that they have functioned as the regional party of Kerala. And by that measure they stand to lose in their effort to build their strength in the neighboring States

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of Madras and Mysore. Already the Communist Government has raised a demand for rectification of boundaries with Madras and Mysore—a demand that the regionalists in those two States will inevitably resent. Can the Communists perform the incredible feat of articulating regional feelings of different regions, which are often conflicting and generally exclusive? If the answer is in the negative, the victory of the Communists in Kerala will prove costly to them.

That the rural and urban votes tend to go in different directions has also been established. West Bengal and Uttar Pradesh demonstrate these tendencies markedly. The Communists and P.S.P. fought the election unitedly against the Congress. The votes of both the major contestants, Congress as well as the "Leftists," increased. But while the left Opposition scored heavily in the metropolitan areas, the Congress consolidated its position in rural Bengal. For example, in Calcutta the Congress lost half its seats (although its percentage of the total vote declined only slightly), while the Communists doubled their representation and the P.S.P. made substantial gains. Conversely, in the predominantly rural district of Midnapore it was the Congress that doubled its representation, while the Communists and Socialists lost several seats. In both districts the Jan Sangh and other parties did poorly.

In a developing economy, next only to regional tensions are the tensions between rural and urban areas or between agriculture on the one hand, and commerce and industry on the other. Once political parties in a democracy get "set" in these molds, as happened in many countries of Europe, then either a sensible long-term policy of coalition has to be worked out, as in the Scandinavian countries, or the result will be tragic failure, as in the East European countries during the inter-war years.

Has the geographical distribution of political forces changed in India? The following table indicates the answer:

TABLE III. REPRESENTATION IN STATE ASSEMBLIES, BY REGIONS

	North		*South*		*East*		*West*	
	1952	*1957*	*1952*	*1957*	*1952*	*1957*	*1952*	*1957*
Congress	1,013	755	378	413	527	488	324	232
P.S.P.	57	58	82	30	55	71	11	36
Communists	6	18	130	65	36	66	1	13
Jan Sangh	24	42	0	0	9	0	0	4
Other Parties	100	59	84	28	117	112	19	43
Independents	100	114	98	110	63	80	20	64

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In north India, the smaller parties lost; Independents and Communists registered some gains; the P.S.P. maintained its position; the Jan Sangh nearly doubled its representation. In the rest of India, the Jan Sangh faded out. It remains, even more than before, a party of the north reacting to communal issues that are becoming obsolete. In south India, political disintegration has been halted. Every Opposition party has received setbacks, while the Congress has improved its position. Notwithstanding the spectacular success of the Communists in Kerala, the over-all advantage has gone to the Congress. In east India, the Congress has lost to the Communists and Socialists; in west India, the Congress Party's gains in the rest of Bombay State have been wiped out by its disastrous failure in the Maharashtra region.

In Rajasthan and Orissa, the second-ranking parties were, and continue to be, the Rama Rajya Parishad and the Ganatantra Parishad respectively. The former has lost ground, the latter has moved up. In the Punjab, with the merger of the Akali party with the Congress, the Communists have emerged as the second party. In six States where the P.S.P. was the second party it retained its position, though with depleted strength. In four States where the Communists were the second party, they retain that position, but in two of them—Madras and Andhra Pradesh—their relative position has declined, and in the other two—Kerala and West Bengal—it has improved, spectacularly in Kerala. The Jan Sangh nowhere enjoys the position of a second party.

Political configurations thus remain the same, except that the Socialists are somewhat flattened out while the Communists have more than balanced their losses with gains. Except for these alterations, no other significant changes are visible in the political topography.

The General Elections of 1957 did indicate, however, that the various parties are less stable than they seemed. The Congress undoubtedly commands a number of safe constituencies, but it received some unexpected jolts. The Communists have built up support in Kerala and parts of West Bengal, although elsewhere its support is fluid. Of the 18 P.S.P. candidates elected to the Lok Sabha, only three are old members; 11 members were unseated and 15 new members were elected in constituencies not previously held. In Bihar, P.S.P.'s strength in the Assembly increased from 24 to 31. But 19 of its sitting members were defeated.

If we gather together all these straws in the wind what do we

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find? What possibilities emerge? How to strengthen the democratic fabric of India?

If we look at the manifestoes of the four principal parties few significant differences are to be seen, except that the Communists stress heavy industry and abuse foreign capital, the Jan Sangh hesitatingly favors free enterprise and rails at Pakistan, while the P.S.P. underscores decentralization and civil liberties. All parties endorse, implicitly if not explicitly, the Five-Year Plan and merely dot the i's and cross the t's in foreign policy. Socialism is no longer the great divide: all are socialists now, and everyone's socialism is diluted in varying degrees.

The elections turned on local grievances, and three issues of universal significance: 1, the Congress Party's monopoly of power and its use of it in an exclusive and partisan manner; 2, lack of responsiveness in the Administration to the people; and 3, corruption and inefficiency in the Congress and its administration. The ruling party has lost ground in north and east India on these grounds alone. In south India, "sated" regionalism has favored Congress; in west India, frustrated regionalism has wreaked vengeance against it. The erosive forces now at work in the north will not take much time to sweep all round. However, the Congress still possesses tremendous assets: if it mends its ways, stoops to conquer and kneels to raise, cleanses its ranks of corruption, it can command an unlimited tenure of power. The cards remain stacked in its favor.

In Rajasthan, the Congress has shown that it can face and overcome feudal opposition. In the Punjab, on the whole, forces of communalism have been repulsed. It is the failure on the economic front—middle-class unemployment, for instance—that plays into the hands of the Communists, as in Kerala and West Bengal.

What happens to the Congress when Nehru disappears? Recent experience shows that loss of its top leader does not destroy a party. When the Jan Sangh's founder, Dr. Shyama Prasad Mookerji, died, his successor, Maulichandra Sharma, went over to the Congress; and yet the Jan Sangh increased its vote from 3.2 to 6.7 million. The president of the Scheduled Castes Federation, Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, died recently; its general secretary and its two representatives in the Lok Sabha crossed over to the Congress. The Federation's vote despite everything remained stable at 2,500,000. When the P.S.P.'s veteran chairman, Acharya

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Narendra Deva, passed away, its top leader, J. P. Narayan, withdrew from politics into *Bhoodan* work and its mercurial and militant ideologue, Dr. Lohia, split the organization. Leaderless, torn by ideological dissensions, the party yet retained its second position in the country. It seems that Indians who are so responsive to leaders can also achieve working arrangements with the rank and file. Perhaps that will be history's answer to the persistent question, "After Nehru what?"

The Communists have undoubtedly spread out. They now have representatives in every State legislature. They have strengthened their position in the Lok Sabha. In Kerala they have a rare opportunity to act as a magnetic foil to the Congress. They well might feel that the ball is at their feet. With this looming challenge, the Congress will have to shake off its ungainly accretions and the P.S.P. may slough off its lethargy. The fact of being in power in Kerala will cramp the style of the Communists in opposition elsewhere. Their administrative record may disenchant their radical supporters. Inside the party the tension between reformers and revolutionaries will grow.

There are a number of quasi-regional parties like the Peasants and Workers party of Maharashtra, and sectional groupings like the Scheduled Class Federation. The Congress enticed away their leaders but the organizations survive. The Communists will try to infiltrate and take over such organizations. If the major democratic parties can frustrate this through an attitude of genuine good will towards these small groups, the Communists, for all their gains, may find themselves marking time.

No party has gone through such hard times as the P.S.P. That in spite of this it has come out unscathed suggests that it has a place among the people. If it overcomes its earlier split and straightens out its ideological knots it can move forward rapidly in at least half the States of India. Its main hurdle is the tie-up with the Communists in Bengal and Maharashtra. If it fails to snap these ties it must fall a prey to the Communist tactics of rule or wreck. If the P.S.P. fades away it will be because of selfish shortsightedness on the part of its men in Bombay and Calcutta.

It is gratifying to find that religious communities are giving support to different parties increasingly on political grounds. The three major parties enjoy support among all communities, though proportionately the Sikhs and Christians lean toward the Congress. The Moslems seem to be functioning politically once

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again. Castes are becoming powerful voting lobbies and the lower castes are challenging the established positions of higher caste men. But political parties are not yet organized on a basis of higher against the lower castes. So long as parties retain this mobility, caste pressures may distort but will not disrupt democracy. In terms of age-groups, younger voters tend to favor the Opposition parties, particularly the fringe parties, the Communists and the Jan Sangh. These by themselves, however, do not appear to herald a major shift in the voting pattern.

Indian democracy need not stumble if her economic development quickens and if it is adequately aided to that end. In international relations, to befriend India is to strengthen the vital forces within the country. The political mind of India is neither wholly clear nor firm. But the elements of hope and strength outweigh those of defeat. If democracy loses in India, it will be because of the wanton negligence of its votaries both within and without that ancient land.

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AUSTRALIA'S TRIANGULAR FOREIGN POLICY

By Gordon Greenwood

THE men who conduct Australian foreign policy are charged with a difficult and delicate operation. Although this is characteristic of the diplomacy of many countries today, the statement may seem surprising to those who still think of Australia as a remote, sparsely occupied agrarian country, lacking the sinews of a modern economy, and devoid, because of some curious affiliation with the United Kingdom, of a fully developed international personality. But contemporary Australia is none of these things. The isolation which for so long conferred a measure of immunity has vanished; the economy, possessing as it does a great steel base, is highly industrialized; the peopling and exploitation of the continent proceeds apace stimulated by large-scale migration, impressive development projects and the discovery of new mineral wealth. Indeed, what is taking place is not greatly dissimilar to the transformation now occurring in Canada.

Australians could well devote all their energies to the immense task of occupying and developing a country roughly as large as the United States. They cannot, however, afford the luxury of domestic concentration to the extent which was possible for Americans in the nineteenth century. In the twentieth, the doctrine of isolation could be only a dangerous illusion and most Australians have come to recognize that fact. If anything, the changes in Australia's international situation are even more revolutionary than those which have occurred internally. This has enormously complicated our task because material and mental resources have had to be diverted from internal development to the political and military defense of the country.

Until the Second World War Australia had enjoyed immunity from any serious external threat. Her security rested upon what has been called "a fortunate combination of circumstances," one not likely to be repeated. Distance and the isolation which it produced had real meaning. More important was the situation prevailing to the north in Asia, where large areas were under European (especially British) rule or influence, a fact which tended to diminish any potential threat to Australian security from the one geographical area from which aggression might come.

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Elsewhere in Asia, notably in China, there was a division and discord destructive of national strength. Japan alone seemed capable of transforming herself into a modern national state, and it was no accident that Japan was the country which Australians most feared. Yet even Japan was hardly a first-rate Power until the late 1920s, and as she grew in strength, her rise in the Pacific was counterbalanced by the more rapid growth of American power. Finally, and of decisive importance, was the immense strength of the United Kingdom in the nineteenth century and beyond. How unchallengeable that strength was tends now to be forgotten. It was behind the shield of the British Navy that the Australian society grew and developed.

These were the traditional foundations of Australian security. They were crumbling away in the period after 1919, but the extent to which the process had gone became fully apparent only with the shock of near-invasion by the Japanese in 1941. Almost overnight, Australians found that they had to discover new and solid guarantees for their future security. They had to rethink many previous notions, redefine existing attitudes and, in a sense, construct for the first time a coherent set of principles for the conduct of foreign policy.

In one respect the task was not excessively difficult. The major objectives of any Australian policy had been made clear by the very circumstances in which Australia found herself in the postwar period. The kind of policy that had to be adopted was in fact dictated by her history, her geography, her wartime experiences and her relative lack of power. By history she was linked with the United Kingdom and Europe, by geography with the world of the Pacific and Southeast Asia. Australia is a Western outpost and her people were anxious to preserve a way of life which, while distinctively Australian, is deeply rooted in the values of Western civilization. To do so they had not only to come to terms with neighboring Asian communities, but to develop a new and intimate association with the United States as the most powerful member of the Western world.

Wartime experience and a changing balance of power, not least in the Pacific, made it abundantly clear that for the foreseeable future the security of Australia was bound up with American strength. Australians, whether they have liked it or not, have had to recognize that fact and act accordingly. But the existence of American strength is not enough in itself; it is also necessary that

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Americans should be willing to exercise it in Australia's defense should assistance ever prove necessary. Equally evident, because of her geographical position, was Australia's imperative need to develop durable and cordial relations with at least a significant number of the newly independent nations of Asia. Finally, it was axiomatic that the old and tried relationship with the Commonwealth as a whole, and with the United Kingdom in particular, should be sustained and where possible developed. Here sentiment was married without discord to a hardheaded appraisal of economic interest and political influence in world affairs.

There are, of course, many other components of Australian foreign policy: support of the United Nations and a desire to substitute principles of international law and order for the uncertainties of power politics; the defense of what majority sentiment would regard as specific national interests, for example, New Guinea; domestic control of migration; the protection of Australia's overseas trade; the development of welfare policies in the southwest Pacific; the Australian stake in Antarctica, and so on. But the essence of Australian foreign policy is to be found in the necessity to cultivate the threefold relationship already referred to—with the United Kingdom, with the United States and with non-Communist Asia. As objectives these are no doubt unexceptionable. What makes Australian policy such a difficult and delicate operation is that in the Australian judgment success in all three endeavors is essential to the country's long-term security. All three therefore have to be pursued concurrently and in such a way as to avoid conflict between them. A measure of irritation and misunderstanding from time to time is recognized as unavoidable. The nightmare of Australian statesmen is that they might on some occasion be forced to make invidious choices between the three partners to Australia's interests.

II

Australian governments in the postwar period, whether under Chifley or Menzies, have pursued each of these three branches of policy tenaciously, although it must be said that the major parties differed somewhat in their interpretation of the proper balance of interests. The need of sustaining the traditional link with the United Kingdom was never in question. One might have expected, however, some weakening of ties because of the disasters to British arms in Malaya, Britain's inability to maintain adequate

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forces in the Pacific and the evident signs that in the postwar world she would no longer command her previous degree of influence. In fact, the tendency would seem to have been in the opposite direction, towards a strengthening rather than a weakening of the British association.

Perhaps most striking evidence of this was the conversion of the Labor Party under Mr. Chifley to the pursuit of a policy of closer Anglo-Australian accord. The Labor Government had come to realize just how prejudicial it would be to Australia if Britain lost the battle for economic stability. Chifley pursued a program of close collaboration, especially in financial matters, with the object of assisting British economic recovery and sustaining British and hence Australian international influence. Cooperation extended to financial and commercial policies designed to assist British economic recovery. It included a gift of £25,000,000 to the British Government; it embraced suggestions for improved consultative machinery; and it involved Australia in the conduct of a more active regional foreign policy which was aimed at least in part at relieving excessive British commitments. Subsequent Liberal and Country Party governments in Australia have tried even more actively to sustain and develop the existing association with the United Kingdom.

The relative decline of British power, however, carried with it unfortunate implications for Australia. Clearly the United Kingdom in the future would no longer be able to contribute decisively to Australian security. Britain's resources were already overcommitted in many parts of the world, the liquidation of her Asian interests amounted at best to a partial withdrawal and the trend clearly was in the direction of an increasing involvement in European regional and economic security arrangements.

These developments inevitably involved important changes in the conduct of Australian foreign policy. Heavier policy and defense commitments had to be undertaken in the area of Australia's own regional interests and assistance had to be sought from other powerful quarters. The increased regional initiative in policy-making has been seen in the creation of the South Pacific Commission, large-scale collaboration in economic and educational assistance programs under the Colombo Plan, active assistance in the Korean War, the provision of facilities for rocket experimentation, and the acceptance of onerous obligations for mutual security under the ANZUS and SEATO Agreements.

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Self-reliance and a willingness to accept responsibility are important to national self-respect as well as being invaluable assets in an ally. There are of course shortcomings in the Australian record; for instance, defense expenditure could well have been more productive had there been a clearer definition of objectives. Nevertheless, it has to be recognized that there are rigid limits to Australia's capacity to achieve her own salvation.

A realistic appraisal of the power position in the Pacific left no doubt about the desirability of fostering closer American ties, but this desire for friendly and intimate coöperation was not only the outcome of a hardheaded assessment of power realities. It was based also upon gratitude to the United States for wartime assistance, upon the recognition of United States leadership in the Western alliance, and upon the widely held belief that American and Australian ways of life have much in common. It is a point which Prime Minister Menzies has put in the strongest terms. "And since in a hundred ways the character of life in the United States so closely resembles that in British communities, it would be strange indeed if we, the British people, regarded the citizens of the United States as being in a true sense foreigners. When we turn from the world scene to consider our own position in this corner of the world, it would be hard to find any Australian of this generation who did not recognize that the friendship and coöperation of the United States are vital to our own safety. In effect, our natural friendship and intuitive understanding coincide with our legitimate self-interest."[1]

It has seemed unthinkable to Australians that with so much in common any serious long-term breach could develop between the United Kingdom and the United States. This attitude of mind is important because it puts Australia's relations with both the United States and the United Kingdom in their proper context. It requires emphasis because much of the debate both in Australia and the United Kingdom over the question of Australia's relations with the United States has been couched in misleading terms. The assumption has been that Britain and the United States represented alternative poles of attraction and that if Australia were to develop more intimate relations with the United States it must inevitably drift away from Britain. Evidence for this was drawn from the ANZUS Pact, which seemed to indicate

[1] "Foreign Affairs and Defense." Statement in the House of Representatives, April 20, 1955. *Current Notes on International Affairs*, April 1955, p. 285.

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a willingness to seek American protection even at the cost of British exclusion. It was reinforced by other instances in which the Australian Government appeared to follow American rather than British initiatives, for example the nonrecognition of Communist China and the broad coincidence of American and Australian views in the discussions leading up to the establishment of SEATO.

Misleading conclusions can easily be drawn from these examples. The Australian view of ANZUS in particular was that it was a regional security arrangement contributing in the area of Australia's interest to the common defense of the non-Communist world in exactly the same way as Britain's participation in NATO, from which Australia was excluded, contributed to the strengthening of the security of the democratic world as a whole. ANZUS, rightly interpreted, therefore represented a contribution to what was after all a common enterprise in which both Britain and the United States were mutually engaged. "It is generally acknowledged," said Mr. Casey, "that the hard core of democracy for the future must be found in the closest possible relationship between the British people and the American people. The ANZUS Treaty is only a local manifestation of closer British-American relations."[2] Viewed in this way the maintenance and even the strengthening of traditional ties with the United Kingdom could be reconciled with the development of an intimate relationship with the United States. So long as the interests and policies of the two great English-speaking democracies were in broad harmony the dilemma of an agonizing choice could be avoided.

Reconciliation of views was not so easy, however, when the Australian Government concentrated on the fostering of cordial relations with the newly emancipated states of Asia. The endeavor to foster mutual understanding and contribute to the economic development and military security of the area was formulated by a sense of urgency about the immensity of the problem and the gravity of the threat. Australian diplomatic, trade and information posts have been rapidly expanded, as have broadcasting services to Asia. Missions of every conceivable kind have been encouraged to visit Australia and draw upon Australian experience and expertise. Large numbers of Asian students have been

[2] *Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates* (Canberra: Government Printer), September 17, 1952, p. 1558.

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granted scholarships to study in Australian universities, technical and agricultural colleges as well as in industrial and administrative organizations. The Government has given extensive support to United Nations and Commonwealth schemes to extend economic and technical aid to underdeveloped Asian countries. The Australian contribution, while relatively small and no doubt pitifully inadequate in the face of Asian needs, has nevertheless had its practical and psychological value. Australian prestige has undoubtedly grown, and the increasing flow of Asian students sponsored by Asian governments is testimony to the esteem in which Australia is held and to the opportunities which Australia can provide.

In these undertakings the Australian Government began with a number of assets. Australia was herself a young country which had passed through several stages before achieving self-government and full international status. She was not tainted by previous association with the colonial exploitation of Asia. Moreover, in the eyes of the leaders of the Asian national movements her record was good. Her Government had displayed active sympathy and support for the Indonesian national movement, had expressed open approval of the British decision to grant independence to India, Pakistan and Ceylon, and had given those states a warm welcome as equal partners in a transformed Commonwealth association. Indeed, the Commonwealth link was itself no inconsiderable asset. At the very least, it provided a point of approach and an easier channel of communication. But above all Australia possessed the very great advantage of Western knowledge and organization without at the same time possessing the military and economic power which might represent a threat to the genuine independence of Asian countries.

Nevertheless, Australian efforts to cultivate Asian good will have to some extent been impeded by obstacles which the Australian Government could not easily remove. Nothing has done more to frustrate the basic objectives of Australian policy than the internal divisions and, indeed, quarrels, within the non-Communist Asian world itself. Leaving aside minor disputes over questions associated with migration (between Ceylon and Burma on the one hand and India on the other), essential damage has been done by the Kashmir dispute. Not less important has been the divergence in outlook which is the outcome of a differing historical experience. This has meant that on a series of crucial issues,

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such as Indochina, SEATO, Communist China and the question of Dutch-administered West New Guinea, the Australian Government's judgment has differed essentially from that of her Asian neighbors. Whereas Australia had observed closely the experience of Communist operations in Europe, Asian governments until comparatively recently would seem to have paid little heed to the European record of Soviet expansion and Soviet intransigence. They have tended to look upon developments in Communist China as simply part of a pattern of Asian revolt and Asian national self-expression against Western domination. The Australian view has been that, while there was no conclusive evidence that Chinese policy would prove aggressively expansionist, it was nevertheless desirable to take precautions against such a possibility. India, in particular, with its policy of neutralism, has taken positions diametrically opposed to those of Australia. Finally, there is the question of colonialism which colors Asian judgments on so many issues. This led to the withholding of support from efforts to stem the Communist advance in Indochina and resulted in collective support for the Indonesian claim in West New Guinea, a claim which Australia has resolutely opposed.

Differences of outlook and judgment between Asia and Australia were, of course, to be expected. Disagreements over such questions as West New Guinea do some damage to the Australian desire for more cordial relationships; but they do not prevent Australia from pursuing her general objective.

What is ironic is that American policy towards Asia in the postwar years should have enormously complicated the Australian task of cultivating good relations simultaneously with Asia and the United States. The Australian dilemma could be stated in oversimplified terms by saying that when Australia has been closest to the United States she has been furthest away from Asia. This in many ways is a paradox. The anti-colonial record of the United States and its long-standing sympathy with aspirations for independence had built a tremendous fund of good will for it in almost all areas under colonial rule. This should have been of incalculable value in dealing with Asia. Yet this fund of good will was expended incredibly quickly, due to a series of policy misjudgments, a lack of sensitivity toward Asian attitudes when they diverged from those of the United States, and a failure to appreciate the psychological reactions that were

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bound to occur in Asian countries when faced by enormous American economic and military power. The leaders of recently emancipated countries are sensitive on questions of status and prestige and fearful of anything that might endanger the reality of their independence. Many are afraid that American policies which led to the presence of American troops or American military installations in Asia may indirectly impair their freedom of action. They are no less afraid that American economic power might place them in a position of dependence.

Australians and New Zealanders can understand these Asian reactions even when they do not approve of them. This is in part because of their own experience in dealing with the United States. Indeed, Australians are inclined to wonder whether there is real understanding in the United States either of the legitimate responsibilities of allies or of the requirements imposed upon America by its world leadership. In the Australian view, an ally has a responsibility not only to defend his own legitimate interests but to criticize what it may regard as weaknesses in the allied position. At times there has been a tendency in the United States to assume that the essential function of an ally, or indeed of any country not committed to the Communist camp, is to accept unquestioningly the American outlook and the American political tactic. No doubt the President repudiates such a concept, but it is disconcerting to discover the extent to which influential Americans have made rigid, ideological conformity the test of rectitude. When, for instance, the New Zealand Government indicated that it was having second thoughts about the recognition of Communist China, this was equated with treachery in some American quarters and even the worth of continuing the ANZUS Agreement was called into question. Such an emotional response not only arouses a natural resentment but implies that certain Americans in positions of responsibility allow their judgments to be clouded by prejudice.

Events of the past nine months have provided an important opportunity for the United States to make a fresh start in her relations with Asian peoples, and it should not be lost. If wisely embraced, it could be used to demonstrate that the United States has no ulterior motives in its dealings with Asia, that its objective is essentially that of the maintenance of stability and security. It was therefore all the more unfortunate that Mr. Dulles should have chosen the SEATO meeting at Canberra in

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March as the occasion for an even more determined reaffirmation of United States objections to the recognition of Communist China. Two SEATO members, the United Kingdom and Pakistan, had already granted recognition and were certainly determined not to budge from this position. Opinion in both the United States and Australia seems to be steadily moving in the same direction. It is time that the United States Government reconsidered this question and in doing so divorced the issue from the emotionalism which up till now has surrounded it in America. Recognition does not imply moral approval. The argument which Charles James Fox advanced for the recognition of the French Revolutionary government still holds good: "It was the true policy of every nation to treat with the existing government of every other nation with which it had relative interests, without inquiring or regarding how that government was constituted, or by what means those who exercised it came into power." Few actions would do more to strengthen the American influence with the non-Communist governments of Asia, few actions would do more to assist the Australian policy of close and cordial relations with the Southeast Asia area.

III

The Suez crisis brought out more clearly than ever the inherent difficulties of Australia's triangular foreign policy. In Australia, as elsewhere, the Anglo-French decision to use force precipitated a great debate about both the legitimacy and the wisdom of the action. The Prime Minister as leader of the mission to President Nasser had been intimately involved at an earlier stage. He now came out in strong support of the British Government and carried his own governmental parties with him—though not, there is reason to suppose, without differences of opinion with Mr. Casey, who has long been regarded as the foremost advocate of close American ties, nor without a good deal of disquiet among some at least of the Prime Minister's supporters. Dr. Evatt, as Leader of the Opposition, was insistent that the Anglo-French action was illegal and unwise. His view throughout was that methods of gunboat diplomacy were anachronistic and that the dispute should be dealt with by the United Nations. The metropolitan press was, on the whole, critical of the action; it hoped that some good might come of it but feared that it would injure British prestige, place an intolerable strain upon the Common-

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wealth, damage Anglo-American relations and excite Asian antagonism. When after the British withdrawal it became possible to draw up some kind of a balance sheet, the majority of the Australian newspapers found their fears justified and looked upon the whole episode as a cardinal blunder. Despite consistent support of the British position by the Menzies Administration, it could be said that the Suez incident deeply divided the nation along much the same lines and for much the same reasons as happened in the United Kingdom.

Perhaps the hardest thing for Australians to accept was the failure of the British Government to employ the machinery of consultation or even to inform Australia in advance of its crucial decision to take independent action. This deliberate failure (as also in the case of the United States and Canada) aroused a great deal of animosity and not least because the Australian Prime Minister had been so actively involved in the earlier stages of the dispute. Beyond this, however, it struck at one of the basic assumptions upon which the Commonwealth rested. A British government acting in secret and on its own initiative could hardly expect other members of the Commonwealth who had not been consulted to share in the attendant risks of the policy pursued. Without full and frank consultation, which does not necessarily imply a binding collective decision, the Commonwealth as an organization has little if any meaning.

Despite the early dismay at the British Government's action, and the incessant criticisms by Dr. Evatt (which were directed at least as much against Menzies as against Eden), opinion rapidly firmed up in support of Britain, if not in support of the specific Suez policy. In more moderate degree the same distinction was made by other members of the Commonwealth. It had been considered possible that the Anglo-French action might lead to the disruption of the Commonwealth; it was almost certain that it would breed dissension within it, diminish British prestige and influence, and in view of Australia's formal stand on Britain's side, worsen Australian relations with her Asian neighbors. It was encouraging from the Australian point of view that the leaders of political opinion in India, Pakistan and Ceylon decided against the drastic step of severing their connection with the Commonwealth. It was also of importance that Asian leaders recognized that in expressing their opposition they were echoing the sentiments of large and influential sections of United King-

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dom opinion. The trenchant criticism of the Suez adventure among Britishers themselves had the effect in Asian communities as elsewhere of directing opposition against a particular measure and a particular government rather than against Britain as such. Nevertheless, only those who wish to deceive themselves would argue that no important damage had been done to Asian relations either with Great Britain or with Australia. It will require long, patient and imaginative effort to restore full confidence and close coöperation.

The second and in many ways most significant consequence of Suez was the complete breakdown of Anglo-American unity of purpose. For the first time in the conduct of Australian foreign policy since the war a government was faced with the necessity of making what it must have regarded as the most invidious of choices—a choice between the United Kingdom and the United States. It decided to give open and formal support to the United Kingdom and in doing so stood almost alone both within and without the Commonwealth. That the choice should have been made in favor of the United Kingdom is testimony both to the influence of the Prime Minister and to the strength of the continuing domestic support for close association with Britain. It is understood that while Cabinet solidarity was formally maintained the decision created deep divisions among ministers. On one question, however, there was no dissent. The Prime Minister, the Minister for External Affairs and the Government supporters as a whole held firm to the belief that the interests of the non-Communist world could not be defended without the closest concert of policy between the United States and the Western European democracies. From the outset the press expressed concern that the greatest casualty of all from Suez might well be in Anglo-American relations. Australian alarm had, of course, an even more specific cause. Enmity or a failure to coöperate for common ends would destroy one of the basic propositions upon which Australian foreign policy has rested.

Two other repercussions of the Suez conflict call for brief comment. The first is a discernible change in attitude on the part of the Government and some sections of the press towards the United Nations. This change reflects dissatisfaction with the position which the General Assembly has come to occupy and more especially with the growing divorce between the power to make a decision and responsibility for its execution. The growth

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in solidarity and numerical strength of certain voting blocs, notably the Afro-Asian, is felt to have given such groups an influence quite out of proportion to their real ability to contribute to economic stability, international order and world peace. There is also the belief that the Assembly is being more and more used as an agency for political group agitation and that many critical issues are not being examined impartially on their merits but are being approached from preconceived positions of prejudice and determined by doctrinaire considerations.

The handling of the Middle Eastern situation disclosed further grounds for criticism. A majority within the Assembly seemed more concerned with technical definitions of aggression—who crossed the frontier first?—than with an examination of the underlying causes of tension or with the discovery of a solution to the problems of the area. Again, while few Australians quarrelled with the decision to establish an international police force, many thought it curious that having insisted on an Anglo-French withdrawal the Assembly did not equally insist on laying down the terms and conditions upon which Egypt should admit such a force. So far as the present government is concerned, these misgivings have been reinforced by the Assembly's handling of the Hungarian and West New Guinea issues. Its misgivings are not shared, however, by Dr. Evatt or the Labor Opposition, both of whom continue to insist that the United Nations should occupy a position of utmost prominence in Australian international thinking.

The Suez crisis also emphasized more sharply the divergence in outlook between the parties on questions of foreign policy. It not only made the difference in approach towards the United Nations explicit but, by widening the gap on a specific issue, also led the Labor Party at the Federal Conference at Brisbane in March to emphasize more strongly other aspects of foreign policy about which they disagreed with the Government. The major area of disagreement continued to be Asian policy. The Conference urged recognition of Communist China and her admission to the United Nations, the withdrawal of Australian forces from Malaya, more determined efforts to develop both official and unofficial contacts with all Asian peoples, and a reshaping of SEATO policy. SEATO in particular was subjected to severe attack. "This conference is of the opinion that SEATO has failed to perform its basic functions, that it is fast becoming an instrument

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for bolstering reactionary régimes as in Siam, and that the Liberal-Country Party coalition government has contributed to SEATO's ineffectiveness."[3]

It is of course easy to exaggerate the extent of genuine difference between the Labor and non-Labor parties. Both are in agreement over the New Guinea issue and both subscribe to the importance of close ties with the United States. Nor would the present Government have much difficulty in agreeing with many other sections of the Labor Conference resolutions—"generous assistance to Asian peoples," "the end of colonialism whenever and wherever the people are fit for self-government" and "recognition of the dignity and self-respect of Asian nations and peoples."[4] The points of difference therefore narrow down to the withdrawal of troops from Malaya, recognition of Communist China and the problem of SEATO.

What Labor does in office may of course differ widely from what Labor says in opposition. It is not easy at this point, however, to see much possibility of compromise between the Government and Opposition positions over SEATO and the use of Australian troops in Malaya. The Government is strongly committed to close collaboration with the United States in planning its security arrangements and SEATO forms an integral part of the pattern of both American and Australian security thinking. How the Labor Party would sustain an equally close association with the United States without at the same time an active participation in Asian security arrangements is something which it has so far not explained and about which it will need to do a good deal of hard thinking.

Despite Suez there are many instances of a practical strengthening of Australian-United States coöperation in the Pacific and Asian areas. One might point to the Australian willingness to make the Woomera Range available for American use, the negotiations designed to ensure a closer integration of Australian and American military and civilian air programs, the decision to standardize Australian and American military equipment, the reiteration by Mr. Dulles of the American promise that Australia would never stand alone in the Pacific, and the rationalization of the Australian defense program in order to ensure a larger ground force for any emergency in the Southeast Asian area.

[3] *Sydney Morning Herald,* March 14, 1957.
[4] *Ibid.*

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In assessing the prospects of SEATO and the wisdom of close coöperation with the United States in Asian security arrangements, we must bear in mind that the Asian reaction to both may well have been affected by the Suez and Hungarian issues. Soviet prestige has suffered a severe blow and many people in Asia will undoubtedly be more cautious than before when assessing whether or not Communism may prove aggressive. It is true, of course, that United Kingdom prestige has also heavily declined; but even here much responsible Asian opinion has contrasted favorably the willingness of the United Kingdom to accept United Nations verdicts with the refusal of the Soviet Union to act in accordance with them. What is more important, however, is the fact that American prestige has very greatly increased in Asia because of her action in leading the opposition to the Anglo-French exercise of force and because of her sustained support for the United Nations.

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NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND FOREIGN POLICY. By HENRY A. KISSINGER. New York: Harper (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1957, 455 p. $5.00.

This is a major contribution to a subject of high, indeed the highest, importance. While growing out of the discussions of a study group at the Council on Foreign Relations it is clearly the product of extended analysis and reflection on the part of the author. After defining the problems involved in our survival in the nuclear age Dr. Kissinger examines the relation between technology and strategy and the issues of all-out and limited warfare. Turning to the policy implications of strategy he deals with the utility and difficulties of coalitions and alliances. A somber, urgent, but not pessimistic book, it concludes that the challenge we face is to demonstrate that "democracy is able to find the moral certainty to act without the support of fanaticism and to run risks without a guarantee of success."

REPORT ON THE ATOM. By GORDON DEAN. New York: Knopf, 1957, 359 p. $5.00.

In this second edition of his discussion of the American atomic energy program the former Chairman of the A.E.C. adds a postscript covering developments between 1953 and 1956.

ATOMS AND PEOPLE. By RALPH E. LAPP. New York: Harper, 1956, 304 p. $4.00.

After a somewhat popular review of the advent of nuclear power, Dr. Lapp, a physicist lately become publicist, turns to a number of present and future problems: the control of atomic power, the peaceful use of atomic energy and the possible development of controlled thermonuclear energy.

JOHN FOSTER DULLES: A BIOGRAPHY. By JOHN ROBINSON BEAL. New York: Harper, 1957, 331 p. $4.50.

By necessity this is less a biography of the Secretary of State than a progress report. Mr. Beal, who is in the Washington Bureau of *Time* magazine, heartily approves of Mr. Dulles' record, the policies he has enunciated, his performance as a diplomat and negotiator, and, with some exceptions, his management of the State Department. While the author's interpretation of some of the Administration's more controversial moves must eventually be checked against materials not yet available, he does throw new, if occasionally bizarre, light on several issues, especially those involving "brinkmanship."

TOTALITARIAN DICTATORSHIP AND AUTOCRACY. By CARL J. FRIEDRICH AND ZBIGNIEW K. BRZEZINSKI. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956, 346 p. $5.50.

An effort, as the authors put it, "to delineate, on the basis of fairly generally known and acknowledged factual data, the general model of totalitarian dictatorship

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and of the society which it has created." Six basic features are discerned: an ideology, a single party, a terroristic police, a communications monopoly, a weapons monopoly and a centrally directed economy.

ORIENTAL DESPOTISM: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF TOTAL POWER. By Karl A. Wittfogel. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957, 556 p. $7.50.

In this massive study of the roots of bureaucratic totalitarianism—the author uses the term "hydraulic" to describe those societies in which centralized control and management of irrigation and agriculture led to a static and pervasive despotism —Professor Wittfogel finds that a major danger of Communism resides in its capacity to take over and exploit such traditions of social organization. A stimulating and provocative work, but not light reading.

DIVERSITY OF WORLDS. By Raymond Aron and August Heckscher. New York: Reynal, 1957, 178 p. $3.50.

A discussion by a French and an American political writer of the mutual interests, problems and conflicts of their two countries. The book is based on a conference held at Arden House in the spring of 1956.

THE CHALLENGE OF COEXISTENCE. By Hugh Gaitskell. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957, 114 p. $2.50.

In these Godkin Lectures the leader of the British Labor Party follows three themes: coexistence and the U.N., coexistence in Europe, and the situation of the so-called uncommitted areas.

FEDERALISM AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE. By William S. Livingston. New York: Oxford University Press, 1956, 380 p. $6.75.

A comparative study of the nature and operation of the federal system of government with specific reference to the process by which the constitution may be altered.

THE CENTRAL BLUE: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF SIR JOHN SLESSOR, MARSHAL OF THE RAF. New York: Praeger, 1957, 709 p. $7.50.

Although an autobiography of a Marshal of the R.A.F. and former Chief of Air Staff, this substantial volume amounts to a history of the development of air power from the First World War through the Second. A vigorous writer, Sir John is quite frank in expounding his strategic and other disagreements with various Allied leaders and officers in the course of his career.

THE APPROACH TO SELF-GOVERNMENT. By Sir Ivor Jennings. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1956, 204 p. $3.00.

An authority on constitutional law addresses himself in these talks to a consideration of the question: What constitution shall be given to a new country?

REVOLUTION ON EAST RIVER. By James Avery Joyce. New York: Abelard-Schuman, 1956, 244 p. $3.50.

Strongly convinced that the United Nations is "bigger than the sum of its parts," the author discusses a number of issues within the U.N. and gives his prescriptions for realizing the "Sovereignty of Man."

CASES ON UNITED NATIONS LAW. Edited by Louis B. Sohn. Brooklyn: Foundation Press, 1956, 1048 p.
BASIC DOCUMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS. Edited by Louis B. Sohn. Brooklyn: Foundation Press, 1956, 307 p. $13.50 (both volumes).

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The first of these two volumes is an extensive casebook centering on problems which have arisen in the work of the United Nations: organization, functions and powers, and problems of war, aggression and international crimes. The volume of documents is designed to be used with the casebook.

DAS KRIEGSGEFANGENENRECHT. By Joachim Hinz. Berlin: Vahlen, 1955, 207 p. DM. 11.75.

A survey of the evolution of the legal status of prisoners of war, with particular emphasis on the work of the Geneva Conference of 1949.

NATIONEN IM WERDEN. By F. R. Allemann. Cologne: Verlag für Politik und Wirtschaft, 1955, 365 p. DM. 13.50.

Impressions by a Swiss journalist of travels in Jugoslavia, Greece, Turkey, Iran, Syria and Lebanon in 1951 and 1953.

ICH SAH SIE STÜRZEN. By Wolfgang Bretholz. Munich: Desch, 1955, 502 p. DM. 18.80.

This informed journalist's account of his travels in southeastern Europe and the Near East contains a good many useful sidelights on events in those areas in the cataclysmic years since 1944.

A STUDY OF HISTORY. By Arnold J. Toynbee. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1957, 414 p. $5.00.

As with the first volumes of the "Study of History," so now for the concluding volumes VII–X, Mr. D. C. Somervell provides a tidy abridgment. A boon in a busy age, as Mr. Toynbee puts it.

THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD AFFAIRS, 1956. By Richard P. Stebbins. New York: Harper (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1957, 426 p. $6.00.

The latest of the Council's annual surveys of American foreign relations is timely and comprehensive. It is a balanced account of the development of international affairs in the year of the Bulganin-Khrushchev "peace" offensive, the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, and the subsequent dual crisis in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. Includes a useful chronology.

DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1956. Edited by Paul E. Zinner. New York: Harper (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1957, 552 p. $6.75.

The eighteenth volume of selected documents in the series originated by the World Peace Foundation and now prepared by the Council on Foreign Relations.

General: Economic, Social and Cultural

LES GRANDES PUISSANCES: ÉTUDE ÉCONOMIQUE. TOME II: LE MONDE (EUROPE EXCEPTÉE). By Jean Chardonnet. Paris: Dalloz, 1955, 662 p. Fr. 1800.

This second volume surveying the economies of the major countries (Vol. I dealing with Europe was noted here October 1955) deals with the United States, the Soviet Union, Canada, Australia, South Africa, India, Pakistan, Brazil, Argentina, China and Japan.

DIE GROSSEN ZWISCHENSTAATLICHEN WIRTSCHAFTSORGANISATIONEN. By Roger Auboin and Others. Zurich: Polygraphischer Verlag, 1955, 176 p. Swiss Fr. 19.80.

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A collection of papers on GATT, O.E.E.C., the European Coal and Steel Community, F.A.O. and other international economic organizations.

WIRTSCHAFTSSYSTEME UND INTERNATIONALER HANDEL. By Ernst Heuss. Zurich: Polygraphischer Verlag, 1955, 224 p. Swiss Fr. 21.85.

A comparative and quite technical study of foreign trade relations under a market economy, a monopolistic economy and a Socialist economy.

TEMI DI POLITICA ECONOMICA NAZIONALE ED INTERNAZIONALE. By Giuseppe Tucci. Padua: C.E.D.A.M., 1955, 349 p. L. 3500.

Brief pieces written between 1953 and 1955 on a wide variety of economic topics, domestic, foreign and international.

HISTOIRE DE LA PENSÉE ÉCONOMIQUE AU XXe SIÈCLE. By Émile James. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1955, 2 v. Fr. 2200.

A solid survey of twentieth-century economic thought; the second volume is devoted to the period since the appearance in 1936 of Keynes' "General Theory."

THE FUTURE OF ARID LANDS. Edited by Gilbert F. White. Washington: American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1956, 453 p. $6.75.

A symposium of papers dealing with water supply, the adaptation of plants and animals to arid conditions, and the better utilization of existing resources.

DIE BERGWIRTSCHAFT DER ERDE. By Ferdinand Friedensburg. Stuttgart: Enke, 1956, 562 p. DM. 69.

The fifth and extensively revised edition of a useful reference work on the world's mining and mineral resources, by country.

THE WORLD FERTILIZER ECONOMY. By Mirko Lamer. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957, 715 p. $12.50.

An extensive study, with particular emphasis on the changes brought about in World War II in the forms and uses of commercial fertilizers.

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AND POLITICAL OPINION. By Bruce Lannes Smith and Chitra M. Smith. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956, 325 p. $6.00.

This useful annotated bibliography of some 2,600 items is designed as a continuation of Smith, Lasswell and Casey's "Propaganda, Communication, and Public Opinion," and covers the period between mid-1943 and mid-1955.

LE COMMUNISME ET L'ÉGLISE CATHOLIQUE. By Albert Galter. Paris: Éditions Fleurus, 1956, 445 p. Fr. 840.

This book, published under the auspices of the "Commission pour l'Église Persécutée" of the Conference of International Catholic Organizations, deals with the actions taken against the Catholic Church by the Communist régimes in the U.S.S.R., Eastern Europe, China, Korea and Vietnam.

The Second World War

GRAND STRATEGY. VOLUME VI: OCTOBER 1944–AUGUST 1945. By John Ehrman. London: H.M.S.O., 1956, 422 p. 30/. (New York: British Information Services, $5.60.)

In his second contribution to this important series on grand strategy in the official British history of the Second World War, Mr. Ehrman deals with the period from October 1944 to the end of the war with Japan.

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THE WAR AT SEA, 1939–1945. VOLUME II: THE PERIOD OF BALANCE. By Captain S. W. Roskill. London: H.M.S.O., 1956, 523 p. 42/. (New York: British Information Services, $7.82.)

In Captain Roskill's second volume on the war at sea, part of the official British history of the Second World War, he covers events, in all waters, from the dark months of the beginning of 1942 until the end of May 1943.

DAY OF INFAMY. By Walter Lord. New York: Holt, 1957, 243 p. $3.95.

A detailed and absorbing account, with many personal close-ups, of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.

THE COMBINED FOOD BOARD. By Eric Roll. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1956, 385 p. $7.50.

A study of the work of the important Combined Food Board in World War II. The author was a British member of the Board and knows his subject well.

SOIXANTE JOURS QUI ÉBRANLÈRENT L'OCCIDENT: 10 MAI–10 JUILLET 1940. By Benoist-Méchin. Paris: Michel, 1956, 3 v. Fr. 3600.

An extremely detailed, day-by-day narrative of the two months, from May 10 to July 10, 1940, which witnessed the fall of France. The political views and prejudices of the author, a former official of the Vichy Government, become increasingly evident in the later portions of the book.

VICTORY IN PAPUA. By Samuel Milner. Washington: Department of the Army, Office of Military History, 1957, 409 p. $6.00.

This volume in the official history of the U. S. Army in World War II provides a thorough account of the actions of the 32nd Division in the Papuan campaign of 1942.

GRAF SPEE: THE LIFE AND DEATH OF A RAIDER. By Dudley Pope. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1957, 256 p. $3.95.

Probably the best and most thorough account of the German pocket battleship —its battle with the British cruisers and its scuttling off the River Plate in December 1939.

DEATH OF A NAVY. By Captain Andrieu d'Albas. New York: Devin-Adair, 1957, 362 p. $5.50.

A translation of "Marine Impériale," a short history of the Japanese fleet in World War II.

The United States

THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN COMMUNISM. By Theodore Draper. New York: Viking, 1957, 498 p. $6.75.

This exceptionally interesting and well-written study is the first in a series on Communism in American life, under the general editorship of Clinton Rossiter. After tracing the principal left-wing currents in American history the author describes the founding of the Communist Party in the United States at the end of the First World War and its evolution in the first formative years of the early 1920s. Though the Party changed in many respects in later years, many of its essential characteristics were implicit in its beginnings.

THE SOLDIER AND THE STATE. By Samuel P. Huntington. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957, 534 p. $7.50.

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A quite ambitious, stimulating and often exasperating book which undertakes to present a theory of civil-military relations, with particular application to the United States. The author has little regard for the premises of American liberalism and feels that "the disciplined order of West Point has more to offer than the garish individualism of Main Street."

SOLDIERS AND SCHOLARS. By John W. Masland and Laurence I. Radway. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957, 530 p. $7.50.

As the authors observe, "the traditional distinction between military and civilian affairs in American life has become less significant." The present work is an extensive study of the implications of this fact in the field of military education in recent years.

UNITED STATES IMPORTS AND WORLD TRADE. By Henry G. Aubrey. New York: Oxford University Press, 1957, 169 p. $3.40.

This interesting study makes careful projections of possible United States imports over the next 20 years. A very large increase in raw materials imports emerges, led by oil, and concentrating on products likely to come from the Western Hemisphere. A discussion of the implications for the world's dollar supply and trade patterns suggests the need for Western Europe to make much greater headway in Latin American markets and points to Canada's trade pattern as an especially important problem.

PROBLEMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF ECONOMIC ACCOUNTS. By the Conference on Research in Income and Wealth. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957, 404 p. $8.00.

REGIONAL INCOME. By the Conference on Research in Income and Wealth. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957, 408 p. $8.00.

These are Volumes 20 and 21 of the Studies in Income and Wealth put out under the auspices of the National Bureau of Economic Research. Both comprise papers delivered at conferences, together with the comments of participants. The first is concerned with problems arising out of the growing need for comparable national economic accounts. The second is a discussion of regional income differentials within the United States, and the methods of measuring them.

A CITIZEN LOOKS AT CONGRESS. By Dean Acheson. New York: Harper, 1957, 124 p. $2.50.

The former Secretary of State discusses the Congressional committee system and the problem of legislative-executive relations, and points to some of the weaknesses he sees in our present mode of operation, especially in the field of foreign affairs.

THE GREAT GIVEAWAY. By Eugene W. Castle. Chicago: Regnery, 1957, 186 p. $3.50.

The title gives away the message and approach of the book. Gathering in a wide range of arguments against foreign aid, the author grapples with the league of bureaucrats, bankers, businessmen, and—it sometimes appears—the U.S. Senate, which he finds devoted to the perpetuation and broadening of aid.

FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND TAXATION. By E. R. Barlow and Ira T. Wender. Englewood Cliffs (N.J.): Prentice-Hall, 1955, 481 p. $15.00.

This study of the rôle of United States tax laws in the field of direct corporate foreign investment is part of a more general Harvard Law School research project on the rôle of taxation in private international investment.

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THE ECONOMIC THOUGHT OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE ORIGINS OF THE NEW DEAL. By Daniel R. Fusfeld. New York: Columbia University Press, 1956, 337 p. $5.00.

Opposing the view that F.D.R. was illiterate in economics and operated opportunistically according to the pressures of the moment, the author, an economist, contends that the President was, in fact, relatively well read in the field and had a well-developed economic philosophy which was the basis for his political program.

DIE POLITISCHE TERMINOLOGIE DES PRÄSIDENTEN FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT. By Waldemar Besson. Tübingen: Mohr, 1955, 205 p. DM. 13.80.

An analysis of the content and development of the political rhetoric and terminology—such phrases as "new deal," "forgotten man" and "arsenal of democracy"—of the Roosevelt era.

WOODROW WILSON AND COLONEL HOUSE. By Alexander L. George and Juliette L. George. New York: Day, 1956, 362 p. $6.00.

As the subtitle—"A Personality Study"—indicates, this able and well-written book is primarily an examination of the personal and psychological element in the complex and often enigmatic relationship between Wilson and his close advisor.

HERBERT HOOVER. By Harold Wolfe. New York: Exposition Press, 1956, 507 p. $5.00.

In the view of the author of this biography, it was a misfortune both for President Hoover and for the United States that he ever became directly involved in partisan politics: "Herbert Hoover was at his best in an appointive position rather than as a political leader or a policy-maker."

OPPONENTS OF WAR, 1917–1918. By H. C. Peterson and Gilbert C. Fite. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1957, 399 p. $6.00.

The story, often an unpleasant and violent one, of the American reaction to anti-war individuals and groups—anarchists, I.W.W.s, Socialists, conscientious objectors—in 1917–1918. The book treats the subject primarily as a chapter in the history of human intolerance and bigotry, an approach which does not do full justice to the issue of loyalty and dissent under conditions of twentieth-century war.

Western Europe

ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE. By David Wightman. New York: Praeger (for the Carnegie Endowment), 1957, 288 p. $5.00.

This study—the winner of an award by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace—examines the background, purposes, operation and limitations of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe up to the end of 1954.

LA COUR DE JUSTICE DE LA COMMUNAUTÉ EUROPÉENNE DU CHARBON ET DE L'ACIER. By Louis Delvaux. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit, 1956, 334 p. Fr. 1500.

An analysis of the organization, competence and procedure of the Court of Justice of the European Coal and Steel Community.

ESTUDIOS SOBRE LA UNIDAD ECONÓMICA DE EUROPA. TOMO V: INSTITUCIONES DE LAS ECONOMÍAS NACIONALES DE EUROPA. By L. Víctor Paret and Others. Madrid: Estudios Económicos Españoles y Europeos, 1955, 905 p. Ptas. 500.

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This fifth volume in the series "Unidad Económica de Europa" is chiefly concerned with economic organization and legislation in the countries of Western Europe.

EUROPA SENZA DOGANE. By Giulio Bergmann and Others. Bari: Laterza, 1956, 237 p. L. 1000.

A Milanese committee in which business, academic and research organizations participated gave rise to this book by the late Senator Giulio Bergmann and four Italian economists. The essays deal with some of the key questions concerning a European common market and give special attention to issues of interest to Italy, such as labor, the development of backward areas, and the position of a country that would enter the Customs Union with more handicaps than the others.

EUROPEAN REFUGEES: 1939–52. By Malcolm J. Proudfoot. Evanston (Ill.): Northwestern University Press, 1956, 542 p. $6.50.

A most valuable study of the movement and handling of European refugees—some 60 millions in all—during and after the Second World War. The author, who died in 1955, had served with the Displaced Persons Branch of SHAEF.

EUROPEAN JEWRY TEN YEARS AFTER THE WAR. New York: Institute of Jewish Affairs, 1956, 293 p. $3.00.

This companion volume to "Hitler's Ten Year War on the Jews," published in 1943, deals with the situation of the surviving Jewish communities, on both sides of the Iron Curtain, in the postwar decade.

DIE GENERATION DER ENTSCHEIDUNG. By Heinz Horst Schrey. Munich: Kaiser, 1955, 335 p. DM. 11.80.

A history of church-state relations in Europe since 1918, with particular attention to the vicissitudes of the Christian churches under Nazism and Communism.

AS FRANCE GOES. By David Schoenbrun. New York: Harper, 1957, 341 p. $5.00.

The Paris representative of the Columbia Broadcasting System, Mr. Schoenbrun has seen a great deal of France since 1944. Essentially a work of reportage, his book is both informative and readable.

MÉMOIRES DE GUERRE: L'UNITÉ, 1942–1944. By Charles de Gaulle. Paris: Plon, 1956, 713 p. Fr. 1350.

In this second volume of these important memoirs (Volume I noted here January 1956), General de Gaulle covers the years between 1942 and the liberation of France in 1944. Unity there was, perhaps, but also a great deal of controversy with the British and American Allies about the conduct of the war and the status of France. Extensive documentary annex.

VERS LA MARINE DE L'ÂGE ATOMIQUE. By Vice-Admiral Barjot. Paris: Amiot-Dumont, 1955, 302 p. Fr. 790.

A discussion of French naval requirements in the light of the experience of the Second World War and the advent of atomic weapons.

QUAI D'ORSAY (1945–1951). By Jacques Dumaine. Paris: Julliard, 1955, 590 p. Fr. 1200.

The posthumously published diary of the French *Chef du Protocole* in the postwar years: a great deal of receptions and diplomatic chitchat but not a particularly substantial contribution.

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LE MARÉCHAL PÉTAIN, L'ALSACE ET LA LORRAINE. By Louis Cernay. Paris: Les Iles d'Or, 1955, 177 p. Fr. 480.

Documents relating to the attitude of the Vichy Government with regard to Alsace and Lorraine between 1940 and 1944.

NIVEAU DE VIE ET PROGRÈS TECHNIQUE EN FRANCE (1860–1939). By Paul Combe. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1956, 618 p. Fr. 1995.

An extensive historical and analytical study, strongly influenced by the views of Simiand, tracing the economic and social evolution of France since 1860.

PARLIAMENTARY REFORM IN SWEDEN, 1866–1921. By Douglas V. Verney. New York: Oxford University Press, 1957, 295 p. $7.20.

A scholarly history of the evolution of the Swedish parliament from the former Estates of Nobles, Clergy, Burghers and Farmers to the establishment of a bicameral legislative body based on universal suffrage.

UNRUHE DES NORDENS. By Walther Hubatsch. Göttingen: Musterschmidt, 1956, 243 p. DM. 14.80.

Historical essays on German-Scandinavian relations, especially in the years since 1914.

A WATCHER ON THE RHINE. By Brian Connell. New York: Morrow, 1957, 320 p. $4.00.

In this report on present-day West Germany the author, a British correspondent, finds much that is disturbing. Along with the enormous economic recovery he hears in German voices "a fresh edge of incipient arrogance."

CODETERMINATION: LABOR'S MIDDLE WAY IN GERMANY. By Abraham Shuchman. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1957, 247 p. $4.50.

Co-determination as now practised in Western Germany comprises an important degree of labor participation in the management of the coal and steel industries, and a smaller degree of labor consultation in the affairs of other industries. Several chapters of this book describe the postwar events leading up to these arrangements and the laws on which they are based, though little is said about the practical results of co-determination. Professor Shuchman sees the present arrangements as a particular realization of much broader concepts concerning labor participation in economic affairs as a means of achieving "industrial democracy."

KLERIKALISMUS IN DER DEUTSCHEN POLITIK. By Thomas Ellwein. Munich: Isar Verlag, 1955, 305 p. DM. 9.80.
KRITIKSPIEGEL. Munich: Isar Verlag, 1956, 67 p. DM. 3.
HAT DIE SPD NOCH EINE CHANCE? By A. W. Uhlig. Munich: Isar Verlag, 1956, 301 p. DM. 9.80.

These three volumes are part of a series of studies—"Heisse Eisen"—dealing with contemporary and contentious issues in Germany. Ellwein's book is a rather polemical discussion of clericalism in the Federal Republic, in political life and in education. Some of the responses and criticisms of his study are presented in the companion "Kritikspiegel." Uhlig raises the question whether the German Social Democratic Party can play a constructive rôle in the present domestic and international situation. His answer is a very conditional affirmative.

WIRTSCHAFTSSYSTEME UND PARTEIPROGRAMME DER WICHTIGSTEN PARTEIEN DER BUNDESREPUBLIK. By Hans-Heinrich Zimdahl. Baden-Baden: Lutzeyer, 1955, 154 p. DM. 6.90.

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A handbook on the economic programs of the various political parties in the German Federal Republic.

WÜRDIGUNGEN. By Theodor Heuss. Tübingen: Wunderlich, 1955, 439 p. DM. 16.80.

Speeches, articles and letters by the *Bundespräsident* on a variety of cultural, historical and political topics, in the years 1949–1955.

ADENAUER. By Paul Weymar. New York: Dutton, 1957, 509 p. $5.95.

A competent, informative, authorized biography of the German Federal Chancellor. While the greater part of the book is appropriately devoted to Adenauer's career since 1945 the earlier years provide many valuable insights into the character and political outlook of this outstanding European figure.

THE KERSTEN MEMOIRS, 1940–1945. By Felix Kersten. New York: Macmillan, 1957, 314 p. $5.00.

Dr. Kersten, who treated Himmler with manual therapy during the war years, gives in these extensive extracts from his notebooks a quite intimate picture of that dreaded figure: "something of a Wallenstein, something of a Robespierre."

MEIN BEITRAG. By Rudolf Nadolny. Wiesbaden: Limes, 1955, 188 p. DM. 11.50.

Posthumously edited and published memoirs of a German career diplomat, whose posts included Stockholm, Ankara and Moscow. Of some interest for Nadolny's views on German-Russian relations.

DER RUNDFUNK IM POLITISCHEN KRÄFTESPIEL DER WEIMARER REPUBLIK 1923–1933. By Hans Bausch. Tübingen: Mohr, 1956, 224 p. DM. 14.50.

This study of the organization of German broadcasting is a very interesting contribution to our understanding of political and administrative developments in the field of mass communication during the Weimar Republic.

WELTMACHTSTREBEN UND FLOTTENBAU. By Wilhelm Schüssler and Others. Witten/Ruhr: Luther-Verlag, 1956, 237 p. DM. 16.80.

An interesting symposium of studies re-examining the implications of Germany's *Weltpolitik* and naval construction program in the years before the First World War.

ZEHN JAHRE SOWJETISCHE BESATZUNGSZONE. By Richard Lukas. Mainz-Gonsenheim: Deutscher Fachschriften-Verlag, 1955, 215 p. DM. 8.70.

A rather patchy history of the Soviet Zone of Germany.

STALINISMUS IN DEUTSCHLAND. By Horst Duhnke. Cologne: Verlag für Politik und Wirtschaft, 1955, 375 p. DM. 10.80.

A substantial survey of the political, social and economic history of the Soviet Zone of Germany from 1945 to 1954.

DIE FÜHRUNGSSCHICHTEN IN ÖSTERREICH UND PREUSSEN (1804–1918). By Nikolaus von Preradovich. Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1955, 240 p. DM. 18.

A useful, comparative analysis of the composition of the ruling élite—diplomats, officials, generals, parliamentarians—in Austria and Prussia in the century preceding the First World War. The *bürgerlich* element proves to have been far greater in the former country than the latter.

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DIE DEUTSCH-SCHWEIZERISCHE PRESSE ZU EINIGEN PROBLEMEN DES ZWEITEN WELTKRIEGES. By Ernst-Otto Maetzke. Tübingen: Mohr, 1955, 109 p. DM. 7.80.

A study of the views of the German language press in Switzerland toward a number of wartime problems: postwar planning, unconditional surrender and the German opposition.

I PADRONI DEL VAPORE. By Ernesto Rossi. Bari: Laterza, 1955, 289 p. L. 1600.

A vigorous indictment of the collaboration between the Confederation of Italian Industries and the Fascist régime in the 1920s and 1930s.

BARONI E CONTADINI. By Giovanni Russo. Bari: Laterza, 1955, 223 p. L. 1300.

A study of the agrarian problem and peasant conditions in southern Italy since 1949.

DIARIO PARTIGIANO. By Ada Gobetti Marchesini Prospero. Turin: Einaudi, 1956, 429 p. L. 2000.

The author of this diary of the Italian Resistance was the widow of Piero Gobetti, one of the early victims of Fascism, and was herself active in the formation of the "Partito di Azione."

PAGAN SPAIN. By Richard Wright. New York: Harper, 1957, 241 p. $4.00.

An American Negro novelist's very personal reaction to Spain and Spanish society.

Eastern Europe

THE CHALLENGE OF SOVIET EDUCATION. By George S. Counts. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1957, 330 p. $6.00.

Professor Counts, a student for many years of the subject, here presents a very comprehensive report on Soviet education—its ideological goals, its function in Soviet society, its success in training an élite of specialists and technicians. On the whole the author finds the Soviet performance a formidable one and does not believe that education will undermine the régime.

THE SOVIET SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT. By John N. Hazard. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957, 256 p. $4.00.

This concise survey of the premises, organization and functioning of the Soviet system of government is the first of a new series, the Chicago Library of Comparative Politics, which is designed to promote a comparative study of political institutions.

EMPIRE OF FEAR. By Vladimir and Evdokia Petrov. New York: Praeger, 1957, 351 p. $5.00.

The life story of the husband and wife, members of a Soviet espionage ring, who defected in Australia in 1954. Interesting if opaque in parts.

CURRENT SOVIET POLICIES—II. Edited by Leo Gruliow. New York: Praeger, 1957, 247 p. $6.00.

This sequel to the first volume, a documentary record of the Nineteenth Communist Party Congress of 1952, provides translations of an extensive selection of speeches from the Twentieth Party Congress plus related documents for the following months.

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THE BOLSHEVIKS AND THE NATIONAL AND COLONIAL QUESTION (1917–1928). By Demetrio Boersner. Geneva: Droz, 1957, 285 p. Swiss Fr. 24. (New York: Lounz, $6.50.)

This monograph deals chiefly with the position of the Comintern toward the national-colonial question in the years up to the Sixth Congress.

MARXISMUS LENINISMUS STALINISMUS. By Max G. Lange. Stuttgart: Klett, 1955, 210 p. DM. 12.80.

A critical review of dialectical materialism, with considerable emphasis on Marx's thought before 1848.

RESOURCES AND PLANNING IN EASTERN EUROPE. Edited by Norman J. G. Pounds and Nicolas Spulber. Bloomington: Indiana University Publications, 1957, 173 p. $2.50.

These proceedings of a conference held at Indiana University in 1956 include useful papers on agricultural and mineral resources, planning and development and economic relations with the U.S.S.R.

COMMUNISM ON THE DECLINE. By George C. Guins. New York: Philosophical Library, 1956, 287 p. $7.50.

In his preface the author remarks, "The numerous facts collected in the present work allow us to believe that Communism has already reached a stage characterized by symptoms of a progressive decay." Certainly a good deal of evidence of inefficiency and ineptness is presented, though it is difficult to be sure what it all adds up to.

LA COSTRUZIONE ECONOMICA SOVIETICA. By Giorgio Roletto. Milan: Giuffrè, 1955, 294 p. L. 2000.

LA JUGOSLAVIA ECONOMICA. By Giorgio Roletto. Milan: Giuffrè, 1956, 419 p. L. 2000.

In these two studies the Director of the Istituto di Geografia Economica of the University of Trieste briefly surveys the resources, agriculture, industries and economic development of the U.S.S.R. and Jugoslavia respectively.

STATTI, LYSTY, DOKUMENTY. By Symon Petliura. New York: Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1956, 479 p. $7.00.

Selected articles, letters, proclamations, etc., of the Ukrainian leader over the years 1902–1926.

ORTSUMBENENNUNGEN UND -NEUGRÜNDUNGEN IM EUROPÄISCHEN TEIL DER SOWJETUNION. By Wolfgang Meckelein. Berlin: Duncker, 1955, 134 p. DM. 16.80.

A useful guide to changed, and new, place names in the European portion of the Soviet Union.

RUSSIA 1942–1953. By Giovanni Brevi. Milan: Garzanti, 1955, 236 p. L. 1200.

An Italian army chaplain's ten years in Soviet prisoner-of-war and labor camps.

NIGHTMARE OF THE INNOCENTS. By Otto Larsen. New York: Philosophical Library, 1957, 240 p. $6.00. (London: Melrose, 1955, 15/.)

A Norwegian's account of his years in a Soviet labor camp.

POLIITTISET MUISTELMANI II. By Carl Enckell. Helsinki: Söderström, 1956, 262 p. M. 1500.

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The second volume of important diplomatic memoirs, shedding new light on the Åland Islands controversy, Finnish-Russian relations of the 1920s, etc.

DIE SOWJETUNION, DIE BALTISCHEN STAATEN UND DAS VÖLKERRECHT. By Boris Meissner. Cologne: Verlag für Politik und Wirtschaft, 1956, 377 p. DM. 25.

A richly documented study dealing with the problem of the Baltic States during and after World War II, particularly as reflected in the negotiations and attitude of the great Powers. It is the author's view that the annexation of the Baltic States by the Soviet Union was contrary to all norms of international law. He argues that by restoring independence to the Baltic States and by including them in a neutralized East European zone, the Soviet Union would prove its willingness to lessen the cold-war tensions and thus regain the confidence of the West.

OSTPREUSSEN UNTER POLNISCHER UND SOWJETISCHER VERWALTUNG. By Rudolf Neumann. Frankfurt/Main: Metzner, 1955, 112 p. DM. 7.80.

This brief survey of East Prussia since 1945 is almost entirely devoted to the Polish zone.

NAJNOWSZA HISTORIA POLITYCZNA POLSKI. By Wladyslaw Pobóg-Malinowski. London: The Author, 1956, 665 p.

A history of Poland between the two world wars (this being the second volume of a three-volume work covering the years 1864–1945). Though an admirer of Pilsudski, the author does strive for objectivity in passing judgment on the political excesses of that period. Based on archival and unpublished sources, as well as on interviews with surviving public figures.

W IMIENIU KREMLA. By Stefan Korboński. Paris: Instytut Literacki, 1956, 375 p.

This volume is the continuation of the author's wartime memoirs (the first volume has been translated into English as "Fighting Warsaw," New York: Macmillan, 1957, and was noted here April 1957) and covers the period from the establishment of the Lublin government to the author's flight abroad in late 1947. Interesting insights into the attitudes of those Peasant Party members who, unlike Mikolajczyk, spent the war years in Poland and as a result did not have much confidence in his efforts at dealing with the Communists.

DIEU CONTRE DIEU? By Claude Naurois. Fribourg: Éditions Saint Paul, 1956, 297 p. Swiss Fr. 9.60.

An extensive study of Pax, a pro-government Catholic group in Poland which tried to adapt Catholicism to Communism. Provides some useful documentation.

IN SILENCE I SPEAK. By George N. Shuster. New York: Farrar, Straus, 1956, 296 p. $4.50.

An account by the President of Hunter College of the ordeals of the Catholic and other churches in Hungary under the Rákosi régime.

THE BRIDGE AT ANDAU. By James A. Michener. New York: Random House, 1957, 270 p. $3.50.

An account of the Hungarian revolution as told to Mr. Michener by a number of participants. Of more interest for its impressions and atmosphere than for a reconstruction of the revolution and its background.

NO MORE COMRADES. By Andor Heller. Chicago: Regnery, 1957, 175 p. $3.50.

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A Hungarian news photographer's account of events in Budapest between October 23 and October 31, 1956.

THE IRON GATE OF ILLYRIA. By Torgny Sommelius. New York: Roy, 1955, 205 p. $4.00.

A Swedish writer's account of his travels in Jugoslavia: impressionistic but effectively so.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

HOME AND ABROAD. By Lord Strang. London: Deutsch, 1956, 320 p. 21/.

Lord Strang, formerly Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, offers in these reflective memoirs first "a rapid conspectus of my period of service" and then a series of essays treating "some of the more important of the international negotiations and diplomatic situations in which I have been personally concerned." These include the Moscow trial of British engineers, the Munich crisis, the Moscow negotiations of 1939, and the work of the European Advisory Commission.

"COMMONWEALTH D'ABORD." By Yves G. Brissonnière. Paris: Domat-Montchrestien, 1955, 371 p. Fr. 920.

An analysis of the presumed incompatibility between Great Britain's Commonwealth connections and its participation in a European community.

THE POST-WAR CONDITION OF BRITAIN. By G. D. H. Cole. New York: Praeger, 1957, 483 p. $6.75.

In 1937 Professor Cole wrote "The Condition of Britain." The present work, in a sense, is a sequel to the first, and indicates the marked economic and social changes of the last two decades. On the whole, and despite the international dangers, the general position seems much more optimistic today.

FABIAN INTERNATIONAL ESSAYS. Edited by T. E. M. McKitterick and Kenneth Younger. New York: Praeger, 1957, 219 p. $3.75.

These essays on contemporary foreign and military affairs are of very considerable interest not only because of the high quality of a number of the contributions but also for the insight they give into the present temper and perspective of important elements in the British Labor movement.

LAWS AND FLAWS: LAPSES OF THE LEGISLATORS. By Edward F. Iwi. London: Odhams, 1956, 224 p. 21/. (Fair Lawn, N.J.: Essential Books, 1957, $3.40.)

Whether it be legal to send the Crown out of the United Kingdom, whose power is symbolized by the mace that lies on the table of the House of Commons, whether the Cloth of Estate was burned up in 1834 or remains in the form of a wooden canopy, are only some of the fascinating issues that engage the attention of Mr. Iwi. His interesting essays are not limited, however, to curiosities, but deal also with such questions as delegated legislation, the reform of the House of Lords, administration of the judiciary, some issues of parliamentary procedure, and the case for new organs to reflect the new state of the Commonwealth.

DIE VERSTAATLICHUNG DES BRITISCHEN KOHLENBERGBAUS. By A. Otto Müller. Zurich: Polygraphischer Verlag, 1955, 165 p. Swiss Fr. 10.40.

A monograph on the nationalization of the British coal industry—its purposes, organization and effects.

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CANADA AND THE UNITED NATIONS. By F. H. Soward and Edgar McInnis, with the assistance of Walter O'Hearn. New York: Manhattan Publishing Co. (for the Canadian Institute of International Affairs and the Carnegie Endowment), 1956, 285 p. $3.00.

This examination of Canadian attitudes and policies toward the U.N. is one of a series of such studies initiated by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Prepared under auspices of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs.

WHO'S WHO IN NEW ZEALAND. Edited by Frank A. Simpson. Wellington (N.Z.): Reed, 1956, 236 p. (New York: Heinman, $8.50.)

The sixth and completely revised edition of this reference book.

The Middle East

EGYPT'S ROLE IN WORLD AFFAIRS. By Emil Lengyel. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1957, 147 p. $2.50.

A rather hasty survey centering on events in Egypt between Farouk's abdication and the end of 1956.

BUREAUCRACY AND SOCIETY IN MODERN EGYPT. By Morroe Berger. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957, 231 p. $4.75.

In states undergoing rapid modernization the bureaucracy plays a highly important rôle in shaping the new society. In this interesting study of the Egyptian civil service as a social group, the author, a sociologist at Princeton, makes use not only of historical and documentary analysis but also of an extensive questionnaire survey of several hundred officials.

DER STREIT UM DEN SUEZKANAL. By Dietrich Rauschning. Hamburg: Forschungsstelle für Völkerrecht und Ausländisches Öffentliches Recht, 1956, 187 p. DM. 10.

A statistical collection of documents providing the historical and legal background of the Suez crisis.

EUROPA MINOR. By Lord Kinross. New York: Morrow, 1956, 167 p. $4.00.

A pleasant account of journeys along coastal Turkey from Antioch to Adrianople.

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A survey of the Syrian economy and its future prospects.

South and Southeast Asia

CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTH AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA. By S. A. Abbas. Groningen: Wolters, 1956, 151 p. (New York: Lounz, $4.00.)

An analysis, with some discussion of the problem of economic growth, and a good deal of statistical material.

CHRISTIANITY AND THE ASIAN REVOLUTION. Edited by Rajah B. Manikam. New York: Friendship Press, 1955, 293 p. $2.50.

A good and open-minded survey of the religious background of the enormous twentieth century political and social upheaval in East Asia.

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A collection of 12 speeches, by a leading Indian diplomat and writer, on a variety of political, social and cultural topics.

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A study of the "reciprocal repercussions of economic and demographic factors" in India. Also published as a dissertation under the title "Ressources et Population de l'Inde sous l'Angle de la Planification" (Geneva, 1955).

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An extensive analysis, by states, of independent India's first general election.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS IN PAKISTAN. By Sir Ivor Jennings. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1957, 378 p. $7.50.

The proceedings of four legal cases before the Federal Court of Pakistan following the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly in October 1954. As Sir Ivor Jennings' long introduction makes clear, those cases are of considerable interest for a wide range of constitutional and Commonwealth problems.

GUERRILLA COMMUNISM IN MALAYA. By Lucian W. Pye. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956, 369 p. $6.00.

An excellent study, based in part on extensive interviews with former Malayan Communist Party members, of the nature, organization and appeals of "People's Liberation" Communism—an exceptionally dynamic and impetuous manifestation of the movement, finding its attraction in the less industrial areas of the world. As the author says, "It is possible to distinguish different types of Communist Parties without denying in the slightest the monolithic ambitions of Communism as a whole."

The Far East and Pacific Ocean

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A volume of historical, geographical, economic and social studies—the first of a projected annual series—prepared in the Research Seminar on Problems of Contemporary China at the University of Hong Kong.

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A first-hand account, by a British radio operator working for the Tibetan Government, of the Chinese Communist invasion of that country and of his subsequent imprisonments and interrogations.

PORK CHOP HILL. By S. L. A. Marshall. New York: Morrow, 1956, 315 p. $5.00.

An able and vivid close-up, by an experienced military historian and reporter, of fighting at the platoon level in the last phases of the Korean War.

Africa

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An informal and interesting self-portrait by the new state's Prime Minister, who has been aptly called a "gay Gandhi."

BOURGUIBA ET LA NAISSANCE D'UNE NATION. By Félix Garas. Paris: Julliard, 1956, 286 p. Fr. 690.

A sympathetic history of the independence movement in Tunisia.

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This sixth volume in the series "Pays Africains" is a brief historical, economic, political and cultural survey, prepared by two natives of Dahomey.

THE ANATOMY OF SOUTH AFRICAN MISERY. By C. W. De Kiewiet. New York: Oxford University Press, 1957, 88 p. $1.75.

Born in the Netherlands, raised in South Africa, educated there and in British and Continental universities, a teacher and writer of history in American universities who has specialized in the study of the British Empire, Dr. De Kiewiet, now President of the University of Rochester, is exceptionally well placed to analyze the critical developments in South Africa. This he does with penetration and style, exposing the "delusion of *apartheid*" but going beyond to elucidate the issues of nationalism and racialism in that troubled society. These are the first Whidden Lectures at McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario.

SOUTH AFRICA WITHOUT PREJUDICE. By H. Maclear Bate. London: Laurie, 1956, 206 p. 18/.

The author, who was commissioned by his publishers to visit South Africa in 1955, finds much to commend in Strydom's policies, and feels that *apartheid* is the only workable solution.

Latin America and the West Indies

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A solid treatise on the organization and operation of the Mexican Government.

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An able and intensive demographic analysis. The author is Vital Statistics Officer in the Development and Welfare Organization, British West Indies.

GARDE D'HAITI. Compiled by James H. McCrocklin. Annapolis: U. S. Naval Institute, 1957, 262 p. $4.50.

An authoritative account of U. S. Marine Corps activity in Haiti from 1915 to 1934. It is the author's conclusion that "If intervention was or is ever justified, then the United States' action in Haiti was justified."

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SOURCE MATERIAL

By Ruth Savord

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